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SUMMARY 
 
This study postulates the existence of a notion of transcendence in immanence in 
the thought of Jacques Derrida.  The deconstruction of, amongst others, Husserlian 
phenomenology and Saussurean structuralism, affords Derrida the opportunity of 
presenting a thought of contamination, haunting and impurity, which is a thought of 
transcendence in immanence.  The hypothesis of a notion of transcendence in 
immanence in Derrida’s thought is refined by specifying it as temporal 
transcendence in immanence.  Accordingly, the intimation of transcendence in 
immanence does not amount to the ontological acceptance of a separate 
transcendent realm.  On the contrary, what appears is a monism: the infinite finitude 
of temporality. 
 
In conversation with the notion of temporal transcendence in immanence intimated in 
Derrida’s thought, this study proposes a notion of theological transcendence in 
immanence.  Theological transcendence in immanence is presented as an inflected 
interpretive performance of salient themes from the tradition of Christian theology 
prior to the advent of modernity.  From this perspective, all being is referred to God 
and finite creation is deemed to be a contingent, non-necessary participation, at an 
unquantifiable analogical remove, in the life and being of God.  The notions of space, 
time and meaning that emerge from such a premise are subsequently explored, and 
brought into conversation with the corresponding notions in Derrida’s work. 
 
The study concludes by asking whether the conversation between the notions of 
temporal and theological transcendence in immanence can in any way be furthered, 
or whether the two positions should rather be regarded as irreconcilable, that is, as 
lying separatively transcendent to each other.  In response, it is suggested that the 
notion of transcendence in immanence implies the attempt to relate juxtaposed 
positions after the fashion of transcendence in immanence.  The possibility of 
temporal transcendence in immanence inhabiting theological transcendence in 
immanence after the fashion of transcendence in immanence is firstly considered 
and rejected.  Thereupon, the reverse option, namely that of theological 
transcendence in immanence making use of temporal transcendence in immanence, 
iii 
 
while at the same time transcending it, is considered and judged to be a suitable 
provisional outcome of the conversation with Derrida. 
 
KEY TERMS 
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Chapter 1 Transcendence in immanence 
 
 
1.1 The meaning of space and time 
 
What is the meaning of space and time?  The mind reels and slips when faced with 
such a question.  Where is one to start in preparing some kind of responsible 
answer?  To start answering will always be to have started already.  A vast amount 
of assumptions will underlie any attempt to answer this simple question, and as 
many of them as possible will have to be addressed in as rigorous a fashion as 
possible.  However, one has to start somewhere.  It should be noted, in terms of 
starting somewhere, that the genitive construction in the question regarding the 
meaning of space and time may be understood subjectively, as well as objectively.  
On the one hand, how do the notions of space and time facilitate or contribute to the 
emergence of meaning? In other words, what is the space of meaning, what is the 
time of meaning?  On the other hand, simply put, what does “space” mean and what 
does “time” mean?  Subsequently, are the subjective and objective interpretations of 
the question mutually exclusive or do they rather contribute towards the 
interpretation of each other?  Closely related and perhaps influencing the different 
ways of interpreting the question regarding the meaning of space and time is the 
issue of situating the question somewhere within the vast spectrum of intellectual 
discourse.  From the perspective of a modern, natural scientific orientation, it may, 
for instance, be more - well, natural - to assume that by “space”, one is indicating 
extension - length, breadth and height - and by “time”, duration.1  Such a discourse 
may furthermore typically consider measurability to be an important epistemic value.  
Alternatively, situating the question regarding the meaning of space and time in the 
field of linguistics and semiology brings a different range of issues to the fore. Are 
spatial and chronological references, for instance, to be viewed as metaphorical in 
one way or another?  This, of course, immediately raises the question of metaphor 
and the relationship of metaphor to meaning.  A moment’s reflection makes it clear 
                                            
1
 Contemporary theoretical physics acknowledges that a rigid attachment to a naïve realist conception 
of space and time on the one hand, and a notion of meaning as the subjective addition of human 
consciousness, may not be very fruitful.  Cf. eg. David Deutsch, The Fabric of Reality (London: 
Penguin, 1997), esp. ch. 5.  Roger Penrose, The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of 
the Universe (London: Vintage, 2007). 
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that to ask whether space and time are (mere) metaphors may be too facile a 
formulation.  Which would, after all, be the more basic category?  The etymology of 
the word “metaphor” seemingly already assumes the notions of space and time.  
This consideration may be radicalised when it is realized that the intimation of 
meaning in itself assumes some kind of notion of space and time.  Meaning, after all, 
emerges where something is brought into - or understood to be in - a relation to 
something else, and this probably necessarily involves spatial and chronological 
assumptions.  This insight was of course elucidated with great rigour from a certain 
perspective by Immanuel Kant in the First Critique.2  Furthermore, to say that 
something is brought into relation with something else may be a rudimentary 
explanation of the operation of signs, thereby drawing semiological considerations 
into the discussion on the meaning of space and time. 
 
By engaging the hugely influential figure of Jacques Derrida as interlocutor, the 
discussion on the meaning of space and time is ipso facto situated in a certain 
context, thereby foregoing other points of entry into an enquiry regarding space and 
time and meaning.  As will have to be substantiated later, Derrida’s work gathers 
together, amongst others, voices from the German transcendental tradition (Kant, 
Husserl and Heidegger, for example) and the French post-structural tradition, while 
at the same time problematising the notions of gathering and handing down as 
such.3  The first objective of this study will be to read the writings of Derrida with 
special attention to the way in which the notions of space and time are used to 
explain the basic tenets of his thought.  How, in other words, are spatial and 
chronological concepts used to convey Derrida’s intention?  On the other hand, and 
inseparable from this, is an investigation which attempts to determine what profile 
the notions of space and time receive from Derrida’s reflections on meaning and 
meaninglessness (what, from Derrida’s viewpoint, is space, and what is time?) 
 
At least in its Husserlian guise, the phenomenological method aims at isolating the 
meaning of an object as it appears in the consciousness of transcendental 
                                            
2
 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (London: Macmillan, 1964), A26, B42; A30, B46. 
3
 In what amounts to an auto-genealogy of sorts, Derrida once described differance as “the juncture of 
… the difference of forces in Nietzsche, Saussure’s principle of semiological difference, differing as 
the possibility of facilitation, impression and delayed effect in Freud, difference as the irreducibility of 
the trace of the other in Levinas, and the ontic-ontological difference in Heidegger.” (Jacques Derrida, 
Speech and Phenomena (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 130.) 
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subjectivity.  By attempting, in this study, a conversation with Jacques Derrida on the 
meaning of space and time, an intellectual journey different from the strictly 
phenomenological is undertaken.  More than simply asking about the apparent 
meaning of Derridean space and time, “space”, “time” and “meaning” themselves 
become the context for the appearance of Derrida’s thoughts, as well as a theoretical 
perspective that presents itself as an alternative to that of Derrida.  This, in a curious 
way, accords with Derrida’s own attitude towards the phenomenological method.  He 
proposes the opposite of the Husserlian epochē: an epochē precisely of the epoch of 
meaning - a putting between brackets that suspends the epoch of meaning.  Once 
fixated meaning is bracketed out, the sliding, indifferent process of writing - as 
understood by Derrida – emerges.4  That something – the impossibility of 
phenomenological certainty – emerges or appears is indicative of Derrida’s relation 
to the phenomenological tradition: the deconstruction of phenomenology in a curious 
way remains a kind of phenomenology, in that it is interested in what appears 
(and/or, precisely, does not appear).   
 
Derridean “writing” interprets space and time, while at the same time being 
interpreted in terms of space and time.  The question of the meaning of space and 
time thus has the possibility of becoming a stage, as it were, for the conversation 
between Derrida and the presuppositions underlying the theoretical approach of this 
study.  What appears on this stage, from the perspective of the present research, is 
an attentive listening to, and in many ways deep concurrence, but eventual 
respectful parting of ways with, Derrida in terms of the meaning of space and time. 
 
 
1.2 A hypothesis: different interpretations of transcendence in immanence 
 
Human experience is an experience of finitude and change.  However, it is also an 
experience of relationality and often of order.  Intimately associated with these 
experiences of finitude and change, as well as relationality and order, are notions of 
spatiality and temporality.  The hypothesis guiding the conversation with Derrida in 
this study about the meaning of space and time is that within the conversation about 
                                            
4
 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (London: Routledge, 1978), p. 339. 
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experiences of change and also of relative stability – experiences that go hand in 
hand with the experience of finitude - there appears to be a shared notion of 
transcendence in immanence.   
 
If immanence, or the immanent, is regarded as that realm of finite reality that is 
accessible to human experience up to the point of being able to be grasped in 
human consciousness, then transcendence, or the transcendent, could be 
understood as the experience of a mysterious “more” inhabiting the immanent and 
postponing an exhaustive, final understanding of an experienced situation. 
Immanence is the finite reality that is experienced by humans.  Transcendence, 
precisely because it transcends experience, is not experienced directly.  And yet 
there is in the experience of finite reality an experience of a “more”, an openness, an 
incompleteness that invites a kind of dynamism and restlessness.  Moving from a 
description of experience to a reflection on experience in the context of knowledge 
formation, one could say that transcendence in immanence has to do with a mystical 
element present in all rational, conceptual knowledge.   
 
Alternatively, one could talk about the presence of the sublime within the 
appreciation of the beautiful.  If the beautiful has to do with form, harmony and 
aesthetic pleasure, the sublime refers to those liminal experiences where the 
categories used to describe our perceptions fall short.  These are the experiences of 
awe, amazement and wonder.  A fundamental question in this regard is whether the 
beautiful and sublime are to be radically separated or, in line with the notion of 
transcendence in immanence, have to be somehow considered together.5   
 
Transcendence in immanence thus has to do with a “double vision” which intimates a 
“more” or “beyond” precisely in the intimation of liminality and finitude, and without 
necessarily being able to determine the border between these “regions” in any 
absolute way.  Our closed reality is never closed – it always confronts us with 
                                            
5
 Within the context of discussing the possibility of reciprocity between subject and subject and 
between subject and object, John Milbank provides an insightful overview of the development leading 
from a view of the sublime somehow inhabiting the beautiful and expressing the “more” within the 
beautiful to a radical separation of the beautiful and the sublime in the aesthetics of Immanuel Kant 
and his intellectual successors.  John Milbank, “The Soul of Reciprocity: Part One, Reciprocity 
Refused”, Modern Theology, 17:3, July 2001, p. 344 ff. 
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openness and unpredictability.6  The question now becomes one of whether or not it 
would be legitimate to extrapolate from our experience of transcendence in 
immanence to postulations regarding the composition of reality as such.  Can one, in 
other words, speak of a relationship between “transcendence” and “immanence”, 
thereby implying that transcendence is somehow a separate reality apart from 
immanent finitude?  Is it warranted to postulate some kind of duality in the real?  
Would it not be much more responsible of thought to remain with the immanent and 
try to accommodate our experience of a “more” in some other way?  Should we, in 
other words, ontologically speaking, remain with some kind of monism? 
 
Casting about for historical precedents of speculations regarding the ontological 
status of transcendence, one finds many examples.  To start with the obvious, a 
clear distinction between transcendence and immanence and, concomitantly, the 
presupposition of an ontological duality, is a salient feature of Plato’s thought.  The 
founder of the Academy postulated a realm of eternal, ideal forms separate from the 
material world, which is subject to change and uncertainty.  This ideal world 
transcends the immanent world of sense experience and everyday consciousness.  
The realm of the transcendent is not, however, hermetically sealed off from that of 
the immanent, as the inhabitants of the material world participate in the forms of the 
eternal ideas, and are deemed to be good, true and beautiful, precisely to the extent 
that they participate in the transcendent ideas.   
 
Plato’s student, Aristotle, criticised the postulations of his erstwhile tutor in important 
ways, two of which are relevant to the purposes of the present discussion.  In the 
first place, there is Aristotle’s rejection of a separate transcendent realm, which in a 
sense duplicates the material world.7  Eric Voegelin suggests that Aristotle’s 
philosophical approach must be regarded as a shift of attention to the immanent 
world of nature, rather than as a radical break with Plato, seeing that neither of them 
developed watertight systems.8  In the second place the Aristotelian notion of kinesis 
is pertinent to the current discussion.  The use of the term kinesis derives from 
                                            
6
 Du Toit, C.W., 2009, ‘Towards a new natural theology based on horizontal transcendence’, HTS 
Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 65(1), Art. #186, p. 1. DOI: 10.4102/hts.v65i1.186. 
7
 See for instance Aristotle’s discussion of the Platonic Forms in the Metaphysics, Book Alpha and 
Book Mu, 990b - 993a and 1079b - 1080a (trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin, 2004), 
pp. 33-38 and pp. 405, 406. 
8
 Eric Voegelin, Order and History: Plato and Aristotle (Missouri: University Press, 1999) p. 328. 
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Aristotle’s appreciation for the dynamics of concrete existence.  Aristotle was, in 
other words, deeply under the impression of the continuous process of change 
happening in nature, a process he explained in terms of a movement from 
potentiality to actuality.9  Now, according to a certain line of interpretation, the 
Aristotelian notion of kinesis would be more faithful to the radicality of change and 
fluctuation in nature than would the Platonic notion of recollection, which tries to link 
the experience of changeable finitude back to transcendent and fixed ideas.10 
 
The different approaches exemplified by Plato and Aristotle continued to be 
elaborated in the Christian era and were institutionalised in various traditions of 
thought.11  On the one hand, Christian intellectuals, reflecting on their faith, found in 
Platonic and neo-Platonic speculation about the transcendent a connection with 
Greek thought.  Thus, Christian theology very naturally came to correlate 
transcendence with God and immanence with creation, and recognised them as 
ontologically distinct (though not necessarily separate.)  The categories and logical 
organon bequeathed by Aristotle, however, also definitively shaped Western thought.  
Upon the re-introduction into the Christian West of many of Aristotle’s works that 
were lost for a millennium, there was a lot of contention regarding the acceptability of 
the main tenets of Aristotle’s philosophy.  Throughout the thirteenth century and 
thereafter, theologians struggled with the challenge posed by Aristotle’s perceived 
“naturalism”, manifested, for instance, in teachings about the eternity of the world, 
the mortality of the soul and the primacy of sense knowledge in human cognition.12  
There were, however, also influential attempts at incorporating Aristotelian 
                                            
9
 Aristotle, Physics, II.1.192b and V.1.225.  In the latter passage Aristotle mentions that there are 
three kinds of motion – qualitative, quantitative and local.  Aristotle, Physics, trans. R.P. Hardie and 
R.K. Gaye.  In: Barnes, J (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume one (Princeton, N.J.: The 
Princeton University Press, 1984). 
10
 For this line of argument, see John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics – Repetition, Deconstruction 
and the Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 16. 
11
 For an interesting discussion, within the context of the notion of time, on how Plotinus in turn 
criticized Aristotle in important ways, while effecting a synthesis of Plato and Aristotle that yet 
constitutes an individual position in its own right, see Eric Alliez, Capital Times (Minneapolis: 
University Press, 1996), chapter two: “The Time of Audacity: Plotinus.”  For a discussion of the 
development of the neo-platonic tradition in Saint Augustine, see the same book, chapter three.  The 
interaction between the Platonic and Aristotelian heritage will be addressed again in chapters four and 
five of this study. 
12
 Williston Walker, A History of the Christian Church, 4th ed. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark Ltd., 1985), p. 
334. 
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philosophy into a broader theological and platonic framework, the latter approach 
possibly of necessity leading to a theorising of transcendence in immanence.13 
 
The attempts at synthesising Plato and Aristotle, thereby somehow thinking in terms 
of transcendence in immanence, were paralleled and later supplanted in influence by 
approaches that cast theology and philosophy in oppositional roles.  Gradually, 
philosophy came to be regarded as a discipline separate from theology, and in many 
respects critical thereof.  The emphasis on experimentation in the work of Roger 
Bacon, while not in itself necessarily implying all that followed, may be viewed as an 
early example of such an approach.  From being the handmaiden of theology, 
philosophy was transformed into natural philosophy and, in many respects, 
associated itself with the methodology and rationality exemplified by the nascent 
natural sciences.14  These developments go hand in hand with a radical separation 
of transcendence and immanence in the period of early modernity.  While early 
modernity still by and large accepted an ontological transcendent, or “God”, it 
nevertheless gradually carved out an autonomous “secular” sphere governed by its 
own natural laws and accessible to a human rationality independent of any reference 
to such a transcendent.  While theology in the West always assumed some notion of 
revelation associated with a transcendent God who initiates the relationship with 
creation, the radical separation of transcendence and immanence in modern thought 
led to revelation being regarded more in supernatural terms as something arriving 
entirely from “outside.”  In some circles, revealed Scripture was seen as the only 
proper object of theological reflection.  Philosophy and the natural sciences, on the 
other hand, assumed a freedom to reflect on a pure immanent nature along the lines 
of a purely immanent rationality.15   
 
It would seem then that the question regarding the ontological status of 
transcendence could be seen as a debate between a theology that naturally regards 
transcendence as a separate ontological reality and a philosophy that only 
recognises an immanent reality.  The situation is, however, not that simple.  In an 
increasingly pluralistic society, there are theological approaches today that range 
                                            
13
 In chapters four and five of this study it will be argued that such a theorizing of transcendence in 
immanence finds an exemplary expression in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. 
14
 Simon Oliver, Philosophy, God and Motion (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 75ff, 156ff. 
15
 Cf. John Milbank, Theology & Social Theory, 2nd ed, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), esp. parts 1 and 2. 
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from acceptance of an ontological duality and even a radical separation of 
transcendence and immanence, on the one hand, to a total rejection of ontological 
transcendence, thereby opting for some kind of ontological monism, on the other 
hand, and many positions in between.16  Philosophy, on the other hand, if it insists 
on positing only an immanent sphere, must still explain our human experience of 
“more” and of mystery in some way or another.  This usually takes place along the 
lines of some biological reductionism, whereby the experience of transcendence is 
explained as being some kind of epiphenomenon of consciousness.17  It would seem 
then that while the question of the ontological status of transcendence has, in the 
past, perhaps been cast as a debate between theology and philosophy, it is also 
evident that the notion of transcendence in immanence is thematised inside both 
theology and philosophy, to the extent that they are regarded as distinct disciplines.   
 
Nevertheless, it is possible to place the conversation about the ontological status of 
transcendence in a somewhat different context.  This is, perhaps, the more “popular 
cultural” context of the question regarding the relationship between “faith” and 
“reason”.  Although it has been argued that forms of faith exist that consciously 
function only on an immanent plane18, the view that the notion of faith is generally 
taken to imply some form of relationship with a transcendent divine would probably 
not be contested.  The question then becomes one of to what extent claims 
regarding the ontological status of transcendence are proper to either “faith” or 
“reason”.  Could it be assumed that faith, in general, holds to an ontologically 
separate reality (called “the divine”) and that reason, on the other hand, accepts no 
such ontological duality?  Here as well, within the context of a discussion between 
“faith” and “reason” (if such an opposition is deemed valid at all), the situation is not 
as simple.  As has already been noted, faith is not always associated with the 
acceptance of a transcendence that has some kind of separate ontological status.  
On the other hand, natural science, widely viewed as the apex and paradigm of 
                                            
16
 Cf. Harvey G. Cox, The Future of Faith (New York: Harper Collins, 2009). p.2.  See also: Cornel du 
Toit, “Shifting Frontiers of Transcendence in Theology, Philosophy and Science”, In: Du Toit, C.W. 
(ed.)  Homo transcendentalis? – Transcendence in science and religion: interdisciplinary perspectives 
(Pretoria: Research Institute for Theology and Religion, University of South Africa, 2010). p.1. 
17
 Cf. Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, Naturalism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008). 
18
 Sessions identifies six models of faith, at least one (the confidence model) of which does not 
proceed from any relationship whatsoever.  W.L. Sessions, The concept of faith – a philosophical 
investigation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).  In his distinction between faith and belief, 
Harvey Cox also advances a position which sees faith as a “deep seated confidence”.  (Ibid. p. 3). 
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human rationality, itself attests to encountering some kind of transcendence.19  
Cornel du Toit, working with the notion of transcendence as a “frontier”, notes that 
while ignorance is the only frontier recognised by science, a portal has nevertheless, 
in recent times, opened for speaking of transcendence within the language and style 
of the natural sciences.  He goes on to say that: 
 
“The openings/frontier posts found in science-theology debates where God 
can act (in a non-interventionist manner) are at the micro level of quantum 
uncertainty, complexity systems, the role of change in evolution, autopoietic 
(self-creating) cell systems in biology, and the notion of emergence.”20 
 
The recognition that a notion of transcendence does have a role to play within the 
discourse of the natural sciences should, however, come with an important 
reservation.  This has to do with the basis upon which such a judgement is made.  
To unquestioningly accept the natural sciences as the paradigm of rationality, and 
then to search for “openings” where traces of transcendence may be accommodated 
within the discourse of the natural sciences, would present a position that is 
vulnerable to serious criticism.  This position simply accepts that a certain natural 
scientific worldview is the standard against which everything else is to be measured.  
Furthermore, this approach casts faith in an apologetic role - the burden of evidence 
now lies with faith to prove that it still has some role to play in the modern world.  
However, this argument is circular - a contender in the field is at the same time 
laying down the rules of the game and acting as judge of the outcome. 
 
Having said this, it seems to be a fact that faith, understood as the relationship with a 
divine, which is regarded as being ontologically transcendent, has lost ground in the 
popular culture of much of the Western world today.  In his monumental study, A 
Secular Age, Charles Taylor traces the developments that lead to the conditions 
within the broader cultural consciousness being less and less conducive to faith in a 
                                            
19
 Cf. Detlev Tönsing.  “Transcendence in physics: an oxymoron”, In: Du Toit, C.W. (ed.)  Homo 
transcendentalis? – Transcendence in science and religion: interdisciplinary perspectives (Pretoria: 
Research Institute for Theology and Religion, University of South Africa, 2010). p.41. 
20
 Du Toit, “Shifting Frontiers of Transcendence in Theology, Philosophy and Science”, p. 16, 17. 
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transcendent God.21  In the course of a lengthy development, we have, in much of 
the West, arrived at a point where it would be a better description to speak of the 
human person as a “buffered” self, rather than as a “porous” self.  According to this 
sensibility it seems to be “axiomatic that all thought, feeling and purpose, all the 
features we normally can ascribe to agents, must be in the minds, which are distinct 
from the ‘outer’ world.  The buffered self begins to find the idea of spirits, moral 
forces, causal powers with a purposive bent, close to incomprehensible.”22  Taylor 
goes on to discuss a number of cultural indicators that accompany the rise of the 
monadic, “buffered” self.  These indicators include an increased sense of interiority, 
exemplified by the growth of a rich vocabulary of interiority; an increased sense of 
privacy; a greater sense of individualism in general, including a stronger notion of 
individual responsibility; instrumental rationality; and, finally, a disenchantment of 
experiences of order and time.23  The insight to be gained from the brief reference to 
secularisation seems to be that an evaluative position with regard to the historical 
development of a secular sphere is at least co-implicated in one’s position on the 
ontological status of transcendence, as well as in one’s standpoint with regard to the 
notion of transcendence in immanence. 
 
This section has started by positing a shared intimation of transcendence in 
immanence as a possible ground for the conversation with Derrida on the meaning 
of space and time.  A subsequent, somewhat retrospective, exploration of the 
notions of transcendence and immanence and, cursorily, of transcendence in 
immanence, has moreover revealed a myriad of different interpretations, especially 
with regard to the ontological status of transcendence, indicating that further refining 
of the initial hypothesis is necessary. 
 
 
1.3 The conversation with Derrida 
 
Does Derrida himself use the expression “transcendence in immanence”?  In 
accordance with his philosophical project, Derrida’s language has, over the years, 
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progressively moved away from the conventionally philosophical towards an 
experimentation with various neologisms and words chosen specifically for their 
ambiguity.  However, early on, in his doctoral thesis, Derrida does use the 
expression “transcendence in immanence” at least once.  Attempting to show the 
impossibility of Husserl’s quest for an absolute ground for phenomenological 
thought, Derrida repeatedly refers to a dialectical tension between identity and 
alterity, which, according to him, is evident throughout phenomenology: 
 
“In the absolute identity of the [phenomenological] subject with itself, the 
temporal dialectic, a priori constitutes alterity.  The subject appears to itself 
originally as a tension between the Same and the Other.  The theme of a 
transcendental intersubjectivity establishing transcendence at the heart of the 
absolute immanence of the ‘ego’ is already announced.  The ultimate 
foundation of the objectivity of intentional consciousness is not the intimacy of 
the ‘I’ with itself but Time or the Other, those two forms of existence which are 
irreducible to a single essence.”24 
 
Hugh Rayment-Pickard remarks that Derrida later on, in the preface to the 1990 
publication of his doctoral thesis, sees the dialectic between the same and the other, 
immanence pervaded by transcendence (as shown in the above quotation), as being 
a prefiguration of what he would later come to call différance.25 
 
The hypothesis of a shared intimation of transcendence in immanence as a possible 
ground for conversing with Derrida on the meaning of space and time may gain 
further clarity when the notion of meaning itself is considered, specifically from a 
semiological point of view.  As in the epistemological, ontological and cultural 
instances already discussed, a notion of transcendence in immanence may be 
hypothesised with regard to the intimation of meaning in the context of the operation 
of signs.  Similarly, in the case of the intimation of meaning through the operation of 
signs, an experience of transcendence in immanence raises the question of whether 
the transcendent is to be regarded as somehow separate from the immanent, 
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thereby accepting some kind of duality, or whether the transcendent is to be viewed 
as an epiphenomenon of the immanent, thereby favouring some kind of monism.  
 
Making use of distinctions proposed by Umberto Eco in his Semiotics and the 
philosophy of language26, two different, and perhaps opposing, “logics” may be 
identified in the operation of meaning intimation.  On the one hand, there is a 
monistic logic of meaning intimation.  Where this logic is operative in the intimation of 
meaning, use is made of an inferential mechanism of meaning in some form or 
another.  In other words, something leads to something else.  According to Eco, this 
is the Philonian mechanism of implication, p > q, which, in the classical world, was 
expounded at length by the Stoics, and in contemporary thought, formed the 
centrepiece of C.S. Peirce’s theory of signs.27  In the inferential category of the 
discovery or production of meaning, the occurrence of something intimates, implies 
or leads to something else.  The inference may be synecdochic in character, which is 
to say that a part of something that is perceived and comprehended leads to an 
intimation of a greater whole.  It may also be metonymic in character, in which case 
the proximity to or association with that which is perceived and comprehended 
allows for novel meaning to be arrived at. The inference may, however, also follow 
upon a fundamental rupture with, or conclusion of what has been going on.  It may, 
in other words, derive from the arrival of something completely unexpected.  In the 
words of Hugh Rayment-Pickard: “The items in a field of metaphors belong together 
not because they may substitute for one another, but because they bear both a 
family resemblance and a necessary dissemblance to one another.”28  As will 
become evident later on, that kind of inference that is the death of every continuity – 
in other words, the coming of the radically other - is what is important to Jacques 
Derrida. 
 
It is important to understand that the inferential mechanism assumes a singular, self-
contained instance that nevertheless leads (or gives way) to a new position, and that 
this leading or traversal in itself supplies or comprises the novel meaning.  The initial 
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point, seemingly, does not need anything else for meaning to emerge - it is self-
contained within its horizon.  This is its monism. 
 
On the other hand, a binary logic may be assumed when attempting to conceive of 
the process of meaning intimation.  Where a binary logic operates, the existence of 
two poles or points of reference is presupposed.  In this regard, it is precisely in the 
interaction or relationship between the two “poles” that meaning is thought to be 
constituted.  Therefore, some form of intersubjectivity, or at least relationality, is 
present in this logic.  According to Eco, the mechanism of the discovery or 
production of meaning, in this case, works according to a relationship of equivalence, 
p ≡ q (rather than inference.)  Some form of pre-established harmony (often 
described as a code) exists in signs of this category, which makes the intimation of 
meaning possible.  A sender transfers meaning content to a receiver using an 
agreed upon code.  In this case, it would therefore perhaps be more appropriate to 
speak of the transference, rather than the inference, of meaning.  The prominent 
feature of a binary logic at work in the intimation of meaning is the assumed 
irreducibility of the relationship.  The one “pole” cannot be reduced to the other. 
 
The short diversion into semiotic theory allows us a point of entry into Derrida’s 
extensive work on linguistic meaning and structure.  The notion of structure is of 
course a metaphysical notion par excellence.  Akin to “idea”, “form” and “essence”, 
the notion of structure enables us to determine in what way structuralism may be 
regarded as a form of phenomenology: a structure is what appears within a network 
of signifiers, constituting a horizon, whereby a certain meaning is defined.  Opposing 
himself to such a view, Derrida, in the essay “Force and Signification”29, to name but 
one, argues that a structure cannot pinpoint meaning in any fixed way - a surplus of 
meaning always remains.  In this regard, one could agree with Rudolphe Gasché 
that Derrida’s thought is geared at systematically outwitting the opposition between 
the structural and its various others30 (such as the network constituting a stable 
background meaning against which a structure appears.)  Derrida’s way of moving 
beyond the binary opposition between structure and its other, whereby meaning can 
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purportedly be fixed, is by highlighting the “structural infinity” of language.31  The 
latter expression would be one way of understanding textuality as such.  Rudolphe 
Gasché paraphrases Derrida’s understanding of textuality, with specific reference to 
structural infinity, as follows: 
 
“Marks, semes, states Derrida, are constituted differentially, diacritically.  If 
such is the case, the marks, as they are deployed within the series which they 
designate (as well as designating all other marks of that same series), 
designate in addition, or, more generally, must blend into, or take the fold of, 
the asemic space of production or inscription that unfolds between the terms 
of the series.  In addition, the marks of a text are, therefore, also 
descriptions/inscriptions ((de)écrit) of the structure and movement of the 
texture of the marks.  They signify the movement of the very operation of 
signifying too.  Yet, even though each mark, while referring to itself and the 
other marks of the series, also represents the spaced-out semi-opening 
(l’entrouverture espacée) ‘which relates the different meanings to each other,’ 
the valence thus added to the semes is not a supplementary meaning that 
would come to enrich the series.  What is added to the series as it becomes 
re-marked by the asemic space of diacritical differentiation … is, in truth, a 
non-sense, something which by right has no meaning, since it is itself the 
possibility of meaning.”32 
 
What Gasché is emphasising by talking about the structural infinity of Derrida’s 
thought regarding language is the fact that there is always more than can be 
gathered under the umbrella of a specific structure.  The “more” is, however, not the 
more of “semantic infinity” - in other words, the more of an infinite richness of 
meaning too great to be grasped by finite minds and language, but the “syntactic 
infinity” that focuses on the actual adding of diacritical marks ad infinitum, whereby a 
continuous spacing is effected.33  To this distinction between the semantic and the 
syntactic infinite will be returned in the last chapter of this study.  Suffice it for the 
present to point out that what Derrida attempts to illustrate is that language always 
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assumes its “other”.  The present study will argue that this insight on the part of 
Derrida is a way of articulating transcendence in immanence.  
 
It is noteworthy that a distinction between opposing “logics” at work with regard to 
the question of meaning – or meaninglessness – also forms an integral part of 
Derrida’s work, even though he would find it necessary to problematise the notion of 
a “logic” in general, due to its link with “logos” as a metaphysical master-word.  In the 
opening manifesto-like pages of De la Grammatologie, Derrida speaks of the 
destruction of the concept of “sign” and its entire logic, as well as the urgent need for 
the construction of a new logic of the “supplement”.34  It would appear, therefore, that 
to talk about different logics at work in an inferential and transferential mechanism of 
meaning intimation, as conjectured above, would not be to introduce something 
completely alien to Derrida’s own thinking to a conversation with Derrida.  In a 
sense, this is what the entire deconstructive project is about.  In the introduction to 
her translation of Derrida’s Dissemination, Barbara Johnson observes the following 
with regard to Derrida’s reading of Rousseau in Of Grammatology:35  
 
“What Derrida’s reading of Rousseau sketches out is indeed nothing less than 
a revolution in the very logic of meaning.  The logic of the supplement 
wrenches apart the neatness of the metaphysical binary oppositions” (italics 
added.)   
 
The opposition of a new logic of meaning to an outdated, metaphysical logic is 
evidenced throughout the Derridean corpus.  In an essay on the work of Edmond 
Jabès, Derrida, for instance, uses the figures of the rabbi and the poet to exemplify 
two differing hermeneutical approaches - an opposition which, on further 
consideration, is perhaps rather similar to the two mechanisms of meaning intimation 
that were proposed as a point of entry into the discussion on the intimation of 
meaning.  The Jews are a people who have received a “Book” from God, a part of 
which has quite literally been given in codified form as the Law. For the rabbi, 
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representing the people of the Book, the hermeneutical endeavour is an attempt to 
elucidate the Book, to help pass it on, and in so doing remain as faithful to the 
original Book as possible.  For the rabbi, the code has been given, and the task of 
interpretation is merely one of clarifying the code and making sure that it is applied 
correctly to every situation that presents itself. 
 
In contrast to the heteronomous (or binary) hermeneutics of the rabbi, the poet 
exemplifies an “impudent” and “autonomous” work of interpretation.  The poet, while 
bound by language, celebrates the freedom of a new creation in his poem - a 
meaning not provided within the parameters of a prescriptive tradition.  In Derrida’s 
words: 
 
“In the beginning is hermeneutics.  But the shared necessity of exegesis, the 
interpretive imperative, is interpreted differently by the rabbi and the poet.  
The difference between the horizon of the original text and exegetic writing 
makes the difference between the rabbi and the poet irreducible … The 
original opening of interpretation essentially signifies that there will always be 
rabbis and poets.  And two interpretations of interpretation.”36 
 
The operation of two mechanisms of meaning intimation finds another exemplary 
expression in an essay by Derrida on différance (a notion which will be explored at 
length in later chapters.) Here, the classically determined structure of signs is 
discussed, in order to “irrevocably surpass” it by explicating another process or logic 
at work.37  According to the widely held classical conception, a sign is put in the 
place of the thing itself, where “thing” may designate a sense or referent.  “When we 
cannot take hold of or show the thing, let us say the present, the being-present, 
when the present does not present itself, then we signify, we go through the detour 
of signs.”38  Thus, on the one hand, there is the metaphysical conception of the sign, 
according to which its meaning is determined by an absent thing which is deemed to 
be true presence and which the sign merely tries to represent.  In deconstructing this 
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conception, Derrida then proposes a mechanism of meaning that moves past the 
distinction between absence and presence by taking difference to be primordial:  
 
“Différance is what makes the movement of signification possible only if each 
element that is said to be ‘present,’ appearing on the stage of presence, is 
related to something other than itself but retains the mark of a past element 
and already lets itself be hollowed out by the mark of its relation to a future 
element.  This trace relates no less to what is called the future than to what is 
called the past, and it constitutes what is called the present by this very 
relation to what it is not…”39 
   
The trace is neither fully present, nor fully absent.  It manifests an alternative 
approach to meaning than that proposed by the binary logic of the classical sign.  
What we are left with in the wake of the brief discussion on meaning in the context of 
the working of signs is, seemingly, a choice between an approach that presupposes 
some kind of monism (the inferential approach), and an approach that presupposes 
a duality (the transferential approach).  At  first glance, this situation seems to be 
corroborated by the oppositions postulated by Derrida, namely an opposition 
between a binary conception of the sign on the one hand, and the trace as a 
substitution of the classic concept of the sign on the other; or, again, between two 
interpretations of interpretation.  Derrida subverts the language of classical 
metaphysics by using it against itself.  He does this by showing the inherent 
undecideability in the binary oppositions used by metaphysics to impose an arbitrary 
order on what is rather to be understood as primordial flux.  Would one be justified in 
saying that the first approach, presumably favoured by Derrida, attempts a 
consistent immanentism, while the latter approach tries to accommodate some kind 
of transcendence?  Once again, the situation is more complicated than that. 
 
In the first place, it should be noted that to speak of an inferential mechanism of 
meaning intimation that implies some kind of monism, and a transferential 
mechanism of meaning intimation that presupposes an irreducible binarity, is to 
establish inaccessible idealities.  Neither of these logics can operate in complete 
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isolation.  The meaning mechanism of equivalence cannot stand on its own in any 
absolute way.  This is the case because no code can mediate perfectly between two 
communicating subjects (if this were the case, would it still be possible to speak of 
two subjects, or would they instead collapse into one?)  There is always an excess of 
meaning that is not covered in an established code’s definition of its signs. This 
situation implies that all communication, of necessity, involves interpretation, which is 
a form of inference.40   
 
On the other hand, to claim sole legitimacy for a mechanism of inference in the 
aliquid stat pro aliquo of the sign is far from unproblematic.  In interpreting the 
meaning of that which is taken to be a sign, the subject has to accept a certain 
meaning constellation as stable, in order to proceed from there to novel, inferred 
meaning.  In other words, in moving from p to q (in p > q), the subject has to make 
certain choices about the meaning of p based upon various factors, such as the 
context in which it occurs.  The inference cannot be made without a relatively stable 
constellation of background meaning being assumed.  The stable background 
meaning may be the result of previous inferences in an infinite regress, but the act of 
assuming their stability at the moment of inference implies a relation of equivalence 
– the meaning is agreed upon; some kind of transcendent horizon is accepted.  In 
this sense, equivalence – some kind of binarity - is also always present in the 
intimation of meaning.   
 
“Derrida both recognizes the necessary resemblement of a theme and observes the 
tendency of all resemblement (simulation, mimesis, metaphor, and so on) to break 
down into dissimulation and difference.  The quality of  resemblement is therefore an 
indeterminable combination of similitude and dissimilitude, continuity and 
discontinuity, life and death.”41  This formulation by Hugh Rayment-Pickard could be 
interpreted as being another way of recognising the presence of the theme of 
transcendence in immanence in Derrida’s thought. 
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1.4 The hypothesis refined: temporal and theological transcendence in  
 immanence 
 
We are now finally in a position to reassert the hypothesis formulated at the 
beginning of this section, in order to refine it further.  The hypothesis is that a shared 
notion of transcendence in immanence may form the basis of a conversation with 
Derrida on the meaning of space and time.  To speak of a choice for a radical 
immanence and a rejection of transcendence in Derrida’s thought would be to 
interpret it in terms of too facile an opposition.  Rather, this study asserts that it 
makes much more sense to appreciate Derrida’s thought as a thought of 
transcendence in immanence.  In fact, in his earliest writings, with a more 
conventional philosophical vocabulary, Derrida uses this exact expression.  In his 
master’s thesis, with the English title The Problem of Genesis in the Philosophy of 
Husserl, we find the following passage (already previously quoted): 
 
“In the absolute identity of the subject with itself, the temporal dialectic, a 
priori, constitutes alterity.  The subject appears to itself originally as a tension 
between the Same and the Other.  The theme of a transcendental 
intersubjectivity establishing transcendence at the heart of the absolute 
immanence of the ‘ego’ is already announced.  The ultimate foundation of the 
objectivity of intentional consciousness is not the intimacy of the ’I’ with itself 
but Time or the Other, those two forms of existence which are irreducible to a 
single essence.”42 
 
But in that case the question becomes one concerning the nature or character of 
transcendence in immanence.  In this regard, a further assertion of this study also 
finds a verbatim ground in the above quotation.  The assertion is that Derrida’s 
thought may be understood as one of temporal transcendence in immanence, and 
that the conversation on the meaning of space and time will receive ample profile by 
juxtaposing this notion with one of theological transcendence in immanence. 
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Temporal transcendence in immanence, as it emerges in Derrida’s thought, is a 
thought of infinite finitude.  It is a thought supremely sensitive to difference and 
change.  Every seemingly stable spatio-temporal constellation is actually inherently 
unstable, as it is not fully present to itself.  It is haunted by the alterity of an absolute 
past that cannot be gathered into the present.  Similarly, the present is always 
waiting for the arrival of a totally unforeseeable future.  Thus, absolute and infinite 
temporality manifests a transcendence in every immanent constellation.   
 
The notion of theological transcendence in immanence, which this study proposes in 
comparison to Derridean temporal transcendence in immanence, is in need of 
careful delimitation.  As has been mentioned before, there is no unequivocal 
“theological” stance on transcendence and immanence and their (possible) 
relationship.  The notion of theological transcendence in immanence is therefore to 
be understood in terms of the specific profile it is given in this study.  By qualifying 
the notion of transcendence in immanence advanced in the conversation with 
Derrida as “theological”, this study seeks to highlight the fact that there are ample 
resources available within the tradition of Christian metaphysical thought43 to deal 
with the experiences of finitude, change, difference and diversity in ways that are at 
least as sensitive as in the temporal transcendence proposed by Derridean thought.  
In contrast to an approach that deals with the experience of transcendence in terms 
of temporality, a theological notion of transcendence in immanence suggests that it 
is precisely due to its participation in divine, infinite Being that finite (immanent) 
reality is experienced as ecstatic (that is, as permeated by transcendence).  
 
Different understandings of the nature of transcendence in immanence in turn lead to 
differing conceptions of the meaning of space and time.  Taken as an objective 
genitive, the expression “the meaning of space and time”, from the perspective of 
temporal transcendence in immanence, does not make sense.  A spatio-temporal 
constellation does not comprise any fixed meaning.  There is, in fact, no fixed 
meaning.  The becoming space of time and the becoming time of space ensure that 
meaning continually bleeds away.  Taken as a subjective genitive, the expression 
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“the meaning of space and time” would, in a sense, point to a radical ontological 
monism.  All that there “is” is the infinite stream of the becoming space of time, and 
the becoming time of space. 
 
From the perspective of theological transcendence in immanence, the meaning of 
space and time, viewed in an objective sense, is likewise radically open.  Yet, 
instead of exploding meaning altogether in the direction of meaninglessness, 
theological transcendence in immanence proposes an understanding of meaning as 
ever-increasing, ever deepening.  Finite being, in a sense, as concentrated in the 
human soul, may be regarded as a journey of meaning that is also a traversal of the 
infinite.  It can therefore never rest in an assumed complete grasp of the meaning of 
being, but is infinitely beckoned to new depths and more fullness of meaning.  The 
subjective sense of the expression “the meaning of space and time” is represented 
by an understanding of space and time as the radically contingent finitude of the 
finite, compared to infinite being, on which it is completely dependent.  Space and 
time constitute the manner in which finite being participates in infinite being, which is 
neither spatial nor temporal, but should rather be regarded as an infinite presence. 
 
 
1.5 Whereto the conversation? 
 
Having suggested different answers to the question of the meaning of space and 
time, the question now becomes one regarding the possibility of rational dialogue per 
se.  Is there a limit and, if so, what is the absolute limit of conversation between a 
notion of temporal transcendence in immanence and one of theological 
transcendence in immanence?  Viewed within a semiological context, what is the 
absolute limit of conversation between a monistic and a binary logic with regard to 
the intimation of meaning?  Such a terminal point may not be easy to determine.  It 
has, after all, earlier been stated that inference and transference cannot be rigidly 
separated.  What is more, since Plato and Aristotle, the available logical and 
rhetorical arguments have been rehearsed many times in the conversation between 
the monistic and binary logics of the intimation of meaning.  It would be a matter of 
course, for example, to test the internal consistency of each view.  To try, in some 
way or another, to show that the other point of view can be included in one’s own 
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argument, may be more conclusive.  This is in fact what Derrida attempts to do with 
his deconstruction of theology.44    
 
At the rational limits of conversation, logic may give way to persuasion.  This may 
simply be to say that the rhetorical thrust that is present in all argumentation now 
features more prominently.  In acknowledging the rhetorical side of arguments, one 
would also not be straying from the Western tradition of intellectual discourse.  Since 
antiquity, beauty has been one of the transcendentals, and a narrative that argues 
that intersubjective meaning arising from the participation between divine 
transcendence and created immanence is simply more beautiful than a narrative that 
accepts a minimalist logic of infinite temporal inference makes perfect sense.  In 
arguing eloquently for the terrifying solitude of immanent will, Nietzsche made a 
similar argument from the premise of a monistic logic of meaning intimation. 
 
This study concludes with the suggestion that the conversation between the 
temporal and theological notions of transcendence in immanence, in all probability, 
has no conclusive end.  However, interminable conversation does not imply 
indecision.  In fact, when it comes to meaning, it may not be possible not to make a 
decision.  In entering the conversation, one either works with a logic proceeding from 
the premise of pure inference – in other words, transcendence is some kind of non-
ontological epiphenomenon of pure immanence, or one works with a logic 
proceeding from the premise of intersubjective transference – in other words, 
transcendence is accorded some kind of ontological status.  There are no meta-
criteria, independent of either of the options, against which to test the rationality and 
validity of the choice that is made. 
 
The fact of having juxtaposed the notion of theological transcendence in immanence 
to a notion of temporal transcendence in immanence, as analysed in the thought of 
my conversation partner, Jacques Derrida, clearly shows that this study decides in 
favour of the former option.  A theological notion of transcendence in immanence, 
when understood correctly, is not susceptible to the allegations of fixation and 
violence levelled against ontotheology and much of modern thought.  While being 
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sensitive to difference and change, such an approach rather saves the notion of 
meaning, while giving a beautiful orientation to space and time.  As will be argued 
later, this is the orientation of proportion in progression and progression in 
proportion.   
 
The chapter following this introduction is devoted to an analysis of spatialisation, a 
state of affairs characteristic of much of modern thought.  Whereas there is 
agreement with Derrida on the existence of a state of spatialisation, it will be argued 
that, based on different assumptions about the intimation of meaning, it is possible to 
construe a different genealogy of spatial dominance from that proposed by Derrida.  
Derrida places modern spatialisation towards the end of a long tradition of Presence, 
and criticises it, along with this whole construed tradition, as “logocentrism”.  It is, 
however, also possible to argue that for much of its existence, Christian thought did 
not hold to such a rigid fixation of meaning, but rather reckoned with an analogical 
construal of meaning, and that it was only with the demise of an analogical worldview 
at the beginning of modernity that the door was opened for epistemological 
spatialisation in its mature, modern form.   
 
The third chapter of this study begins by exploring Derrida’s deconstruction of 
structuralism and Husserlian phenomenology.  The notions of différance and the 
trace, which emerge from this analysis, will in turn establish a perspective on the 
functioning of time and space in Derrida’s thought.  As will become apparent, his is 
an ontology of radical temporality, a temporality that can never be gathered under 
the form of the present.  Time is always anachronistic or “out of joint”45, whereby 
Derrida says that the present is always contaminated by the haunting of an absolute 
past or the arrival of an absolute future.  Concomitantly, there is no absolute 
interiority of the experience of time, as proposed in the transcendental tradition.  
Every transcendental interiority, together with the consciousness of time that 
appears within it, is always “contaminated” by empirical reality, that is, by exteriority. 
To communicate this idea of contamination, Derrida makes use of the notions of 
“spacing” and of the trace.  After briefly exploring the relationship between Derrida’s 
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temporal ontology and that of Martin Heidegger, the chapter concludes by bringing 
Derridean space and time to bear on the notion of transcendence in immanence. 
 
The fourth chapter of this study aims at establishing an alternative perspective on the 
meaning of space and time to that of Derrida.  Proceeding from a discussion of the 
emergence of a concept of real divine transcendence in the thought of the 
Cappadocian fathers, this chapter seeks to articulate a binary logic of meaning 
intimation that nevertheless allows for genuine difference and change.  Another way 
of formulating this approach would be to say that it aligns itself with recent attempts 
at salvaging the notion of analogy for philosophy and theology.  Within a binary logic 
of meaning intimation, informed by an orthodox Christian thought of transcendence, 
space and time may firstly be construed as the condition of finitude, that is, as the 
border between finitude and infinitude.  Space and time go hand in hand with 
materiality and embodiment as basic characteristics of the creaturely relation to the 
divine.  Proceeding, in turn, from the notion of a creaturely, embodied relation to 
God, the meaning of space and time may be sought in characteristics such as 
rhythm, proportion and orientation, all of which play an important role in liturgy.  A 
second perspective on the meaning of space and time from within a binary logic of 
meaning intimation is established by focusing not on the practices of the 
creaturely/embodied “pole” of the relationship, but on the relationship itself.  From 
this perspective, space and time are in a sense the ontological “distance” between 
the triune God as infinite being and his finite creation.  This in turn may be related to 
the concept of beauty in the Christian tradition: space and time are the distance of 
beauty, and the beauty of distance.  Creation, especially as represented in humanity, 
in regarding God’s glory, traverses the infinite distance of His beauty.  Precisely 
because of this journey, this pilgrimage into the infinite, the possibility of an 
appreciation for genuine change and difference opens up. 
 
The fifth and final chapter of this study surveys the conversation with Derrida on the 
meaning of space and time, and again explores the theme of the limits of rational 
discussion.  It will be noted that there are indeed many points of affinity between 
Derrida’s understanding of the meaning of space and time and an ontology deriving 
primarily from a binary (analogical) logic of meaning intimation.  Chief amongst these 
is the thought of the permeation of immanence by transcendence.  In Derrida’s 
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words, this would be a thought of contamination.  The question then, however, 
becomes one of the nature of the transcendence that permeates immanence.  
Should it be seen as the absolute past that haunts every present, or should it be 
seen as an infinite that gives creaturely being to be?  In other words, is it a matter of 
temporalising the transcendent, or of transcending the temporal?   
 
Having surveyed both temporal transcendence in immanence and theological 
transcendence in immanence, this study concludes with the suggestion that the two 
positions in the conversation, due to the intrinsic nature of transcendence in 
immanence, would not be satisfied if they were left lying separatively transcendent46 
to each other.  In other words, the methodology of transcendence in immanence 
itself does not agree with a conclusion that juxtaposes two points of view without 
attempting some kind of resolution after the fashion of transcendence in immanence.  
In the light of this situation, the possibility of temporal transcendence in immanence 
inhabiting theological transcendence in immanence after the fashion of 
transcendence in immanence is firstly considered and rejected.  Thereupon, the 
reverse option, namely that of theological transcendence in immanence making use 
of temporal transcendence in immanence, while at the same time transcending it 
(the methodology of transcendence in immanence) is considered and judged to be a 
suitable provisional outcome of the conversation with Derrida.  It is provisional 
because the conversation can never be conclusively decided: if one chose to do so, 
it would always be possible to propose a deconstruction of the conclusion reached 
by this study. 
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Chapter 2 Speaking of spatialisation: modernity and its discontents 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the conversation revolves around the analysis of a certain affliction of 
modern thought that may be characterised as spatialisation.  Spatialisation is not, by 
any means, the most prominent notion used by Derrida to highlight and explain the 
ills of Western metaphysics, but the categories of space, as well as time, which are 
involved in this notion result in it being eminently suitable as an introduction to the 
problematic relationship between transcendence and immanence identified with the 
pathology of modern metaphysics.  An analysis of spatialisation will, in its turn, serve 
as an introduction to the very important concept of “Presence” in Derrida’s thought, 
as well as its spatial and temporal implications.  Derrida’s overview of Western 
metaphysics as a metaphysics of presence will subsequently lead to the introduction 
of the concept of “différance” which, according to him, is another way of indicating 
the (auto)-deconstruction of a metaphysics that relates transcendence and 
immanence in a problematic manner. 
 
After looking at Derrida’s analysis of spatialisation, the second part of this chapter 
attempts an alternative reading of the phenomenon of spatialisation.  Modern 
spatialisation as such is equally negatively judged, but the stereotyping thereof as 
just another example of the metaphysics of presence that immobilises the whole of 
Western thought since antiquity is rejected.  It will be suggested that the particular 
pathology of modern thought is to be found in its radical separation of transcendence 
and immanence, which goes together with the epistemological turn that inaugurates 
modernity.  However, this situation cannot simply be projected onto the whole history 
of Western metaphysics.  This study argues that another way of relating 
transcendence and immanence is possible - one that has in fact, at times, been 
present in the tradition of Western thought since antiquity.   
 
 
 
 
27 
 
2.2 Spatialisation: structuralism 
 
Spatialisation may be described as the situation whereby the elements of the world 
are thought to be comprehensively definable and fixable.  Once defined, the entities 
that make up the world are deemed to be in fixed relationship to one another.  The 
experience of change is understood against the background of a deeper, underlying 
stability.  According to this worldview, the fixed order of reality is also open to 
exhaustive rational investigation.  The world becomes flat and spread out 
(spatialised), and hovering over it - or over against it - is an analysing reason 
performing the function of a patient cartographer.  The result of reason’s 
cartographic activity is knowledge representing reality “as it is”, somewhat like a two-
dimensional map reflected in a (two-dimensional) mirror.   
 
According to Jacques Derrida, that special epoch in the history of thought, where 
thought as language became self-conscious and problematised itself, provides an 
important opportunity for gaining insight into the general characteristics of 
spatialisation as described above47.  An avenue into the problematisation of 
language, and concomitantly into an analysis of spatialisation, is afforded Derrida by 
way of the analysis of structuralism as a twentieth century theoretical movement. 
Along with phenomenology, Derrida’s treatment of which will be discussed below, 
structuralism may be viewed as an important manifestation of the becoming self-
conscious of language.48 
 
Derrida emphasises that the notion of structure is as old as Western philosophy itself 
and that, as such, it is intimately connected with concepts such as epistēme, truth 
and form.49  Before turning to structuralism and its pivotal or liminal position in the 
emerging self-consciousness of language, the notion of structure and structurality 
itself, together with the spatial and chronological references involved, must be 
investigated.  In the essay entitled Force and Signification, Derrida proposes that 
structurality gains prominence in proportion to the diminishment of force: 
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“In the future [structuralism] will be interpreted, perhaps, as a relaxation, if not 
a lapse, of the attention given to force, which is the tension of force itself.  
Form fascinates when one no longer has the force to understand force from 
within itself.”50 
 
Derrida’s essay continues to argue for a renewed appreciation of the restless force 
that continually disturbs the structural moment (in a sense by itself), but this is to get 
ahead of the argument.  What is important to recognise here is that structure, and 
especially the negative, spatialised manifestation thereof, dominates in the absence 
of force, or to use Derrida’s word play, through the force of weakness.  It is worth 
quoting him at length in this regard: 
 
“The force of our weakness is that impotence separates, disengages, and 
emancipates.  Henceforth, the totality is more clearly perceived, the panorama 
and the panoramagram are possible.  The panoramagram, the very image of 
the structuralist instrument, was invented in 1824, as Littré states, in order ‘to 
obtain immediately, on a flat surface, the development of depth vision of 
objects on the horizon.’  Thanks to more or less openly acknowledged 
schematization and spatialization, one can glance over the field divested of its 
forces more freely or diagrammatically.  Or one can glance over the totality 
divested of its forces, even if it is the totality of form and meaning, for what is 
in question, in this case, is meaning rethought as form; and structure is the 
formal unity of form and meaning.”51 
 
The isolation of a structure is thus, according to Derrida’s interpretation of 
structuralism, to identify the meaning of something in terms of abstract defined forms 
and their relations.  In Force and Signification, Derrida devotes much attention to the 
reading of a work by the literary critic, Jean Rousset, which he views as being 
exemplary of such a structuralist approach.  Rousset would, for instance, identify a 
structure in the work of Corneille, and then trace the development of this structure 
through various stages of Corneille’s writing.  Derrida observes that the structure that 
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Rousset identifies is quite rigorously geometrical (in the case of Corneille, it is a 
helix), and then remarks that such a geometricism comes naturally to a structuralist 
approach.  Even though the notion of structure refers strictu sensu to space - 
geometric or morphological space, the order of forms and sites in the architectural or 
topographical sense of structure was soon – for instance, already in Aristotle - 
metaphorically applied to language and argumentation as well.52  It is, however, 
precisely the metaphoricity (understood as merely figurative) of the spatial and 
geometric notions inherent to structure that Derrida wants to destroy.  The spatiality 
of linguistic structure – and of metaphoricity - should be noted.  Language, after all, 
determines things by spatialising them – spreading the signifiers out.53  It is because 
of this spatialising function of language that the concept of structure is also natural in 
linguistics and literary criticism. 
 
To restate - identifying a structure is thus to identify the meaning of something in 
terms of defined forms and their relations.  The identification of meaning in terms of 
structure, however, involves a certain kind of abstraction or extraction: the form has 
to be separated from the content, which together with it constitutes a living whole.  
As Derrida says: “[T]he relief and design of structures appears more clearly when 
content, which is the living energy of meaning, is neutralized.”54  A binary opposition 
now emerges - the opposition between form and content.  This opposition is one of 
many binary oppositions which, according to Derrida, structures Western 
metaphysical thought.  In these binary oppositions, there is, according to him, always 
a hierarchy at work - one of the terms is suppressed or dominated by the other.  In 
the case of the spatialisation effected by structuralism, it is content that is subjugated 
by form.  Form sits on top of content - its idealised and generalised character makes 
for easy application in various contexts, and increases the manipulative power of the 
rational agent that abstracts the form in the first place. 
 
The form-content opposition is related to another central distinction in structuralism, 
namely that between signifier and signified.  Ferdinand de Saussure, in his 
inauguration of modern structuralist linguistics, continued this distinction, which is 
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central to Western metaphysics, by accepting that a linguistic sign consists of two 
sides: a material signifier and an intelligible signified that belong together like the two 
sides of a leaf of paper.  Saussure’s breakthrough lay in the assertion that each 
particular signifier is not connected to a discrete signified meaning, but that signifiers 
signify precisely through their interaction with all the other signifiers in a linguistic 
system.  The structure as a whole, as well as the intricate relations between the 
signifiers, should therefore be studied.  Saussure’s structuralism leaves the 
distinction between a material signifier and an intelligible signified intact, however, 
which is precisely what Derrida finds extremely problematic.   
 
The subjection of the signifier to a transcendent meaning is nothing but violence, 
according to Derrida.  This is the case even if the meaning does not lie in any single 
element of a structure, but in the structure as a whole.  To abstract the form of a 
linguistic discourse from its content and then to privilege meaning as form above the 
material content is to arrest the living flow of the discourse, and thereby to commit 
violence.  The violence of spatialisation is in a sense violence committed against 
time.  Time is disregarded in favour of a snapshot of formal relations, which are then 
analysed.  Derrida formulates this as follows: 
 
“[S]imultaneity is the myth of a total reading or description, promoted to the 
status of regulatory ideal.  The search for the simultaneous explains the 
capacity to be fascinated by the spatial image: is space not the ‘order of 
coexistences’ (Leibniz)? … In this demand for the flat and the horizontal, what 
is intolerable for structuralism is indeed the richness implied by the volume, 
every element of signification that cannot be spread out into the simultaneity 
of a form.”55 
 
The spatialisation effected by structuralism is, in Derrida’s reading, another instance 
of a binary opposition established in order to subject one aspect of the opposition to 
the other.  In this case, it is time subjected to a certain notion of space - space as a 
formal structure of elements in certain fixed relations to each other.  Another dualism 
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underlies this notion of meaning - a subject outside of the structure oversees it and 
intimates its meaning. 
 
 
2.3 Spatialisation: phenomenology 
 
The other important tributary of what was called the becoming self conscious of 
language, or the linguistic turn, which Derrida analysed during the 1960’s, is 
phenomenology.  Though apparently embarking on different projects – structuralism 
pursuing a theory of language and culture, while phenomenology is a philosophy of 
interior consciousness – Derrida nevertheless extracts the similarities in both, the 
correspondence between them being a state of spatialisation based on a shared 
metaphysical allegiance.  In the case of phenomenology, the spatialisation is to be 
intimated in the binary oppositions introduced, followed by the promotion of one side 
of the opposition over the other, resulting in the one hovering above the other, so to 
speak.   
 
In his exposition of the phenomenological method, Edmund Husserl more or less 
consciously followed the problematic already addressed in a methodological manner 
by Descartes.56  As will be discussed in the second part of this chapter, the latter 
sought to establish certainty by a reduction of being to thought.  This reduction was 
facilitated by Descartes’ postulation of a res cogitans, a thinking substance, and a 
res extensa, the material world, the latter standing, in a sense, over against thought. 
Once so divided, the great quest of modern thought was cast as the search for a way 
in which to bridge the gap between subjective thought and the rest of the world, in 
such a way that certainty could be achieved and scepticism avoided.  Descartes’ 
option was to reach for certainty from within thought itself, that is to say a rationalist 
option. Clear and distinct thoughts provide the secure footing for bridging the gap to 
the world.  On the other hand, and maintaining the premise of a split between a 
thinking subject and the rest of the world, empiricism proposed that the things 
themselves will report in such a way that the gap will be bridged.  The 
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epistemological gap will, as it were, be bridged from “the other side”, thereby 
establishing certainty. 
 
According to Derrida, Husserl rejected as one-sided both the rationalistic proto-
structuralism (for example, Dilthey’s Weltanschauungsanalisen), and the vulgar 
empiricism, espoused, for example, by positivism, which was present in theoretical 
thought at the turn of the 20th century.57  Instead, Husserl ceaselessly attempted to 
reconcile the structuralist demand (which leads to a comprehensive description of a 
totality, of a form or a function organised according to an internal legality, in which 
elements have meaning only through the solidarity of their correlation or opposition), 
with the genetic demand (that is, the search for the origin and foundation of the 
structure)58.  Derrida describes Husserl’s alternative to the structure - genesis 
opposition as follows: 
 
“[Husserl] had to navigate between the Scylla and Charybdis of logicizing 
structuralism and psychologistic genetism … He had to open up a new 
direction of philosophical attention and permit the discovery of a concrete, but 
nonempirical, intentionality, a ‘transcendental experience’ which would be 
‘constitutive’, that is, like all intentionality, simultaneously productive and 
revelatory, active and passive.  The original unity, the common root of activity 
and passivity is from quite early on the very possibility of meaning for 
Husserl.”59 
 
Thus, Husserl attempted a resolution of the subject-object divide, as well as the 
rationalism-empiricism divide, by means of a transcendental reduction of thought, 
following the direction indicated by Kant.  Everything belonging to the merely local or 
contingent in experience has to be expelled.  Anything that belongs to a particular 
individual or situation is a matter of individual psychology.  The fundamental 
structures of the mind have to be universal and transcendent.  Correspondingly, the 
focus cannot be on the experiential object itself, but on the transcendental object as 
it appears in consciousness, subsequent to the bracketing out of all particularities 
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and non-essentialities.  Meaning emerges from the intentional relationship between 
the transcendental subject and object in consciousness. 
 
The apparent difference to, as well as eventual similarity with, the structuralist project 
should be noted at this point.  On the face of it, the conception of meaning in 
structuralism appears to be very different from that of phenomenology.  Whereas 
structuralism focuses on meaning as it arises from the relationship between the 
elements of a system, for instance language, phenomenology holds that meaning 
arises in interior consciousness.  However, relation is as important in the emergence 
of meaning for phenomenology as it is for structuralism.  In the case of 
phenomenology, it is the singular, intentional relationship between the 
transcendental subject and object in consciousness.  Furthermore, this relationship 
is, as in the manifest aim of structuralism, also analysed as a definite structure in 
phenomenology.  Derrida identifies the structure of transcendental intentionality in 
Husserl’s thought as the noetic-noematic correlation.  According to this structure, the 
noema, “which is the objectivity of the object, the meaning and the ‘as such’ of the 
thing for consciousness”, while present in consciousness, does not belong to 
consciousness in a real way.60  The noema is neither the determined thing itself in its 
raw existence (the noema is precisely the appearing of this thing), nor is it a moment 
belonging only to subjective thought.  “It is neither of the world nor of consciousness, 
but is the world or something of the world for consciousness.”61  To grasp how the 
noema appear in the intentionality of transcendental thought is, according to Derrida, 
to simultaneously see how it is the condition of every structuralism and how 
ephemeral and disappearing every structure is, situated neither in the object nor in 
thought.62   
 
What is important here is to realise that the concept of structure and the analysis of 
structure, together with the stasis that it implies, play an important role in Husserl’s 
thought.  As mentioned above, Husserl continually attempted to reconcile the 
structuralist demand with the restless energy of becoming (genesis.)  That he was 
conscious of the disabilities of structuralism alone is evidenced, according to Derrida, 
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by another oppositional pair that Husserl made use of, namely that between hyle and 
morphe.  While the noema is an intentional and non-real element, the hyle is a real 
but not intentional element of the experienced.  “It is the sensate (experienced and 
not real) material of affect before any animation by intentional form.  It is the pole of 
pure passivity, of nonintentionality without which consciousness could not receive 
anything other than itself, nor exercise its intentional activity.”63  Hyle is primarily 
temporal matter.  As such, it is the force that brings every structure into a crisis.  
Husserl was aware of the need for a “transcendental aesthetic” in his thought, which 
would be able to accommodate the temporality of matter.  According to Derrida, it is 
this realisation on the part of Husserl that gave rise to the numerous displacements 
of the eidetic reduction (manifested, for example, in the journey from the Logische 
Untersuchungen to Ideen I). Husserl was constantly attempting to reconcile structure 
with genesis. 
 
What is apparent to Derrida, however, is precisely the existence of this opposition 
between structure and genesis, which is equivalent to the opposition between 
structure and force in structuralism.  While in various ways trying to account for the 
temporality of matter - the naked factuality thereof - Husserl nevertheless privileged 
the meaning of objects as it appeared in the structure of transcendental 
intentionality. The spatialisation of phenomenology is effected through the separation 
of meaning and fact, subjecting the latter to the former. 
 
Phenomenology’s spatialisation is the spatialisation of meaning.  External, “worldly” 
space is first reduced to nothing in order that, from within the transcendental 
reduction, the ideal space of meaning may emerge.  In the external world of objects, 
space involves mediation (there is, for instance, a distance between two points of 
reference.)  However, the living presence, the pure auto-affection of transcendental 
thought, involves no mediation.  According to Husserl, there is absolute proximity 
between the self and the meaning it wishes to express.  In the essay entitled Speech 
and Phenomena (La Voix et le Phénomène64), Derrida says the following in relation 
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to the distinction between indication and expression, which will be discussed in more 
detail below: 
 
“When I speak, it belongs to the phenomenological essence of this operation 
that I hear myself… at the same time that I speak.  The signifier, animated by 
my breath and by the meaning-intention (in Husserl’s language the expression 
animated by the Bedeutungsintention), is in absolute proximity to me… It does 
not risk death in the body of a signifier that is given over to the world and the 
visibility of space.” 
 
The absolutely pure auto-affection occurring in the living presence of the 
phenomenological subject to itself is therefore the absolute reduction of space in 
general. From within this reduction, the ideal space of meaning now emerges.  This 
space is meaning, and outside of it is non-meaning.  But how can space be 
meaning?  Because it is what is opened up, what appears from within a certain 
attitude.  Meaning is what is lighted up, or comes to light, in the light of reason.  At 
this point, Derrida emphasizes the undisputable Greek ancestry of Husserl’s 
thought.65  As for Plato, as well as for Aristotle, so for Husserl the theoretical thought 
attitude reveals the essence of things.  Like a balloon or net, it also binds all that is 
thus revealed together into a whole.  This binding together of truth in its appearance 
does not, however, simply constitute a synchronic space - it is also diachronic.  The 
whole history of truth thus revealed in the light of reason is regarded by 
phenomenology as the space of meaning, thereby taming and neutralising the naked 
force of time.  Derrida formulates this as follows: 
 
“Reason, thus, unveils itself.  Reason, Husserl says, is the logos which is 
produced in history.  It traverses Being with itself in sight, in sight of appearing 
to itself, that is, to state itself and hear itself as logos”.66 
 
He adds the following: 
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“Logos is nothing outside history and Being, since it is discourse, infinite 
discursiveness and not an actual infinity, and since it is meaning.” 
 
To use another metaphor and to touch on a point to which we shall return later - the 
space of meaning is that space which is lighted up by the light of reason.  In being 
lighted by a single logos it is constituted as a single whole.  It is also constituted as 
an inside that excludes an outside.  What lies outside is non-meaning, unreality, 
irrationality.   
 
Husserl’s analysis of the structure of transcendental thought is intimately related to 
his idea of the functioning of language.  Derrida meticulously traces the operative 
binary opposition in Husserl’s theory of signs – specifically in Husserl’s earlier work, 
the Logische Untersuchungen – that parallels the other binary oppositions in his 
(later) work.67  According to Derrida, there is an immensely important distinction in 
Husserl’s theory of language that is not subjected to critical reflection by him: the 
distinction between indication (Anzeigen) and expression (Ausdruck).  Indication 
involves all occurrences of signs in the natural, empirical world.  It also denotes the 
physical vehicle of a sign (the signifier), whether it is the physical voice or a written 
symbol.  According to Husserl, indication comprises a certain motivation or 
movement: it is what moves something “such as a thinking being” to pass by thought 
from something to something else.68  Indication would therefore necessarily be 
involved as the medium by which inter-subjective communication takes place.  The 
problem with indication, which arises from its very nature as part of the world out 
there, is that it can deliver no certainty or absolute truth.  In Husserl’s view, certainty, 
truth and indeed meaning are the exclusive reserve of the expression. 
 
Prefiguring what will later become the eidetic and transcendental reductions of 
thought, Husserl abstracts from the general signification of what he calls indication a 
special kind of signification, which is called expression.  Expression takes place 
when a living subject wants to express something.  It is signification vivified by the 
intention to express69 of a living subject.  Only expressions are truly meaningful.  
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They provide the original charge of meaning carried by the signification of indication.  
Derrida summarises as follows:70 
 
“Pure expression will be the pure active intention (spirit, psychē, life, will) of an 
act of meaning (bedeuten) that animates a speech whose content 
(Bedeutung) is present.  It is present not in nature, since only indication takes 
place in nature and across space, but in consciousness.” 
 
Expression occurs purely in consciousness.  It does not take into account any state 
of affairs of the real world, or even the existence of other subjects.  What matters is 
the intentional meaning advanced by the thinking subject with regard to an object 
inside of thought.  How is this certain?  How is this absolutely truthful, without need 
for further clarification?  According to Husserl, the key is the living self presence of 
the subject.  The thinking subject, the ego of transcendental consciousness, is 
absolutely present to itself.  As such, it is absolutely present to the intentional 
expression of meaning.  This is ideal meaning - nothing more is needed.  Because 
the intentional meaning of an expression is ideal, it is also infinitely repeatable.  
Inside of consciousness, there is no loss of meaning or truth in repetition.  This is the 
case because the intention of meaning expressed in transcendental consciousness 
is not a communication of meaning.  It is only when the expression is externalised in 
the physical vehicle of indication that communication is introduced.   
 
The consideration of Derrida’s treatment of the Husserlian theory of language has 
confirmed the earlier conclusion at the end of the discussion of the transcendental 
reduction in general.  Phenomenology wants to reconcile the thinking subject and the 
object of thought by reducing both to transcendental consciousness.  From the 
foothold in transcendental consciousness, the space of meaning opens up.  This 
space is an interior which is rigorously shielded from an exterior of non-meaning and 
non-being.  Even though Husserl was radically opposed to dogmatic metaphysics 
and advocated scientific investigation, the nature of his whole project places him, in 
Derrida’s opinion, squarely within the grand tradition of metaphysical thought: 
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“[Philosophy] is the twilight of forces, that is, the sun-splashed morning in 
which images, forms, and phenomena speak; it is the morning of ideas and 
idols in which relief of forces becomes repose, its depth flattened in the light 
as it stretches itself into horizontality.”71 
 
It is, however, precisely this “repose of forces” in the philosophical moment that, 
according to Derrida, harbours a deeper violence: the violence of a specific truth 
being fixated, a form imposed at the expense of other possibilities - the violence of 
time in its flow arrested. 
 
 
2.4 Presence 
 
The notion of presence provides Derrida with a vital means of analysing what he 
takes to be the fixated nature of the whole tradition of western metaphysics.  Before 
attending to Derrida’s discussions of presence, it may be helpful to note the spatial, 
as well as the temporal, freightedness of the term.  Presence implies being situated 
in space and time - it implies a here and now.  From the perspective of space, 
presence would imply proximity, even absolute proximity.  From the perspective of 
time, presence indicates simultaneity.  It is also very difficult to separate the spatial 
and temporal aspects of presence in any absolute way.  Spatial presence implies the 
proximity of reference points at a given moment, and therefore also implies 
simultaneity.  Temporal presence implies simultaneity with regard to some fixed 
moment, and it is precisely this fixedness that invokes notions of spatiality.  This 
section will examine Derrida’s analysis of presence in phenomenology, linguistics 
and theology, while continually trying to bear in mind the spatial and temporal 
references inherent to the term.   
 
In order to gain insight into Derrida’s perspective on the functioning of the notion of 
presence in phenomenology, we may start by asking why Husserl finds it necessary 
to employ this notion.  With what end in mind is it used?  According to Derrida, 
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presence, in Husserl’s view, is intimately linked to being.  Presence is what opens up 
the experience of being as such.  It is the gateway to the most authentic life: 
 
“[W]hat is signified by phenomenology’s ‘principle of principles’? What does 
the value of primordial presence to intuition as source of sense and evidence, 
as the a priori of a prioris, signify?  First of all it signifies the certainty, itself 
ideal and absolute, that the universal form of all experience (Erlebnis), and 
therefore of all life, has always been and will always be the present.  The 
present alone is and ever will be.  Being is presence or the modification of 
presence.”72 
 
Being is what is present, and focusing on what is present therefore opens up an 
experience or intuition of true being.  To be present to being is to have certainty and 
access to the fullness of life.  Formulated with specific philosophical questions in 
mind, presence to being is the holy grail of the quest for the unification of rationalism 
and empiricism - it is nothing less than the reconciliation of the res cogitans and the 
res extensa.   
 
In Husserl’s view, presence to being is achieved in the absolute self-presence of the 
subject of transcendental thought.  At a certain level, the thinking subject is 
absolutely transparent to itself, its intuition and its will.  Here, Derrida remarks, 
phenomenology differs profoundly from psychoanalysis, which proceeds precisely 
from the assumption that an important part of subjectivity is unconscious, and that 
conscious decisions are influenced by forces from the unconscious.73  According to 
Husserl, presence to self stems from the pure auto-affection of the subject.   The 
intuition of a transcendental object of thought – be it an object in the world, a state of 
the subject or a memory – is absolute.  In the world of indication, communication is 
necessary.  A certain state of affairs has to be communicated from one subject to 
another.  In other words, signs have to be used.  A sign is precisely that which has to 
supply meaning where full meaning is lacking.  However, in the pure auto-affection of 
the subject of transcendental thought, no communication, and therefore no 
signification, is necessary.  The fullness of meaning is immediate and absolute. 
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It is important to note what happens to space and time in Husserl’s presence as self-
presence: both are reduced.  As has been described above, space is completely 
reduced, only to re-emerge as the spatialised space of meaning.  Time is, however, 
also reduced.  It becomes the “now” of absolute proximity to self.  Derrida formulates 
this as follows: “Self-presence must be produced in the undivided unity of a temporal 
present so as to have nothing to reveal to itself by the agency of signs.”74  This 
undivided unity of a temporal present has the character of a point, of the now as 
stigmē.  This “now” becomes the source point for pure auto-affection, for absolute 
proximity to self.75  And yet, as Derrida observes, Husserl cannot but introduce a 
series of oppositional pairs into his description, thereby complicating his description 
of the now as “primal form” (Urform) of consciousness:76 “[transcendental 
phenomenology] describes the living present as a primordial and incessant synthesis 
that is constantly led back upon itself, back upon its assembled and assembling self, 
by retentional traces and protentional openings.”77  The deconstruction of the 
temporal “now” of phenomenology will be examined again in the next chapter. 
 
While presence resides in the pure auto-affection of the subject (the intuition of 
meaning), it also resides in the purity of the expression of meaning.  As has already 
been mentioned, Husserl protects presence by making a radical distinction between 
expression and indication.  Indication involves an incomplete transfer of meaning, 
and puts processes such as interpretation into play, but expression is animated by 
the living presence of the subject to itself - in the case of expression, no loss of 
meaning is incurred.  According to Husserl, the present is always the living present.  
This means an expression is “backed up” by an intentional subject that wants to 
express that meaning here and now.  If the living will to say something (“vouloir dire”) 
is not present – for example, when an expression is written down – then it has fallen 
from presence and is in need of re-animation.   
 
It is precisely to protect the notion of presence and the privileged access to being 
that it provides according to him, that Husserl has to make a radical distinction 
                                            
74
 Ibid. p. 61. 
75
 Ibid. p. 53. 
76
 Ibid. p. 63, 64. 
77
 Ibid. p. 152. 
41 
 
between speech and writing, and to privilege the former above the latter.  In 
speaking, the subject hears himself speak – is completely present to himself 
speaking.  This ensures the animation of the expression by the will of the subject.  In 
contrast, writing is second-hand - it is removed from the living will of the expressing 
subject.  Transposing an expression into written signs exposes it to death: it has 
become mortal, and is no longer in direct contact with being.  To make a radical 
distinction between life and death, between expression and indication, between 
speech and writing, and then to elevate the one side of the distinction above the 
other: this is the price of presence, according to Derrida’s reading of Husserl. 
 
Phenomenological presence is intimately related to ideality.  The meaning that is 
expressed from out of the living intuition of the transcendental object is an ideal 
meaning.  It is the essence of the object that is expressed.  Because it is ideal, it is 
infinitely repeatable - without the loss of meaning, collateral to the drag of 
interpretation in inter-subjective communication.  Derrida’s interpretation of 
phenomenological ideality reads as follows: 
 
“But this ideality, which is but another name for the permanence of the same 
and the possibility of its repetition, does not exist in the world, and it does not 
come from another world; it depends entirely on the possibility of acts of 
repetition.  It is constituted by this possibility.  Its ‘being’ is proportionate to the 
power of repetition; absolute ideality is the correlate of a possibility of 
indefinite repetition.  It could therefore be said that being is determined by 
Husserl as ideality, that is, as repetition.”78  
 
The concept that emerges, as it were, out of the repetition of the ideal as a means of 
protecting presence is that of re-presentation.  The now of presence has to be 
affirmed and then re-affirmed from moment to moment.  Each new moment must re-
establish that presence is there and that it is identical to the ideal essence present in 
transcendental thought.  The “re-“ in the continuing reiteration of representation is, 
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according to Derrida, the Trojan horse inside of presence that will shake the whole of 
this spatialising structure.79 
 
In Derrida’s view, it is this chain of presence-ideality-repeatability-representation that 
indisputably links Husserl to the grand tradition of Western metaphysics.  Even 
though Husserl himself was critical of unfounded metaphysical assumptions, and 
rejected Platonic realism with regard to the world of ideas, he nevertheless 
maintained that ideality is a way of being that is irreducible to sensible existence or 
empirical reality and their fictional counterparts.  In determining the ontos on as an 
eidos, Plato and Husserl are, according to Derrida, affirming the same thing.80 
 
The insights gained from listening to Derrida’s treatment of Husserl may be 
expanded into an understanding of Derrida’s problematisation of Western 
metaphysics in general.81  As has already been observed, the closure of the age of 
presence is indicated at the beginning of De la Grammatologie with a manifesto-like 
conviction and references to a “necessity” that strangely belie the anti-teleological 
stance of Derrida’s thought.82  While this observation will have to be taken up again 
later, we remain for the moment with Derrida’s treatment of the epoch of presence, in 
order to gain further insight into its profile.   
 
The epoch of presence is, according to Derrida, the epoch of the Logos, of epistemē 
and of truth.  Wherever the fullness of experience is referred to an organising Logos, 
there presence may be said to reign, as the Logos is inevitably conceptualised as 
some final master-word that is taken to be the organising principle of what exists. 
The Logos is an enduring pattern or constellation of meaning.  As such, it is 
presence itself - it becomes the point of orientation for all experience.  The Logos is 
what makes epistemē as scientific knowledge possible: that knowledge that is 
certain because it conceptualises the essence of the experienced things – an 
essence that these things have precisely because of their relationship to the Logos 
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as presence.  This relationship to the Logos is also what constitutes the truth of 
beings.  Beings are true to the extent that they share in the truth of Being, which is 
another word for presence.  Being expresses its meaning as Logos, whereby 
everything is bound into a unity. 
 
The epoch of presence, in which experience is referred to a master-word or logos, is 
therefore, by its very nature, the epoch of the sign.  A sign is what refers to 
something else (Being; Logos) in order to lay claim to its presence in the here and 
now, even though the fullness of that presence is absent in the here and now.  The 
sign is what bridges the interval between what is experienced and what is taken to 
be the absolute point of orientation – or presence.  This formulation confirms the 
most traditional metaphysical description of the sign as consisting of two “sides”: a 
signifier and a signified.  In explaining why he prefers on a certain point the 
Nietzchean text as less metaphysical than the Heideggerian, Derrida states the 
following (wherein the metaphysical character of the sign emerges): 
 
“…Heideggerian thought [on Being] would reinstate rather than destroy the 
instance of the logos and of the truth of being as ‘primum signatum:’ the 
transcendental signified (‘transcendental’ in a certain sense, as in the Middle 
Ages the transcendental – ens, unum, verum, bonum – was said to be the 
‘primum cognitum’) implied by all categories or all determined significations, 
by all lexicons and all syntax, and therefore by all linguistic signifiers, though 
not to be identified simply with any of those signifiers, allowing itself to be 
precomprehended through each of them, remaining irreducible to all the 
epochal determinations that it nonetheless makes possible, thus opening the 
history of the logos, yet itself being only through the logos; that is, being 
nothing before the logos and outside of it.  The logos of being, ‘Thought 
obeying the voice of Being,’ is the first and last resource of the sign, of the 
difference between signans and signatum.  There has to be a transcendental 
signified for the difference between signifier and signified to be somewhere 
absolute and irreducible.”83 
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The transcendental signified is the meaning for which the empirical signifier (be that 
a word or an experience) is a placeholder.  And therefore, via the sign, all experience 
is referred to presence.  In being a reference to a presence that is not a plenitude in 
the here and now, the sign is, however, according to Derrida, also precisely a re-
presentation.  This representation in the service of presence and of meaning makes 
of the sign an accomplice to a fixating, dominating regime: through its representation 
of a transcendent presence, the sign holds all of reality subject to some grand 
master-meaning.  The result of the hegemony of presence is spatialisation: reality is 
conceived of as bound together, yet spread out before presence, somewhat like the 
lands of a feudal lord are spread out before and around his castle. 
 
If the epoch of presence is the epoch of the sign, it may also, according to the same 
logic, be described as the epoch of the phonē, the spoken sign.  Because there 
exists a presence to which everything else is referred, it follows that certain referents 
may be closer to original presence than others, and should therefore be taken to be 
superior or more pure signs.  In the same vein, Derrida analyses the whole history of 
the priority – even dominance – of the phonic signifier.  Aristotle is taken to be a 
classic example.84  According to Aristotle, the voice, as the producer of the first 
symbols, has an essential and immediate relationship with the mind.  The signifiers 
produced by the voice are not merely signifiers amongst others - they are the 
privileged signifiers of mental experiences, which themselves reflect or mirror things 
by natural resemblance.  Things or beings are reflected naturally in the mind, and 
these mental experiences are then first and foremost represented in speech as 
phonic signifiers.85  In every situation, according to Aristotle and the subsequent 
metaphysical tradition, the voice is closest to the signified, whether the latter is 
determined strictly as sense (be that thought sense or lived sense) or more loosely 
as a thing.  However, if certain signifiers (the phonic) are taken to be most proximate 
to the logos as meaning, it follows that other signifiers are less proximate, secondary 
and derivative.  This insight affords Derrida the opportunity to analyse the repressed 
status of the written signifier in the age of phonocentrism, which will be discussed 
below. 
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For all his attention to the constitutive role of difference in the working of language, 
Ferdinand de Saussure is nevertheless taken by Derrida to be an important twentieth 
century exponent of the logocentric tradition, which is also a phonocentric tradition.86  
Saussure defines the project and object of general linguistics as follows: “The 
linguistic object is not defined by the combination of the written word and the spoken 
word: the spoken form alone constitutes the object.”87  This is the case because the 
spoken form is self-contained and capable of bearing the full burden of signification. 
The spoken word is already a unity of sense and sound, of concept and voice, of 
signified and signifier.  In the unity of the thought-sound, the intimation of meaning by 
way of reference is successfully achieved.   
 
Alongside, or rather behind, language as speech, follows a second distinct system of 
signs – that of writing.  The function of the written sign, according to Derrida’s 
analysis of Saussure, is to be a sign of a sign.  It has to represent, in an external 
manner, the presence signified by the spoken sign in an internal manner (because of 
the alleged natural proximity of sense and sound in the spoken word.)  The radical 
distinction between an outside and an inside (itself spatial designations), equivalent 
to the radical distinction between writing and speech, may be explained in terms of 
the notions of space and time, which are of specific interest to the present study.  
According to Derrida, it is no coincidence that writing in Western culture developed 
as a linear form of signification.  Because writing is representing in a spatial, exterior 
way the signification effected by speech in a temporal medium (that of sound), the 
written signifiers are linked in a linear consecutive chain, thereby in a sense 
representing consecutive moments of presence.  This representation has an 
interesting effect.  While the phonic signifier, which in its materiality is temporally 
ordered, is privileged, the representation practised by the written sign has a 
spatialising effect: signification and meaning is linearised and stretched out.  The 
radical distinction between inside and outside, enforced by the metaphysical epoch 
of logocentrism and phonocentrism, therefore appears to lead to a parallel radical 
distinction between space and time.  While being radically distinguished, space and 
time nevertheless mirror each other: spatialisation is the mirroring representation of 
                                            
86
 Ibid. p. 29. 
87
 Ibid. 31, as quoted by Derrida.  Italics added by Derrida. 
46 
 
the temporally ordered voice in its proximity to presence.88  The metaphysics of 
presence, on the other hand, leads to a “vulgar concept of time”89, in that history is 
spread out in a past, present and future bound together by a centre (a spatial 
notion), which is the logos.  As will become apparent later, Derrida, in his 
deconstruction of presence, favours a notion of space-time whereby, in ways that 
remain to be investigated, a parallel with developments in twentieth century physics 
– particularly relativity theory – emerges.   
 
In Saussure’s view, writing’s natural place is therefore as an auxiliary, non-necessary 
re-presentation of the primary system of signification, which is speech.  In making 
this distinction, he is, according to Derrida, following a well-travelled metaphysical 
path that starts at least with Plato.  In his essay entitled Plato’s Pharmacy, Derrida in 
fact mentions De Saussure as an heir of Plato with regard to the subsidiary position 
of writing in relation to speech.90  In a fashion similar to his treatment of Saussure 
and Husserl, Derrida analyses Plato as an exponent of the Western metaphysical 
tradition.  Due to Plato’s position at the earliest articulations of this tradition, and also 
because of “the incomparable subtlety and force of his conceptualization” of it, 
Derrida acknowledges that the whole of this metaphysical tradition with which he is 
in dialogue may in a sense be termed Platonism.91 
 
The defining characteristic of Plato’s system, according to Derrida, is its binarism, 
which he traces in the form of a chain of binary oppositional metaphors that are 
utilised throughout Socrates’ many discourses.  With regard to the structure of the 
myth of writing in the Phaedrus, Derrida summarises Plato’s binarism as follows:  
 
“Plato had to make his tale conform to structural laws.  The most general of 
these [are] those that govern and articulate the oppositions speech/writing, 
life/death, father/son, master/servant, first/second, legitimate son/orphan-
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bastard, soul/body, inside/outside, good/evil, seriousness/play, day/night, 
sun/moon etc…”92 
 
In a painstaking and brilliant manner, Derrida analyses many of the mentioned 
oppositions in Plato’s thought.  The analysis of the ontological import of the 
father/son oppositional metaphor is a salient example.  In Plato’s Pharmacy, Derrida 
devotes a section to “The Father of Logos.”93  Logos is meaning.  It is what binds the 
disparate and variable impressions of reality into a coherent experience, which at the 
same time spreads it out into a single landscape with a single horizon 
(spatialisation.)  The statement that Logos is meaning should, however, be further 
refined.  It would be more accurate to say that Logos is the articulation of a meaning 
that arises from somewhere else.  The Logos is the word of the Father.  The Father 
is the origin of the Logos and the one that animates the Logos.  Because of its origin 
in the presence of the Father, the Logos is a logon zoon, a living word.  In the 
Platonic discourse, the Father is referred to by many names.  In the myth of the 
origin of writing in the Phaedrus, the Father is also the Sun God, Ammun-Ra.  The 
Sun-God is the creator of everything through his sun-filled voice.  His light illuminates 
everything.  Sometimes, the Father is described as the Good, sometimes as the 
epekeina tes ousias - that which surpasses all being.   
 
This last, well known expression by Plato is important, as it provides Derrida with a 
point of entry into the structure of the binary logic operating in Platonic thought.  
Precisely because the Father is epekeina tes ousias, He is in a sense unmentionable 
in terms of being.  Like another metaphor for Him, the sun, which cannot be looked 
at with the naked eye, the Father cannot be grasped directly.  He can only be 
mentioned by way of His son, the Logos.  The Logos is the articulation of meaning, 
and in the articulation of meaning the fatherhood of the Father is taken for granted.  
The Logos is an expression of the presence of the Father, who is in Himself absent, 
because He cannot be grasped - He is beyond articulation.94   
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Thus, the Logos is a good son, a royal son that faithfully presents the Father in all 
matters and thereby maintains the Father’s dominions in a single unity, both spatially 
and temporally.  This is the case for as long as the Logos is a logon zoon.  However, 
here too, as Derrida suggests, as soon as meaning becomes inscribed as writing, it 
loses its vitality.  Contrary to Saussure, who saw in writing a system of signification 
distinct from speech, Plato holds writing to be half-dead speech: 
 
“There is only a logos more or less alive, more or less distant from itself.  
Writing is not an independent order of signification; it is weakened speech, 
something not completely dead: a living-dead, a reprieved corpse, a deferred 
life, a semblance of breath … the simulacrum of living discourse is not 
inanimate; it is not insignificant; it simply signifies little, and always the same 
thing.”95 
 
The best that can be said of writing is that it is a technical skill, a mere 
hypomnemonic aid to speech.  In the worst case scenario, writing is a devious 
poison (a pharmakon, in one of its meanings) that seeks to invert the God-ordained 
hierarchical order and to supplant meaning.96  To use another metaphor, writing is 
the bastard son of meaning that wants to commit parricide.  Derrida grabs hold of 
this notion of the supplementing activity of writing, which is in fact a supplanting, and 
argues that this is always the case.  Writing is in fact more originary and there is a 
completely different logic from the binary to be recognised with regard to the 
intimation of meaning.  The deconstruction of the metaphysical tradition which, 
according to Derrida, is built on a binary logic of meaning intimation by the logic of 
writing, will be discussed in the next chapter.  Let us for the moment content 
ourselves with a summary of the binary logic of meaning intimation which, according 
to Derrida, is responsible for the spatialisation of meaning, as analysed in various 
texts.   
 
In Derrida’s view, the whole edifice of Western metaphysics is built on the 
assumption of an all-important signified to which all of experience is referred.  This 
point of reference is the highest being and the most original presence.  Its presence 
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is not, however, a presence consummated in experience.  Experience and presence 
do not constitute a single unity- instead, they constitute two poles of an irreducible 
duality.  The referral – or transferral – of experience to (absent) presence is what 
constitutes meaning, according to this logic.  This is precisely the function of the sign 
in the binary logic of Western metaphysics.  The binary sign allows for meaning 
intimation by being made up of two sides: a material signifier and an ideal signified, 
which are taken to be two sides of the same thing.  In itself, the sign effects the 
traversal from the one pole to the other.  Derrida formulates this as follows: 
 
“The reassuring evidence within which Western tradition had to organize itself 
and must continue to live would therefore be as follows: the order of the 
signified is never contemporary, it is at best the subtly discrepant inverse or 
parallel – discrepant by the time of a breath – from the order of the signifier.  
And the sign must be the unity of a heterogeneity, since the signified (sense 
or thing, noema or reality) is not in itself a signifier, a trace: in any case is not 
constituted in its sense by its relationship with a possible trace.  The formal 
essence of the signified is presence, and the privilege of its proximity to the 
logos as phonē is the privilege of presence.”97 
 
According to Derrida, the binary logic of meaning intimation, as described by him, is 
the underlying mechanism that facilitates the violence inherent to metaphysics.  
Because the sign represents a fixed presence, experience has to conform to this 
presence.  This, according to Derrida, always leads to the systematic exclusion of 
some part of the rich variety of experience.  There is always a supplement that is not 
covered by the sign used, and that is then repressed and excluded.  In Derrida’s 
view, this malady is evidenced in the hierarchical oppositions effected by a binary 
logic of meaning: one pole of the opposition is always subordinated to the other. 
 
Under the reign of the binary sign, space and time manifest their fixatedness: they 
are two separate realms that mirror each other in their re-presentation of presence. 
In Derrida’s analysis, the phonic signifier is taken to be naturally the closest to the 
signified presence.  As the phonic signifier is a temporally ordered signifier, presence 
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may be said to be first and foremost temporally fixated.  The phonic signifier is, in its 
turn, externalised in space – for example, in the written sign.  The written sign 
represents the spoken sign, and in a linear fashion spreads out that which follows 
one another consecutively in the order of time.  The result is a spatialisation of 
presence:  the whole of experience is spread out before presence.  The mirroring 
between space and time results in time, in its turn, being spatialised as well: this is 
the origin of history as a bound-together whole with a past, present and future. 
 
In the second part of this chapter, an alternative analysis of spatialisation will be 
proposed.  On the one hand, the fixating violence of spatialisation will be judged 
equally negatively.  What Derrida has analysed in terms of a binary logic of meaning 
intimation will be understood in terms of the radical distinction and separation of 
transcendence and immanence, which gained cultural and philosophical prominence 
at the beginning of modernity.  The analysis in terms of transcendence and 
immanence will also afford the opportunity to suggest a different genealogy for the 
phenomenon of spatialisation.  Contrary to what Derrida believes, it will be 
suggested that the whole of Western thought does not go hand in hand with a radical 
separation of transcendence in immanence.  Derrida’s proposal (which will be 
examined in the next chapter) of an ontology, epistemology and semiology of 
transcendence in immanence does have historical precedents.  Ultimately, however, 
the question has to do with the kinds of transcendence in immanence that are 
suggested by the historical precedents, as interpreted in the present study, and by 
deconstruction respectively. 
 
 
2.5 On the contrary: an ecstatic Platonism and a high scholastic theology of  
 participation in the infinite 
 
An alternative reading of the history of Western thought to the one suggested by 
Derrida is possible.  According to this alternative reading, Western metaphysics may 
not be dismissed tout court as the history of the fixating violence of logocentrism and 
Presence.  The proposal of an alternative reading does not, however, imply that the 
whole of the Derridean analysis is deemed to be invalid.  Derrida’s indictment of the 
spatialisation wrought by modern thought is shared, and in many respects, 
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endorsed.  The shared sentiment extends to the analysis of the modern rational 
subject standing as it were over against the rest of reality given in its experience, and 
mapping it onto a rational and technically manipulable grid.  Yet, Derrida’s 
generalisation of his analysis of the presence of modernity into a similar diagnosis of 
the whole of Western thought can and should be met with an alternative proposal.  
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the exploration of alternative readings of 
Plato and Aquinas, followed by an alternative genealogy of the spatialisation that is 
characteristic of modern thought. 
 
In the previous section, it was noted how Derrida, especially in his essay entitled 
Plato’s Pharmacy, attempted to indicate a fixation on a static and rigid presence in 
Socrates’ speeches, and furthermore alleged that this fixation became the dominant 
theme of Western metaphysics.  An alternative understanding of Plato’s legacy does, 
however, exist and has recently been articulated again by a British philosopher of 
religion, Catherine Pickstock.  The first chapter of Pickstock’s book, entitled After 
Writing,98 performs a meticulous reading mainly of Plato’s Phaedrus, which explicitly 
refutes Derrida’s reading of this dialogue and of Plato in general.  Pickstock points 
out, firstly, that Plato/Socrates himself is in fact precisely attacking presence as 
manifested in the instrumentalisation and commodification of language by the 
sophists.  Secondly, her rebuttal of Derrida’s reading attempts to show the 
generalisations present in the Derridean reading of Plato.  Thirdly, Pickstock’s 
analysis seeks to provide an alternative reading of the project of Platonic thought – 
one that does not fall prey to the accusation of fixatedness due to an attachment to 
metaphysical presence. 
 
The first point to be made then, following Pickstock, is that Socrates, far from 
advocating a spatialisation through the referencing of eternal ideas, is actually 
attacking spatialisation as it is manifested in the implications of sophistic thought.  A 
sophistic sensibility, as exemplified by Phaedrus in the dialogue of the same name, 
seeks to use language to its own advantage.99  Thus, the written version of Lysias’ 
speech becomes a means to provoke Socrates into delivering a rival speech.  The 
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speech itself, as well as Socrates’ initial rival “sophistic” speech, extols the 
advantages of non-commitment.  Phaedrus is eager to hear Socrates’ speech on the 
same subject, not for its own sake, but so that he may augment the effectiveness of 
his appeal when using this speech, as well as that of Lysias, in the future.  Both the 
way in which Lysias’ speech functions in the dialogue and the content thereof 
suggest an instrumentalisation and commodification of language.  The written 
character of the speech makes it transferable to many different situations.  
Furthermore, the person to which the non-erotic speech would be addressed, in 
order to convince him of the excellence of a purely contractual relationship, is in fact 
reduced to an object.  He is being manipulated for the pleasure and advantage of the 
one making the speech.  The written rhetoric of the sophists, exemplified by 
Phaedrus and specifically manifested in the manner in which he uses Lysias’ 
speech, is the object of Socrates’ sarcasm, as well as serious critique.  Phaedrus’ 
use of language is revealed as self-serving, merely in the interest of the pleasure of 
the subject using it.  In the end, such use of language reduces it to nothing but 
manipulation, mastery and control – and therefore to violence.  In addition, it 
excludes any true inter-subjectivity.  The contractual view of interpersonal relations 
implies that the other becomes a means to an end, and not an end in him-/herself.   
 
Although Lysias’ speech and the rival sophistic speech that Socrates delivers initially 
both purport to allow for more difference, therein that this attitude will not result in the 
subject becoming tied to only one lover, this attitude in fact bears witness to an even 
greater indifference.  The practice of moving from one addressee to another implies 
that all recipients of the sophistic speech are in the end regarded as merely the 
same: they are not appreciated for their individuality - they are commodities to be 
used for the pleasure of the one delivering the speech.   
 
What emerges from Plato’s dialogues is therefore, in Catherine Pickstock’s view, a 
distinctly negative judgement of the underlying ontology and epistemology of the 
sophists.  Regarding the latter, the sophistic consciousness may be said to be a 
proto-Cartesian consciousness, in that it explicitly establishes the subject as agent 
over against other entities, which are treated as objects or commodities to be 
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manipulated.100  Such an approach excludes true inter-subjectivity and is unable to 
accommodate uniqueness.  The result is indifference - a univocal and purely 
immanent ontology grounded in the language of the fixed subject.   
 
According to Pickstock, a distinctly different view of language, knowledge and reality 
emerges from Socrates’ second, “erotic” speech in the Phaedrus, and from the 
platonic corpus in general.101  Pickstock notes that far from being a defence of 
Presence, as Derrida alleges, the Socratic preference for orality is primarily linked to 
an account of the subject as doxological.102  Doxology, praise of the divine, first and 
foremost implies that the divine is seen to exist as an other subject.  Doxology, at its 
most basic level, presupposes inter-subjectivity.  The divine as subject is there and is 
not reducible to an object to be manipulated.  In fact, in seeing the primary inter-
subjective relationship as the relationship with the divine, as opposed to first and 
foremost a relationship with other humans, the human subject relinquishes the 
initiative and becomes an ecstatic subject. 
 
In the Phaedrus, Socrates narrates the myth wherein the soul (of gods as well as 
men) is likened to a winged chariot drawn by two horses and driven by a charioteer 
(246a.)103  With regard to the wings of the soul, he says the following:   
 
“The natural property of a wing is to carry what is heavy upwards, lifting it aloft 
to the region where the race of the gods resides, and in a way, of all the 
things belonging to the sphere of the body, it has the greatest share in the 
divine, the divine being beautiful, wise, good and everything which is of that 
kind (246 d5, e1).” 
 
                                            
100
 Ibid. p. 7. 
101
 In a recent essay in Modern Theology, Pickstock elaborates further on a reading of the “other 
Plato” that differs from the “terminal Plato” of Derrida and others, as well as from the “epistemological 
Plato” of Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy.  Catherine Pickstock, “The Late Arrival of Language: 
Word, Nature and the Divine in Plato’s Cratylus”, Modern Theology, 27:2, April 2011.  For a critique of 
Pickstock’s reading of Plato, see Eli Diamond, “Catherine Pickstock, Plato and the Unity of Divinity 
and Humanity: Liturgical or Philosophical?” in Wayne J. Hankey and Douglas Hedley (eds.), 
Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), p. 1ff. 
102
 After Writing, p. 4. 
103
 Phaedrus, translated by Christopher Rowe (London: Penguin, 2005).  All further references to the 
Phaedrus appear in parentheses in the text. 
54 
 
As in this passage, the divine, to whom the human subject stands in relation, is often 
described by Plato as the good (also the beautiful, the true, etc.)  The good, 
according to Plato, is a transcendent good - it cannot be grasped or completely 
fathomed.  The good always exceeds all characterisations thereof.  Pickstock’s 
reading of the good in Plato clearly contradicts Derrida’s reading, in which the good 
is seen as an unapproachable and therefore fetishised ideal.104  The good, as 
epekeina tes ousias, is not an absent presence represented firstly by oral, and 
derivatively by written, signs.  To see the epekeina tes ousias in this way, as Derrida 
does, is to think of it in immanent or ontic terms, whereas it should in fact be 
regarded as a transcendent and always overflowing plenitude.  The good is beyond 
the distinction of presence and absence.  “The fact that it cannot be grasped by a 
mathēma and is unsayable does not identify it with absence.  Rather its mode of 
‘presence’ is articulated through the gifts which it bestows, the beyond being which, 
as difference, gives things to be…”105.   
 
Pickstock goes on to interpret Plato’s portrayal of the transcendence of the good as 
a kind of contagion, due to the fact that its plenitude spills over into immanence, in 
such a way that the good is revealed in the beauty of physical particulars.106  In the 
immanent realm of physical particulars, all things share to some extent in the good, 
because they derive from the transcendent good which, in its plenitude, overflows 
into immanence. 
 
The fact that all things participate in the good means that all things, to the extent that 
they are good, refer back to the transcendent good from which they derive.  Their 
participation in the good imparts to all physical particulars a character of doxological 
reference.  While all of immanent reality may be said to have a doxological 
character, this attitude of praise finds its highest expression in the human subject.  
Upon observing the beauty of a particular object, the will is stirred by desire (ēros).  It 
is ēros that brings the soul into motion and lifts it up on the way to the good.  The 
non-fixated, always overflowing character of the divine is thus inter-subjectively 
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participated in by the human subject who is, precisely because of this participation, 
equally mobile, that is, non-fixated.   
 
What emerges out of the foregoing paragraphs is an image of the human subject as 
an ecstatic subject: its reference is doxologically outside of itself in the divine.  
Because the divine is always overflowing, the ekstasis of the human subject similarly 
always evades fixation.  The contrast between the ecstatic platonic subject and the 
proto-Cartesian sophistic subject is analysed by Pickstock in the different attitudes of 
Socrates and Phaedrus.107  The latter’s mercantile sensibilities lead him to use the 
speech of a non-citizen, Lysias, in an instrumental way, in order to gain a secure 
footing from where to manipulate and turn matters to his own advantage.  Socrates, 
on the other hand, who is a citizen of Athens (autochthonous), is paradoxically much 
more appreciative of the surroundings where the interlocutors find themselves 
outside the city walls.  Socrates’ doxological attitude allows him to better appreciate 
the novel experience of the beautiful place where they find themselves.  The beauty 
of the particular things that he observes refers Socrates’ gaze to the good wherein 
they participate, and brings him to honour the gods.  In Pickstock’s words: “By 
leaving the city walls behind, both literally and figuratively, Socrates has not become 
indifferent to place, in the manner of the Phaedrean mathēsis which can operate 
anywhere, but rather sees places all the more intensely.”108   
 
The ontology that emerges from Pickstock’s doxological reading of Plato has, as its 
main feature, a transcendent, but always overflowing good that gives immanent 
reality to be.  Immanent reality, and eminently the human subject, is reciprocally 
mobile therein that through participation in the good, it is always on a doxological 
journey to the good.  Participation in the transcendent, overflowing good allows 
appreciation of real differences between particulars, without conceding to absolute 
and relationless difference.  Pickstock makes the last point as follows: 
 
“Dialectical differentiation is quite other from sophistic classification because it 
is thus combined with synopsis, which sees things together as one and only 
thereby as different, and exhibiting novelty through time...  Both recognition as 
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self-knowledge and recognition as knowledge of everything else are matters 
of seeing together and separating out.  Thus we only glimpse the differences 
of the finite in their orientation towards, and yet separation from, the 
transcendent realm.”109 
 
The epistemology concomitant with the ontology that emerges in this alternative 
reading of Plato is equally itinerant.  The movement whereby the will is propelled by 
ēros to the good in the perception of beauty has already been described, but how is 
this to be rhymed with platonic recollection (anamnesis), an important building block 
of platonic epistemology?  In this regard, it should be noted that there is a complex 
process of dialectical recognition at work in the erotic subject.  When the 
philosopher-lover glimpses the good in the physical world, he receives from without 
what he recognises from within his memory – that which at one time he had received 
from a transcendence without, at the time when his soul was in harmony with the 
good.110  The memory recollected here is not by way of the retrospective repetition of 
an experience of the pre-existent soul, but a non-identical repetition in the inhabited 
present.111  The act of recognition is initially triggered from without by some element 
of the physical world, but the resulting recognition is simultaneously and 
ambiguously internal and external – self-knowledge and memory of the good 
respectively.  Pickstock comments that in this yoking together of memory and 
perception, eternity seems more contemporaneous than the present moment.112  
The harmony with the good which the soul recollects is part of its eternal giftedness, 
and not the repetition of an experience which it had as an already separately existing 
and completely sealed off interiority.  Recollection stems from inter-subjectivity and 
ēros is doxologically on its way to fuller inter-subjectivity.  Furthermore, according to 
this scheme, it becomes impossible to assign pure activity or pure passivity to the 
thinking subject.  Rather, the erotic gaze hovers between activity and passivity as it 
receives into itself by way of recognition that which offers itself to be recognised in its 
giftedness. 
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In summary then, the Platonic/Socratic preference for orality and suspicion of writing 
should be understood in light of the doxological nature of language, and not 
according to a rigid, binary distinction between presence and absence, as proposed 
by Derrida.  Upon this alternative reading, the spoken word has priority, not because 
of its purported proximity to full presence, whereby it may be used as a dominating 
master word, but precisely because of its mobility.  The spoken word has priority to 
the extent that it is more properly liturgical, doxological and erotic - in other words, to 
the extent that it is more mobile and on the way to the good.  All language that is 
separated from doxology results in a sophistic “virtual reality” or realm of mere 
fiction, which is manipulable, ironic and uninhabited.113  Due to the facile 
commodifiability of a written text, the danger of this happening is greater in written 
language, but it may also happen in oral discourse, for example where rhetoric loses 
its connection with dialectic in un-erotic speech.  Likewise, written language is not 
always unliturgical and therefore bad. Socrates’ dialogues are after all handed down 
in written form.  As Pickstock notes, “the interplays between son and father, writing 
and speech, moon and sun are not violent or incompatible spatial oppositions but 
enact a kind of asymmetrical reciprocity, or non-identical repetition.”114  Even if the 
initiative lies with the one side of the distinction (father, son, speech), the non-
identical repetition effected by the other side affords true appreciation of difference, 
and not the violent suppression thereof. 
 
The above reading of Plato has been advanced in order to argue that a monolithic 
reading of the history of Western metaphysics, as fixated on presence, may be 
unwarranted.  In the same way, a reading of the high scholastic theology of 
participation in the infinite, as articulated by Thomas Aquinas, will now be attempted.  
Unlike in the case of Plato, direct engagement with Aquinas’ thought is all but absent 
from the Derridean corpus.  This being so, Derrida nevertheless makes references 
that seem to include Thomistic theology in his indictment of Western metaphysics.  
In a telling passage from Grammatology, Derrida makes the following general 
statement about onto-theology: 
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“The subordination of the trace to the full presence summed up in the logos, 
the humbling of writing beneath a speech dreaming its plenitude, such are the 
gestures required by an onto-theology determining the archaeological and 
eschatological meaning of being as presence, as parousia, as life without 
difference: another name for death, historical metonymy where God’s name 
holds death in check.  That is why, if this movement begins its era in the form 
of Platonism, it ends in infinitist metaphysics.  Only infinite being can reduce 
the difference in presence.  In that sense, the name of God, at least as it is 
pronounced within classical rationalism, is the name of indifference itself.  
Only a positive infinity can lift the trace, ‘sublimate’ it…  We must not therefore 
speak of a ‘theological prejudice,’ functioning sporadically when it is a 
question of the plenitude of the logos; the logos as sublimation of the trace is 
theological.  Infinitist theologies are always logocentrisms, whether they are 
creationisms or not.”115 
 
With regard to Christian theology God, as infinite being, functions as guarantor of 
presence.  The fixating violence of presence is safeguarded by sublimating it into a 
transcendent infinite – such, at least, is deconstruction’s allegation.  This being the 
case, the charge continues, there is structurally no difference between the rationality 
exemplified by Christian theology and that of ancient Platonism.  Furthermore, what 
aggravates the situation with regard to Christianity is that it purports to be a message 
of universal peace.  While preaching peace and goodwill, Christianity, however, in 
fact commits violence in the form of a universal fixation of its own particular 
conception of presence.116 
 
The accusation that the rationality of Christian theology masks a metaphysics of 
presence by sublimating it to an infinite transcendent is, however, susceptible to 
serious criticism.  While it may be readily accepted that Christian theology proceeds 
from a binary logic of meaning intimation, in that it does accept a transcendence over 
and within the immanent, the inference that this inevitably leads to a structurally 
violent fixation can and must be met with the proposal of a different logical inference, 
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as well as a different reading of the history of Christian theology.  The argument that 
follows suggests that the binary logic of meaning intimation present in the theology of 
Thomas Aquinas functions in a non-fixating way.  If this is indeed the case, the 
implication for the conversation with Derrida is that his reading of the history of 
Western metaphysics is open to a charge of structuralist generalisation.117 
 
Almost since its inception, Christianity articulated its belief in the relationship 
between God and his creation, as expressed in the Old and New Testaments, also in 
terms of the Hellenistic intellectual apparatus prevalent at that time.118  The 
appropriation of Hellenistic sensibilities, and especially certain forms of neo-
Platonism, may be seen in the discussion around and resolution of the prominent 
Trinitarian and Christological controversies during the early Christian centuries.  
Thus, Augustine and Boethius insisted that God is absolutely simple, so that no 
distinctions can be made between God’s essence and his existence, or between 
God himself and his properties, such as His goodness, wisdom and truth.  Indeed, 
such is the perfection of God that no real distinction is allowed between one 
perfection, such as goodness, and another, such as truth (the celebrated doctrine of 
the convertibility of the transcendentals.119)  What may be termed this neo-platonic 
tradition of Christian theology was further characterised by the emphasis of a 
number of Greek theologians, most importantly the Pseudo-Dionysius, on the 
absolute transcendence of God.  Thus, nothing positive can really be affirmed of God 
- all affirmation necessarily falls short, since God is always greater than what we can 
say of Him (the approach that, in time, came to be known as negative theology).     
 
The rediscovery of the greater part of Aristotle’s writings posed a major challenge for 
the traditional platonistic theology of the Middle Ages.  Until the early twelfth century, 
Aristotle’s influence extended only to the discipline of logic (the so- called logica 
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vetus), the Categories and On Interpretation, supplemented by a few other works, 
including the Introduction by Porphyry and some commentaries by Boethius, being 
the only parts of his work that were available.  Between 1130 and 1170, the 
remainder of Aristotle’s logical works were introduced to the West (the so- called 
logica nova.)  Moreover, during the course of the next hundred years, Latin 
translations of Aristotle’s natural scientific writings, his political and literary treatises, 
and most importantly, his philosophical writings (On the soul, the Metaphysics, the 
Ethics) reached Europe, so that by 1270, Latin Christendom possessed practically 
the entire extant Aristotelian corpus.120  Aristotle confronted the West with a coherent 
view of reality that owed nothing to specifically Christian sources of inspiration. Thus, 
throughout the thirteenth century, theologians wrestled with the issues posed by 
Aristotle’s “naturalism.”  Some scholars, following Averroës, considered Aristotle’s 
teaching to be the supreme and final truth and sought to purge it of all neo-platonic 
“contaminations.” The best known of the radical Aristotelians were two masters at 
the arts faculty of Paris in the 1260’s and 1270’s: Siger of Brabant and Boetius of 
Dacia.121 Another movement within scholasticism, however, considered it possible to 
combine Aristotelianism with the Christian neo-platonism of Augustine and the 
Pseudo-Dionysius (in the process modifying both the Aristotelian and the Platonic 
elements122), thus softening the impact of Aristotle’s naturalism and rendering it more 
acceptable for traditional philosophical purposes.  The enormous scope of the 
systematic work of Thomas Aquinas undoubtedly earns him the first place among 
the ranks of the latter school of thought.  According to Aquinas, what people may 
assert in faith cannot and should not be without an intelligible basis in the general 
structure of the human experience of reality.  With this point of departure of Aquinas 
in mind, Rudi te Velde argues that an important thrust of the Thomistic project has 
been to interpret and transform the Aristotelian conception of prima philosophia as 
the study of being qua being precisely in order to thematise the inherent intelligibility 
of a creation in relationship with its Creator.123   
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A point of entry into Aquinas’ thought may be acquired by bearing in mind that 
Aquinas proceeds from an assumed ontology, and explicates epistemological 
questions from within this prior assumed state of affairs of the world.  This is different 
from a modern understanding, which no longer sees any way open to reality, save 
through the clarification of prior epistemological issues.124  While ontology and 
epistemology cannot be separated rigorously, and while any such attempts remain 
inevitably stereotypical, it will be argued later that the shift from starting with ontology 
to starting with epistemology has been one of the major shifts in Western intellectual 
activity.  Even though he at some stage advances certain intellectual “proofs” for the 
existence of God (which may also be taken to be arguments for the intelligibility of 
creation), Aquinas nevertheless, in important ways, simply accepts that God is the 
ground of all that exists, and that all of reality given in experience should be referred 
back to this final cause.   
 
Aquinas expounds his understanding of the relationship between God and creation 
by way of a number of traditional philosophical distinctions, of which the main one 
may be taken to be the distinction between existence and essence (or esse and 
essentia.)  Existence pertains to sheer being there, whereas essence seeks to 
answer the question: “what is there?”  God is the only one that exists in the fullest 
sense of the word.  This fullness of existence may be described in another way by 
stating that God is infinite, always excessive being; He is be-ing itself (ipsum esse.)  
Furthermore, God is what he is essentially.  This means that apart from being 
existence itself, God is also all predications of being in his own being: He is 
goodness itself, wisdom itself, truth itself, etc.  The distinction between existence and 
essence therefore serves its first purpose for Aquinas in the affirmation that in God, 
there is no distinction between them: in God, existence and essence coincide.  As 
being itself, God is also infinite goodness, truth and beauty.  God is not some 
abstract and void ground of being (as, for example, in Heidegger) - He is precisely 
also infinite form and so, in a sense, contains all form in Himself. 
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Whereas the being of God is a “real identity” of essence and existence, the being of 
creatures is constituted by a “real distinction” (distinctio realis) between essence and 
existence.125  Creaturely existence has its origin in God, to the extent that He 
contingently gives to be something which is not Himself and which is finite and 
dependent in its mode of existence. That which God gives to be is existent, good, 
wise, true and beautiful in a radically dependent way: all of these predications may 
be said of it only to the extent that it shares in God’s existence, goodness, wisdom, 
etc.  The real distinction between existence and essence is an expression of the 
radical contingency and dependence of the creature on God.  The formal essence of 
a creature (it’s quidditas; what it is) informs the fact of its existence (it’s haecceitas), 
but at the same time implies that the creature exists outside of itself, is incomplete in 
itself.  In the words of John Betz: “[A creature’s] essence is at once immanent to its 
existence and beyond it (or transcendent), so that existence itself is only given as the 
coming to be of essence.”126  The real distinction between creaturely existence and 
essence presents itself as a tension between a being that is “there” and “such”, yet 
whose “such” in fact remains to be attained, so that in its purity it is never really 
“there”.127   
 
A second distinction that is made alongside the first in Aquinas’ thought is the 
distinction between actuality and potentiality.  Aquinas understands being from the 
perspective of actuality.  According to him, “to be” primarily means “to be in act.” This 
provides another way to think of God as the highest be-ing: God is also the most 
actual being.  In God, there is no potentiality, as He is always completely actualised 
in His infinity.  Creaturely existence, however, is a mixture of actuality and 
potentiality.  The more the potentiality inherent in something is actualised, the closer 
it moves to realising the telos it was created for, and therefore, the higher the degree 
to which it participates in the divine being.   
 
Thirdly, and intimately connected with the previous distinctions, a general theory of 
causality informs Aquinas’ ontology.  According to this theory, every agent produces 
something like itself.  Agent causality and similarity cannot be separated.  Thus, 
                                            
125
 See Summa Theologiae I, q. 88, a. 2 – 4, as well as I, q. 3, a. 4 corp. 
126
 John R. Betz, “Beyond the Sublime: The Aesthetics of the Analogy of Being (part 2),” Modern 
Theology, 22:1, January 2006, p. 21. 
127
 Ibid.  Betz is here paraphrasing Erich Przywara. 
63 
 
creation, as caused by God, in some sense participates in his being, and is at the 
same time also drawn to God as it becomes more actual.   
 
The distinctions between infinite being and finite being, existence and essence and  
actuality and potentiality provide the means for speaking of the radical distinction, as 
well as intimate community, between God and His creation or, philosophically 
speaking, between transcendence and immanence.  On the one hand, God as 
infinite being radically transcends His finite creation.  God is always more - He can 
never be grasped or defined - His is an overflowing fullness of being.  On the other 
hand, God’s transcendence is not an absolute transcendence, in the sense that He 
is completely alien to His creation.  Creaturely being, to the extent that it exists in 
actuality, refers to infinite being, in whom it has its cause and finds its completion.  
Prior to all distinctions between substance and accidents, genera, species and 
subsistents being as being participates in infinite being to the extent that it exists and 
has actuality.   
 
In the words of Rudi te Velde:  
 
“God is conceived of [by Aquinas] as the universal principle and origin of that 
concrete totality of all things sharing in the common perfection of being (ens 
commune.)  In so far as the totality of all beings is not intelligible in itself, it 
must be understood as the multiplied and differentiated effect of that original 
fullness of being in relation to which the whole of reality becomes intelligible 
as being.  The differentiated esse of the many things, constituting the world, is 
not intelligible unless as derived from that which is ipsum esse.  So it is from 
this perspective that one can affirm and uphold the concrete and substantial 
reality of the world without identifying it with the ultimate reality.”128 
 
An eminently useful means of describing the shining through of transcendence in 
immanence, even while the ontological remove of immanence from transcendence is 
also maintained, is afforded by the notion of analogy.  This is so in spite of the fact 
that Aquinas rarely uses the term “analogy” as such.  What one finds in Aquinas is a 
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general division of terms into the categories “equivocal”, “univocal” and “analogical”, 
and he presents this threefold division as if he is simply using the divisions, 
definitions and examples with which everyone is familiar.129   
 
Whereas analogy was known in the platonic tradition as the manner in which 
material beings participate in ideal forms, the Aristotelian distinctions with regard to 
the different kinds of analogy provided Aquinas with a sophisticated means to 
describe the participation of immanence in transcendence, as well as the 
modulations existing within creaturely being.  In the Metaphysics 4.2 (1003a), 
Aristotle raises the general problem of the word “being” and its different senses, and 
he also introduces what is known as pros hen (ad unum) equivocation – the idea that 
different senses may be unified through a relationship to one central sense: 
 
“There are many senses in which being can be said, but they are related to 
one central point [pros hen], one definite kind of thing, and are not equivocal.  
Everything which is healthy is related to health … and everything which is 
medical to medicine…” 
 
This type of analogy became known as the analogy of attribution, and in the 
thirteenth century its special mark was being said in a prior and a posterior sense 
(per prius et posterius.)130  Another type of analogy is, however, also described in the 
Metaphysics131 - one that understands the relationship of being to beings as a 
proportion of mutual otherness (ως άλλo piρός άλλo, litt.: “one thing to another.”) 
Whereas a proportion exists, this proportion is not quantifiable, and therefore not 
able to be fixed in any way.  Analogy may now further involve the comparison of two 
proportions or relations.  Thus, “principle” was said to be an analogical term when 
said of a point and a spring of water, because a point is related to a line, just as a 
spring is related to a stream.  This type of analogy came to be known as the analogy 
of proportionality. 
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In explaining the relationship between God and his creation in terms of analogy, 
Aquinas had to revise Aristotle’s pros hen analogy (analogia attributionis), because 
the good or the being or the wisdom that can be said of God and creatures per 
analogiam is obviously not a tertium comparationis that is other than God himself.132  
Thus, the analogy of proportionality must be incorporated into the analogy of 
attribution - although there is a similarity between God and his creatures, there is 
also always an unquantifiable dissimilarity.   
 
Given that the being of God is a real identity of essence and existence, while in the 
being of creatures, there is a real distinction between essence and existence, the 
relationship between God and creation is necessarily one of analogy, indeed a 
relationship of ever greater dissimilarity, in spite of all similarity.  The theological 
formulation of the material content of the notion analogia entis hails from the time of 
the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), some two decades before Aquinas’ birth.  
According to a canon accepted at this council, “…one cannot note a similarity 
between Creator and the creature, however great, without the necessity of noting a 
greater dissimilarity between them.”133  This adage is one of the underlying premises 
of Aquinas’ thought.  John Milbank points to the following passage from the Summa 
Theologiae as a substantiation of the fact that one may speak of analogia entis in 
Aquinas as an ontological and not merely a linguistic or conceptual category (I.Q.4 a. 
3 resp): 
 
 “… if there is an agent not contained in any genus, its effects will still more 
distantly reproduce the form of the agent not, that is, so as to participate in the 
likeness of the agent’s form according to the same specific or generic 
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formality, but only according to some sort of analogy, as existence is common 
to all.”134 
 
Analogia entis thus provides a mediating third way between absolute equivocity and 
absolute univocity of being.  “This is because,” once again in the words of John 
Milbank, which also hint at the formulation of the Fourth Lateran council, “the 
transgeneric height of remoteness (all we know is even more unlike pure being, pure 
unity, etc. than one species or genus is unlike another) is nonetheless an equal 
closeness to everything, which reveals a hidden bond between finitely remote things 
and categories.”135  Analogia entis means that there is no absolute equivocity, since 
all differences between beings, regardless of how far apart they may be in the 
hierarchies of genera and species or even as absolute particularities, still derive from 
infinite transcendent Being.  And yet, genuine difference is not hereby abrogated, but 
may be even more emphatically affirmed.  Because creatures receive their being as 
a free and contingent gift from God, from whom they, as finite, are always more 
different than alike – even though they participate distantly in His being - creatures 
are also genuinely different from one another and not reducible to any overarching 
ontic designation.  Analogy allows respect for the genuine irreducible distinctness of 
creatures (their haeceitas) to be affirmed – there is no “presence” to which they refer 
– while at the same time holding that they nevertheless participate in an 
unquantifiable way in the transcendent Being of God (unquantifiable precisely 
because infinite).   
 
What Aquinas has done is to take Aristotle’s metaphysics of being, with its 
appreciation for the immanent sphere, and to incorporate it into a platonic scheme 
that works in terms of a participation of immanence in transcendence and 
concomitantly, a movement of immanence to transcendence, which is driven by 
desire.  The result of this fusion is that metaphysics, as the science assuming the 
intelligibility of being, becomes “less architectonic and more artisanal.”136  
Metaphysics cannot simply purport to provide an overarching framework of 
substances, genera and species into which all of reality may be pigeon-holed.  
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Rather, metaphysics now has the task of painstakingly appreciating (making use of 
categories, etc.) how each particular being uniquely participates in divine being. 
However, because divine being is infinite, the description of this analogical 
relationship can never be completed, and the uniqueness of an individual can 
therefore never be disregarded.  This is the reason why presence may not be said to 
be fixated in Aquinas - metaphysics is an endless description and re-description of 
an infinite number of particulars – metaphysics becomes history137. 
 
Analogy, as materially derived from the theology of Thomas Aquinas, allows for the 
adherence to what Derrida describes as a binary logic of meaning intimation, without 
thereby submitting to the charge of fixation because of the existence of a prior 
established code.  While experience is referred to God as ipsum esse, and meaning 
is therefore intimated in an appeal to this reference, this does not invalidate the 
endless task of interpretation.  Precisely because He in whom an experience 
participates is infinite form, the experience can never be fathomed completely - the 
task of interpretation is ongoing.   
 
Despite the promise that analogy holds, as a modification of the binary logic of 
meaning intimation, it has nevertheless been rejected as merely another 
manifestation of the metaphysics of presence.  The most prominent philosophical138 
rejection of analogy in recent times – a rejection that is undoubtedly echoed by 
Derrida - has been that of Martin Heidegger.  According to Heidegger, “die Analogie 
gehört zur Metaphysik” firstly, in the sense that a being “speaks” of another, highest 
being, and secondly, in the sense that similarities and generalities are expounded on 
the basis of this speech.139  Because of the metaphysical mooring of reality to a 
highest “analogon”, the radical difference between being and beings cannot be 
thought, resulting in a forgetfulness of being in its radical eventfulness (Ereignis.)140   
Betz argues that the best reply to Heidegger’s criticism of the analogy of being would 
be to point to the dogmatism present in his own thought.  Whereas Christian 
theology in its Thomistic guise strives to think the relationship between existence and 
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essence, Heidegger demolishes every relationship.  Existence becomes an empty 
abyss: Das Nichts, while essence becomes the fleeting Seiendes on the surface of 
experience.  In the end, Heidegger can offer no rationally more compelling argument 
for his approach, as opposed to that of Aquinas.   
 
 
2.6 The epistemological turn 
 
The preceding suggestions regarding the possibility of alternative readings of Plato 
and Aquinas have been offered in order to question Derrida’s general indictment of 
the whole of the Western metaphysical tradition as a metaphysics of presence.  This, 
however, does not imply a general dismissal of Derrida’s analysis.  Indeed, Derrida’s 
reading of the spatialisation wrought by structuralism and Husserlian 
phenomenology, and by modern thought in general, provides an outstanding 
introduction to the postmodern condition, to borrow a phrase from Lyotard.  
Following Heidegger and Derrida, the modern epoch may indeed be described as an 
age of the fixation of presence.  The spatialisation resulting from the fixation of 
presence is, in modernity, accompanied by specific convictions as to the meaning of 
space and time (the genitive once again being understood subjectively, as well as 
objectively).   
 
It is against the background of the question regarding the origin of this state of 
spatialisation and the resolution of this situation that the real dialogue with Derrida is 
profiled.  It may well be that certain irreconcilable differences with regard to the 
meaning of space and time will emerge as differing suggestions with regard to the 
resolution of the gridlocked state of spatialisation are offered in the dialogue.  This is 
the context of the next two chapters of this study.  The remainder of this chapter is 
devoted to an alternative reading of the origins of modern spatialisation to that of 
Derrida.   
 
The counter-proposal to that of Derrida about the origin of spatialisation proceeds 
from the assertion that an important change in perspective gradually took shape 
during the philosophical moment when late medieval thought was giving way to early 
modernity.  This change in the dominant intellectual perspective would never at the 
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time have been described in all too radical terms, but as its consequences were 
drawn ever more radically in the intervening centuries, the claim that nothing short of 
a revolution took place can now confidently be made.  The inversion, which will be 
referred to as the epistemological turn141, involves a dislocation of human reasoning 
from a prior place embedded in a chain of being, and a coagulation of human reason 
into an autonomous thinking and judging subject.142  Henceforth, matters regarding a 
certain kind of knowledge – the representational kind – were to be the point of 
departure in philosophical, as well as theological, discourses.  This prioritisation of 
epistemology over ontology was, however, first made possible by certain underlying 
theological and ontological decisions.143 
 
For a millennium, until the advent of late-Scholasticism, a Christianised version of 
Platonism has in one form or another been prominent in Western metaphysical 
thought, even when synthesised with a rediscovered Aristotelianism.  A major 
characteristic of this tradition is the notion of a fundamental co-inherence144 and 
community between empirical, created reality and what is regarded as divine 
transcendence.  According to this worldview, created being participates in an 
analogical way in God’s own being.  While being finite and after the fall subject to 
corruption, creation nevertheless exists as God’s word of love, a word that is at the 
same time an invitation to answer in love and adoration.  This holds true of human 
subjectivity as well.  As representative of creation, humanity finds its identity in being 
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addressed by God, and by answering in adoration.  The relationship between God 
and His creation, as understood in the grand metaphysical tradition of Christian 
thought, may be described as one of asymmetrical reciprocity.145  This expression 
indicates real community between God and creation, while nevertheless maintaining 
that the one party in the relationship is radically dependent on the other. 
 
Another way of typifying this tradition would be to point to the co-inherence of 
ontology and epistemology.  A commitment to the interdependence of ontology and 
epistemology proceeds naturally from convictions about the being of God.  In God, 
infinite being and complete knowledge are one and the same.  Human knowledge, 
as an incomplete tracing of the divine ideas in creation that ends in the beatific 
vision, is therefore viewed as inextricably linked to the nature of being.146 
 
Although it is of course difficult and dangerous to identify the advent of a broader 
cultural sensibility with a single person, the epistemological turn finds a certain 
preliminary culmination in the thought of John Duns Scotus, a theologian who lived 
around the turn of the fourteenth century.  Critical of the encyclopaedic synthesis of 
Thomas Aquinas, to which an analogical worldview is central, Scotus propounded 
two seminal theses: the first on the univocity of being, and the second on the formal 
distinction of essences.147  Scotus believed that without a unified conception of 
being, theology as a science would be impossible, and we would have no natural 
knowledge of God. He argued that the fact that contradiction would arise when a 
term was affirmed and denied of the same thing was sufficient reason to discard the 
notion of analogy and to work only with univocity.  Concomitantly, he rejected the 
view held by the Thomists that for a term to be univocal, it had to be a strictly 
categorial term, picking out some natural kind or other (a genus or species or 
property, for example).  Following the implications of this approach to its 
consequences, he then argued that ‘being’ (ens) was a univocal term subordinated 
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to a single univocal concept.148  Scotus’ thesis on the univocity of being implies that 
there is a conceptual category of neutral being as such that is prior to the distinction 
between finite and infinite being.  Even though there is an infinite quantitative 
separation between God, as transcendent being, and His creation as immanent 
being, both transcendence and immanence share in the neutral conceptual category 
of being.  The positing of this prior category of being opened the way for the analysis 
of being apart from any theological considerations, and therefore opened up the 
possibility of a purely immanent space.   
 
The second thesis for which Scotus is known further exemplifies the shift towards the 
priority of epistemology over ontology.  Until his time, medieval theories of 
signification were complicated by the metaphysical problem of common natures 
(essences).  For some scholastics, the primary significate of a common noun was 
the common nature, and the secondary significate was the thing having that nature. 
According to Aquinas, who did not want to give common natures any kind of 
intermediary existence independent of both concepts and actual things, the 
significate (significatum) of a term was the intellect's conception (whether simple or 
definitional) of the thing signified- the thing signified (res significata) was usually the 
property or the nature characterising individual external objects, and the referent 
(suppositum) was the individual external object itself, viewed as the bearer of the 
property or nature.149  
 
What was needed, Scotus argued, was a way of enabling the concept to enjoy some 
kind of unity, while allowing the word to have a significate that was not a simple, 
common nature. Having established the univocity of being, Scotus thought that the 
answer to this problem should be looked for in the notion of a mental language 
superior to spoken language, where concepts, as parts of this mental language, 
could themselves be regarded as having signification.150  And so, a distinction 
between formal and objective concepts was made.  The formal concept was the act 
of mind or conception that represented an object, and the objective concept was the 
object represented. According to this scheme, acts of mind acquired their own 
                                            
148
 E.J. Ashworth, Medieval Theories of Analogy  (In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2004) p. 
9. 
149
 Ashworth, Medieval Theories of Analogy, p. 2. 
150
 Ibid. p. 2, 9 
72 
 
separate existence as mind-dependent objects that nevertheless have an objective 
being - the being of being thought (esse objective, esse cognitum).  The result of this 
thesis of formal distinction was that the bond between the essential form and the 
actual existence of things, which was up until then taken to be natural, was broken. 
Whereas Thomistic thought made a real distinction between essence and existence, 
the two now became completely separate.  Even if something exists in a particular 
material form, this does not, according to Scotus, exclude the possibility of it having 
other forms.  It is logically possible to conceptualise a thing as having other forms.  
Thus, by prioritising virtual possibility over actual existence, Scotus furthers the 
theoretical shift towards dogmatic epistemological priority, since the possible is, by 
definition, only given in thought.151 
 
The move towards the prioritisation of epistemology over ontology gained 
momentum with the rise of nominalism, associated with the name of William of 
Occam.  Also known as terminism, nominalism holds that there are no such things 
as universal essences.  The general terms with which we refer to classes of things 
(for instance, “tree” or “dog”) are nothing but generalisations based on our 
experience of individual things, to which a linguistic sign is then accorded.152  
Nominalism contributed greatly to the disenchantment of nature.  Henceforth, nature 
was to be examined with the instrument of inferential reason and, at least initially, in 
light of the positive revelation of Scripture, a revelation which – contrary to the 
analogical tradition - in itself did not seem to necessarily have an inner, rational 
rapport with creation, as it simply sprang from the inscrutable divine will.  In the 
words of David Bentley-Hart: 
 
“… Western theology made its own, quite substantial contribution to modern 
‘nihilism’: when nominalism largely severed the perceptible world from the 
analogical index of divine transcendence, and thus reduced divine freedom to 
a kind of voluntarism and theophany to mere legislation, such that creation 
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and revelation could be imagined only as manifestations of the will of a god 
who is at most, a supreme being among lesser beings…”153 
 
The epistemological turn received a mature, early modern expression in the thought 
of René Descartes.  He explicitly divided reality into a res cogitans and a res 
extensa, and sought to gain a secure knowledge of everything by starting in his own 
thought.  These moves where symptomatic of a massive chasm that opened up 
between the thinking, conceptualising subject on the one hand, and a neutral, 
objectified reality on the other.  Henceforth, the human mind fulfilled the role of a 
wonderful mirror in which the complexities of nature would be faithfully reflected.154  
Logic, as a faculty of the mind, subsequently came to be regarded as a powerful 
instrument for isolating and cataloguing the elements of the world out there, and then 
identifying the relationships between these elements.  The result of these 
machinations of the mind would be a mathesis universalis, a universal method 
according to which reality should be approached, but also at the same time a kind of 
map of reality155.  These developments would greatly facilitate human intervention in 
the world.  Whereas there is always a legitimate way in which reason can be seen as 
the coping tool par excellence of the human organism, the result of the 
epistemological turn was an almost exclusively instrumentalist view of rationality.156  
The instrument of human reason was to be the scales on which all of being would be 
judged.   
 
The changed role of rationality goes hand in hand with a changed view of the world, 
which is reflected in the mind.  It is, in the first place, a disenchanted world.  The 
secrets of the world are secrets only because they have not yet been discovered 
using the dissecting scalpel of reason.  It is a world that accords no place to the 
mystery of immanence pervaded by transcendence.  Everything is taken to be 
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immediately present to itself and in principle to the perceiving cogito.  In short, it is 
the world of univocity: being is simply the meaning of being.  It is, in the second 
place, a flattened out world.  As the mind came to be seen as a mirror of nature, and 
a physical map as a representation of this representation, so nature itself came to be 
regarded in terms of these two dimensional metaphors.  Functional hierarchies may 
be identified, but under the synoptic gaze of reason, no ascending or descending 
chain of being is allowed.  In the third place it is an atomistic world - a world 
comprised of isolated elements that may be analysed in their different relations, but 
where the totality nevertheless only equals the sum of the parts. 
 
What has in fact happened with the epistemological turn is that the demarcation of 
the transcendent from the immanent has shifted.  Whereas in the Christian 
metaphysical tradition, the transcendent was regarded as that which exceeds 
immanent being, while nevertheless pervading it and sharing in its life, in the wake of 
the epistemological turn, it came to function first and foremost as that which 
transcends experience or consciousness.  The epistemological transcendent is that 
which lies outside of human experience.  It is the noumenal, in Kantian terms, as 
opposed to the phenomenal.  The metaphysical transcendent, on the other hand, 
was pushed further and further away from an immanence that was increasingly 
deemed independent, that is, capable of being regarded on its own.  The rise of the 
epistemological transcendent may be described in other terms by saying that a 
classical, transcendental metaphysics (e.g. in Plato and Aristotle) was supplanted by 
a modern metaphysical transcendentalism (e.g. in Kant.)157  In the wake of the 
epistemological turn, Christian thought, which came under its influence, while still 
recognising an ontological transcendent, radically separated the transcendent and 
the immanent and tried to reconcile them in an extrinsic manner.  The dominant 
conception came to be that transcendence and immanence are dialectically related 
rather than analogically - immanence comprises a world of substances that exhaust 
their meaning in their finitude, while transcendence “can arrive among these 
substances only as a self announcing paradox.”158  For Christian thought, in its 
modernist guise, the separation between the ontological transcendent and immanent 
                                            
157
 Cf. Betz, Beyond the sublime (part 2), p. 25. 
158
 Bentley-Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, p. 136. 
75 
 
came to be identified with the separation between the epistemological transcendent 
and immanent. 
 
Seeing that the overarching context of the present discussion is a conversation with 
Jacques Derrida on space, time and meaning, it may be pertinent at this point to try 
and establish what the development towards epistemological dominance may mean 
in semiological terms.  The opening up of a chasm between the reasoning subject 
and an objectified, spatialised reality over against it, as the epistemological turn was 
described above, may also be associated with a shift in the assumptions about the 
discovery – or production – of meaning.159  The connection between the 
epistemological turn and the process of meaning intimation will be determined in 
terms of the two logics of meaning intimation hypothetically proposed in the 
introductory chapter, the one – seemingly – favouring a purely immanent approach, 
and the other – seemingly – favouring a radical distinction between immanence and 
transcendence in the operation of the sign.  What has been proposed in the 
introductory chapter may be restated in summary by once again using Umberto 
Eco’s elucidation of the sign.160 
 
Eco, discussing various customary ways in which a sign is taken to mean something, 
distinguishes a number of broad categories in this regard.  The first category is 
characterised by the fact that the aliquid stat pro aliquo relationship is based on an 
inferential mechanism (p > q.)  In the inferential category of the discovery or 
production of meaning, the occurrence of something intimates, implies or leads to 
something else.  The inference may be synecdochic in character, which is to say that 
a part of something that is perceived and comprehended leads to an intimation of a 
greater whole.  It may also be metonymic in character, in which case the proximity to 
or association with that which is perceived and comprehended allows for novel 
meaning to be achieved.  
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The second category of signs distinguished by Eco is where the sign is taken to be a 
gesture produced with the intention of communicating.  Presupposed in this category 
is some form of intersubjectivity.  A sender transfers meaning content to a receiver 
using an agreed upon code.  According to Eco, the mechanism of the discovery or 
production of meaning in this case works according to a relationship of equivalence 
(rather than inference): p ≡ q.  Some form of pre-established harmony (often 
described as a code) exists in signs of this category, which makes the intimation of 
meaning possible.  In this case, it may be more appropriate to speak of the 
transference than of the inference of meaning.   
 
According to Eco, there is a “clear opposition” between these first two categories, an 
opposition that is then upset by the introduction of a third category, namely that of 
symbol.  A symbol may appear to be as arbitrary as the conventional signs of the 
second category, yet the perceiver of a symbol is able to move along certain 
operations that lead to modified meaning content.  Symbols then, are signs that 
presuppose intersubjectivity – they intend to communicate – yet, they also 
incorporate the mechanism of inference (p > q.)  Eco calls these signs iconic or 
analogical.  After identifying these different possible, and sometimes customary, 
categories of the sign, Eco himself goes on to argue that the identified categories are 
not all equally basic.  Following C.S. Peirce he identifies in the sign mechanism of 
inference (p > q) the most basic dynamic of sign production, and subsequently 
identifies this mechanism as the field of study of a general semiotics.161 
 
The three categories of sign-function identified above may be used to trace the fate 
of semiological reasoning in the wake of the epistemological turn.  On the one hand, 
and ontologically speaking, the shift towards departing from the perspective of the 
transcendental subject resulted in a dogmatic adherence to the sign mechanism of 
inference.  Ontologically speaking, the sign mechanism of equivalence, whereby 
immanent creation signifies a transcendent creator, was no longer available.   
 
Within a worldview that assumes the co-inherence of transcendence and 
immanence, meaning, at its most basic ontological level, would be regarded as being 
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rooted in intersubjectivity.  God gratuitously and lovingly establishes a relationship 
between Himself and his creation, this being the act of creation itself.  This exitus, or 
Ur-kenosis of God in his Son, and the reditus of redeemed creation in the Son 
through the Spirit, is a perichoresis that shares in the perichoresis of the Trinity.  In a 
worldview characterised at its most basic level by such an intersubjective 
community, meaning may be said to be a manifestation of communication.  In terms 
of our hypothetical sign mechanisms, this would be a scenario where, on an 
ontological level, Eco’s sign relationship of equivalence takes precedence.  Christian 
metaphysical thought up until the late Middle Ages simply assumed that ontologically 
meaning was rooted in such a sign relationship of equivalence.  The Christian neo-
platonic sensibilities of Augustine, for instance, led him to regard the whole of 
created reality as a sign.162  Creation points past itself to God, in whom it continues 
to exist from moment to moment.  Having said this, with regard to meaning, the 
relationship between God as infinite Being and finite creation cannot be presumed to 
be one of strict equivalence.  Transcendence cannot be grasped or comprehended - 
there is always an overflowing of meaning with regard to finite subjectivity.  Two 
observations should now be made: the transference of meaning in intersubjective 
communication between God and His creation cannot be said to be based on a 
mutually agreed upon code.  There exists an asymmetrical reciprocity in the 
establishment of the code.  The operative logic here is more that of the gift than of 
the convention.  God gives the meaning, and in intimating it, creation gives it back to 
God.  This leads to the second observation, which states that with regard to meaning 
in its most basic ontological manifestation, it may be more appropriate to speak of 
the anaphoresis of meaning than of the inference or transference of meaning.  The 
meaning of creation and every part of it is precisely this anaphoric163 pointing 
towards God.  Meaning is to be viewed as a direction, even as a semiotic journey, 
and this also holds true for the sign as such. 
 
The turn towards the priority of epistemology inaugurated a shift in the ontological 
mooring of meaning.  With ontological transcendence being very distant, the initiative 
for the production or discovery of meaning now rested on the autonomous thinking 
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subject.  Starting with itself, the epistemological subject interprets itself and 
everything else.  This corresponds in a strict sense with Eco’s sign relationship of 
inference, namely p > q: departing from its own experience, the cogito infers or 
intimates the meaning of itself and the world.  Meaning is rooted in the subjectivity of 
the cogito, which hypothesises about the world.  On an ontological level, the ubiquity 
of the sign relationship of inference may be said to characterise the modern, as well 
as post-modern, epochs. 
 
Modern science may be regarded as a formalisation and institutionalisation of the 
logic of the sign mechanism of inference.  As theorising about the scientific method 
gained sophistication, the emphasis shifted from simple induction to an appreciation 
of the role of the scientific hypothesis, a process of meaning formation that C.S. 
Peirce, in expounding it, called abduction.164  The inferential mechanism of induction 
works on the basis of repeated instances of a similar experience leading to the 
postulation of a general rule.  When the next instance is encountered, it is then 
assumed to fall under the same rule.  It should be noted that the experiences 
comprising the individual instances of the inductive process are never in themselves 
“brute facts” - they themselves are interpreted within the speculative horizon of a  
hypothesis.  Gradually, the logic of this “most daring of inferences, that of abduction 
or hypothesis”165 became clear to theoreticians of the scientific method: given a 
specific experience, and accepting that a certain stability in background meaning has 
to be assumed, a rule or model may be postulated, of which a certain state of affairs 
is an instance, with the experienced phenomenon being the result of this state of 
affairs.  The experienced phenomenon is therefore deduced from a hypothesized 
general law and case instance.  Holmes Rolston describes this so-called 
hypothetico-deductive model of scientific reasoning as “a theory (the hypothesis) 
arising out of the facts, followed by deduction back down to further empirical-level 
expectations, those then being related back to observations to confirm or disconfirm 
the theory, more or less, and to generate revised theory, from which new 
conclusions are drawn, after which the facts are again consulted.”166 
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The “opposition”167 between a sign relation of equivalence and a sign relation of 
inference may provide a perspective on the alienation between reason and faith, or 
reason and revelation, which has been one of the defining characteristics of modern 
and post-modern thought.  Seeing no other recourse on an ontological level but to 
work exclusively with a sign relation of inference, modern secular thought regards 
the convictions of faith as dogmatic, ideological and in the service of the abuse of 
power.  Inversely, as the option of analogy grew dimmer in the wake of the demise of 
an analogical worldview, conservative theological thought worked exclusively with a 
sign relation of equivalence, resulting in various forms of fideism and pietism.  
However, these opposing narratives share common assumptions even in their 
opposition, namely that being is univocal and that transcendence and immanence 
are to be regarded as radically separate. 
 
Whereas the sign mechanism of equivalence in modernity became unavailable on an 
ontological level, this is precisely not the case on an epistemological level.  In the 
wake of the epistemological turn, the sign relation of equivalence was drafted into 
the service of an ideological ideal of subjective certainty, to the effect that immediacy 
exists between what is perceived and its basic meaning.  While no intrinsic 
relationship between subjective thought and the world out there is accepted 
(epistemologically speaking, transcendence and immanence are radically separate), 
it is nevertheless accepted that an equivalence between the immanent and the 
transcendent poles of meaning intimation is achievable.   
 
This ideal of Presence has been successfully criticised in what came to be known as 
post-modernity, and it may be assumed that Eco broadly shares in these post-
modern sensibilities.  There is always an excess of meaning that is not covered in an 
established code’s definition of its signs.  In other words, all communication involves 
interpretation, which is a form of inference.  The sign relation of equivalence, 
especially in the form it takes in the wake of the epistemological turn, may rightly be 
criticised.  The fact of interpretation being always present does not, however, detract 
from the importance of intersubjective communication in the intimation of meaning, 
and of the possible insights to be gained in proceeding from an ontological point of 
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departure that cherishes the participatory community between ontological 
transcendence and immanence. 
 
In the following parts of this chapter it will be argued that the epistemological turn, 
with its semiological ramifications, had a determining influence on the way in which 
space and time are approached in modernity.  The main characteristic of this 
relationship to space and time is that they are regarded as inherently neutral, 
indifferent and meaningless.  In keeping with the divide between an objectified reality 
“out there” and a thinking, judging subject in opposition to it, space and time are 
regarded as extension and duration on the one hand, and as neutral categories of 
thought on the other.  Between these subjective and objective notions of space and 
time a mirroring takes place.   
 
The fate of space and time in modernity is eminently demonstrated in the work of 
Isaac Newton.  Newton founded classical mechanics on the view that space is 
something distinct from body, and that time is something that passes uniformly, 
without regard for whatever happens in the world.  For this reason, he spoke of 
absolute space and absolute time, in order to distinguish these entities from ways in 
which we measure them (which he called relative spaces and relative times.)168  
Absolute space extends uniformly in all directions, and is perfectly geometrical in 
character.  Time, in its uniform flow, is likewise perfectly mathematical.  Newton’s 
view of space is often described as substantivalist169, because in his view, absolute 
space, in distinction from material body, may in some respects be regarded as a 
separate substance.  Space (as well as time in later interpretations) may be mapped 
according to the Cartesian system of axes.  An x, y and z axis extends infinitely from 
whatever point in absolute space is taken to be the point of reference. 
 
Meaning does not pertain to modern notions of space and time in an intrinsic 
manner.  Rather, it is reserved for the thinking, judging subject to ascribe meaning to 
specific regions of space and time.  Until this happens, one region of space is 
completely isomorphic to the next.  In this regard, the contrast with notions of space 
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and time prior to the epistemological turn becomes apparent when the category of 
motion is considered.  Aristotelian thought, as appropriated in the Christian tradition 
by Aquinas, may be characterised as fundamentally teleological.  Aristotle discerns 
in nature an urge to move from potentiality to actuality, from pure matter to matter 
realised in form.  There is therefore in nature an inherent principle of motion; even 
stronger: nature may be defined as an inherent principle of motion.170  Aristotle 
insists that motion is always between two poles or opposites: from something to 
something else - it is never a nondescript “wandering” without an identifiable origin 
and destination.  Aquinas follows Aristotle in this regard, and as a result, Aristotle-
Aquinas is able to distinguish between so-called “natural” and “violent” motions.  
Oliver describes the distinction as follows: 
 
Natural motions are those characteristic behaviours which are produced by a 
being in a given environment … For example, the fall of a heavy body to earth 
is a natural motion.  By contrast, a violent motion is one in which there is no 
intrinsic intentionality of that motion or by the being itself.171 
 
The point is that motion is not an indifferent category. From this perspective, it is 
perfectly natural to distinguish between good or bad, better or worse, proper or 
improper motions. Motion is meaningful, and therefore the space and time being 
traversed are meaningful.  The qualitative distinction between natural and violent 
motion, going hand in hand with an inherent meaningfulness of space and time, was, 
however, rejected in modernity.   
 
In Newton’s Principia Mathematica, motion is a simple category well known to all, 
requiring little, if any, reflection on its meaning or purpose.  Motion is nothing beyond 
the predictable spatial movement over time of particular material bodies.172   Motion 
is completely neutral.  In fact, according to Newton, a body will maintain its current 
state of motion or rest infinitely, unless acted upon by a specific force.  This is the 
well known principle of inertia.  Force thus becomes the operative notion in 
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Newtonian dynamics.  At any given moment, the resultant movement of a body is the 
vectorial sum of the forces operating on it.  Space and time may be regarded as the 
neutral containers – or, taken together, as the arena - for the conflict of forces.  And 
so conflict, even violence, becomes the natural state of affairs in the Newtonian 
world, but of course, to describe nature as violent is itself deemed to be subjective.  
It remains the judgement of the thinking ego, and may not be said of nature 
inherently.  
 
It has been stated that the fate of space and time subsequent to the epistemological 
turn was to be reduced either to the Cartesian res extansa or to the Cartesian res 
cogitans, these two “sides” in any case effecting a kind of spatialised mirroring of 
each other.  If Newton’s substantivalist notion of space may be viewed as a case in 
point of the former kind of reduction (to pure extension), it finds its counterpart 
reduction in the transcendental ideality of space and time propounded by Immanuel 
Kant. 
 
In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes a number of celebrated distinctions with 
regard to human knowledge.  After making the distinction between a priori 
knowledge, which does not depend on experience, and a posteriori knowledge, 
which has its source in experience, Kant distinguishes between analytic and 
synthetic judgements of reason.  Whereas analytic judgements are purely 
explicative, the predicate of a statement adding nothing which is not already 
contained in the subject, synthetic judgements are ampliative - the predicate of a 
statement contains an element that is outside of the subject.  The distinctions 
between a priori and a posteriori knowledge and between synthetic and analytical 
statements form the groundwork for the Kantian project of overcoming the 
epistemological deadlock, in which the factions of empiricists and rationalists were 
caught.  The solution to the standoff between rationalism and empiricism proposed 
by Kant was by way of a novel reference to the transcendental subject.  Experience 
is always experience ‘for me’, the experiencing subject.  I can only say something 
about my experience, and in the process of articulating my experience, some stable 
categories will begin to emerge.  “I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied 
not so much with objects as with our manner of cognizing objects so far as it is 
meant to be possible a priori.  A system of such concepts would be called 
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transcendental philosophy…”173  Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is an endeavour to 
show what knowledge is, in order that objects can conform to knowledge, as well as 
to show that some synthetic knowledge is possible apart from experience, that is, a 
priori. 
 
According to Kant, the object, as object of our sense, must conform to the 
constitution of our faculty of intuition, otherwise there would simply be no experience.  
We have to concern ourselves with appearances, not with the things in themselves.  
The section of the Critique of Pure Reason that deals with perception is called the 
Transcendental Aesthetic.  Human perception is possible because of our faculty of 
intuition (Anschauung).  With regard to intuition, Kant has the following to say: 
 
“Intuition takes place only so far as the object is given to us, which requires, 
with human beings at least, that it affects the mind in a certain way.  The 
capacity (receptivity) for obtaining presentations according as we are affected 
by objects is called sensibility [Sinnlichkeit].  By means of sensibility, 
therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes intuitions; these are 
thought, however, by the understanding [Verstand], and from it arise 
concepts.”174 
 
Within the framework of perception thus explained, Kant has to explain how the a 
posteriori and a priori elements of knowledge relate and combine in the 
transcendental subject.  This he accomplishes by making a further distinction: 
between matter and form.  The matter of appearance is that which is related to 
sensation, and consequently is a posteriori.  The form of appearance, on the other 
hand, is the relational ordering thereof and is a priori.  “Since that in which alone 
sensations can gain order and be placed in a certain form cannot itself be sensation, 
the matter of all appearance is given to us only a posteriori, its form, however, must 
lie ready for all sensations, a priori, in the mind and therefore lend itself to be  
considered apart from sensation.”175  The transcendental aesthetic is the science of 
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all principles of a priori sensibility, and it is here, as pre-experiential forms in the 
mind, that Kant locates the categories of space and time. 
 
Space, according to Kant, is a pure form of sensibility.  This view, according to 
Cunningham, distinguishes Kant from both Newton and Leibniz, who variously held 
that space was absolutely real and self-subsistent (Newton, as became apparent in 
the foregoing discussion), or merely relational (Leibniz).176  “By means of the outer 
sense (a property of our mind) we present to ourselves objects as external to us, and 
all of them in space.”177  Categorised in space, the shape, magnitude and relation of 
objects to one another are determined or determinable.  Space is then a priori and 
not empirical.  As such, it is the subjective condition of sensibility.  Space does not 
refer to things in themselves, because it does not pertain to “objects” as such.  The 
resultant notion of space is that it is both empirically real and yet transcendentally 
ideal.178 
 
Time, just as space, is a pure form of sensibility.  According to Kant, “inner sense, 
through which the mind views itself or its inner state, does not give an intuition of the 
soul itself as an object; but the intuition of its inner state is nevertheless possible only 
under a determinate form so that everything internal is presented in relations of 
time.”179  Time is not something which is subject-independent.  Time, as inner sense, 
may be described as the passage of the subject.  Space is required to enable a 
subject to persist, but this persistence is, in a sense, marked off by time.180  The way 
in which an object of experience persists in the time of the subject may be further 
explained, according to Kant, by noting that time has three “modes”: duration, 
succession and coexistence.181  These modes of time provide human consciousness 
with the frame of reference to perceive continuity (substance), alteration (change), 
causality and the interaction between simultaneous entities.  Without them, 
consciousness, as the site of finite unity, would be impossible.   
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The transcendental ideality of Kantian space and time supports the argument that 
the modern notion of space and time, subsequent to the epistemological turn, may 
be characterised as being spatialised.  Human subjectivity spreads itself out over all 
of experience, providing stability and unity.  Thus, whereas spatialisation starts off as 
a characterisation of the modern world, it ends up in a curious mirroring, as a 
characterisation of subjective consciousness.  If modernity is also characterised by 
an obsession with the passing of time, this historicism may nevertheless itself be 
characterised as a kind of spatialisation.  In modernity, the movement of time is 
frozen into the pseudo-eternity of the moment.  Plato characterised time as the 
moving image of eternity182, while Augustine, in his Christianising of Plato’s 
metaphysics, knew the distension of time in the soul.  For Augustine, there is no 
isolated present moment.  The present is complemented by the past, as well as the 
future.  In the wake of the epistemological turn, time in modernity becomes a series 
of discrete moments, each of which has to be seized and experienced for its own 
sake.  The present, that moment which is currently actual, becomes the only moment 
there is.183  Yet, every moment is also inherently the same as the next.184   
 
This, finally, brings us back to the question of the meaning of space and time.  The 
only meaning allowed for space and time in modernity is the spatialisation that 
follows in the wake of the epistemological turn.  From the perspective of the 
subjective genitive, in the construction “the meaning of space and time”, space and 
time are regarded as inherently meaningless - neutral categories of thought relating 
the subject to experience, or otherwise as the disenchanted container of the 
universe.  From the perspective of the objective genitive, the meaning of space and 
                                            
182
 Timaeus par. 37.  In: Plato – Timaeus and Critias, trans. Desmond Lee (London: Penguin, 1977), 
p. 51. 
183
 Ward, Cities of God, p.170.  See especially Ward’s extrapolation to consumerism and the market. 
184
 The features of space and time in modern social theory bear many resemblances to its 
counterparts in natural science, as discussed above.  Modernity sees the rise of the nation state, 
which is in fact nothing but a space dominated by a homogenising, centralised power.  The nation 
state is characterised by a flattening out: over against a population of contracting individuals lies the 
absolute power of the state.  This stands in contrast to the so-called complex space of pre-modernity, 
populated by all kinds of social institutions (e.g. guilds and monastic orders), in which community is 
mediated.   
The neutrality and indifference of time as a series of isomorphic moments become visible in the 
machine-like functioning of the modern state.  The state becomes a self-perpetuating machine; its 
apparatus grinding on, with little regard for the comings and goings of people or generations.  The 
conclusion has to be that in modern societies, space and time are characterised by a neutrality and 
indifference that awaits the imposition of meaning by the nation state as subject. 
 
86 
 
time in modernity is regarded solely in inferential terms: departing from its own 
experience, the epistemological subject infers or intimates the meaning of itself and 
the world.  The movement of that inference is marked out in space and time. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that he situates the phenomenon of spatialisation within 
another narrative to that with which this chapter has ended, the phenomenon itself 
has been astutely analysed by Jacques Derrida.  In the following chapter, Derrida’s 
deconstruction of spatialisation will be analysed. Thereafter, the notions of space 
and time that emerge from this deconstruction will be examined. 
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Chapter 3 Derrida: spacing and the infinite finitude of temporality 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Jacques Derrida’s interrogation, as explored in the previous chapter, highlighted the 
spatialisation which, according to him, necessarily ensues whenever a structuralist 
impulse informs the study of history, culture, literature and language in general.  
Following Derrida, spatialisation may be described as a certain objectification and 
ordering of experience, whereby experience itself first and foremost becomes a field 
of objective knowledge, and thereafter is ordered according to some kind of unifying 
principle.  Thus, experience is separated from, and somehow spread out before 
thought, as it were, two-dimensionally.  On the other hand, thought itself, in 
representing this reality, becomes two-dimensional and spread out.   
 
This chapter is devoted to Derrida’s reading of the demise of spatialisation and the 
metaphysics of presence.  This, of course, in itself constitutes a reading of Derrida’s 
reading.  It would therefore be prudent to make a few preliminary remarks about the 
different lines of Derrida interpretation, in order to position the present study in 
relation to existing scholarship. 
 
In the introductory chapter to his 2003 book, entitled Impossible God – Derrida’s 
Theology, Hugh Rayment-Pickard suggests that there are two basic approaches to 
the interpretation of Derrida’s work: a cognitivist and a non-cognitivist approach.185  
To start with the latter, the non-cognitivist approach holds the view that Derrida’s 
work cannot and should not be read as philosophy proper.  This is the case because, 
on the one hand, Derrida’s work has irrevocably problematised the philosophical 
project as such.  It is not possible to do philosophy like before in the wake of 
deconstruction, and therefore, naturally, deconstruction itself should not be subject to 
the criteria that it itself criticised.  The American philosopher, Richard Rorty, may be 
regarded as an exponent of such a non-cognitivist approach.  In his view, Derrida’s 
work consciously adopts a more literary and playful style, to such an extent that it 
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may even be asked whether Derrida really wants to communicate something and not 
rather simply rejoice in his own private language game.  In Rorty’s words: 
 
“I take it that Derrida does not want to make a single move within the 
language game which distinguishes between fantasy and argument, 
philosophy and literature, serious writing and playful writing – the language 
game of la grande époque.  He is not going to play by the rules of somebody 
else’s final vocabulary.”186 
 
Another exponent of a non-cognitivist approach to Derrida, albeit in a completely 
different register, is the German Jürgen Habermas.    In contrast to Rorty, Habermas  
evaluates such a literary approach, whereby Derrida “works on Husserl and 
Saussure no differently than on Artaud”, very negatively.  For Habermas, such an 
approach implies that the subject of knowledge be sacrificed.  Henceforth, the 
analysis is directed at an anonymous occurring of language, an occurring “that 
releases worlds from within itself and swallows worlds back up.”187  Despite the cult-
like status that Derrida’s work achieved amongst his followers, the nett result of 
Derrida’s writings, in Habermas’ opinion, amounts to little more than some kind of 
mystification.188  
 
In the opposing camp to the non-cognitivists is a grouping of Derrida scholars who, 
according to Rayment-Pickard, emphasise the thematic and structural coherence in 
Derrida’s philosophy.189  Eminent amongst this grouping are scholars such as 
Rudophe Gasché and Christopher Norris.190  Whereas the non-cognitivists readily 
point to the so-called literary texts produced by Derrida, chiefly in the 1970’s (the 
“Genet column” in Glas, the “Envois” section of The Post Card, “Tympan” in Margins 
of Philosophy), the cognitivists argue that Derrida’s earlier writings explicitly address 
                                            
186
 Richard Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity (Cambridge: University Press, 1989), p. 133. 
187
 Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Blackwell – Polity 
Press, 1992), pp. 206, 209. 
188
 Rayment-Pickard, Impossible God, p. 10. 
189
 Ibid. p. 11.  This is the approach that Rayment-Pickard himself favours. 
190
 See Rudolphe Gasché, Inventions of Difference – On Jacques Derrida, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1994) and Christopher Norris, “Deconstruction, Postmodernism and 
Philosophy”, In D. Wood (ed.), Derrida: A Critical Reader, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). 
89 
 
the major philosophical topoi, and that the theoretical arguments he proposed as 
early as the 1960’s are developed and elaborated on throughout his career.   
 
This study aligns itself with that approach to Derrida interpretation which takes the 
thematic and structural coherence in Derrida’s work seriously.  In other words, it is 
accepted that Derrida’s position is broadly coherent and that it can be engaged in a 
philosophical and theological conversation, such as this study purports to be.  Once 
this point of departure is accepted, the question arises as to whether or not certain 
periods in Derrida’s career are to be distinguished.  While such an endeavour may 
be undertaken, by pointing to the major influences at different times during Derrida’s 
career (variously, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger and Levinas), this study 
nevertheless also accepts that no major kehre may be distinguished in Derrida’s 
career.  Having said this, this study acknowledges that Derrida’s earlier writings, 
especially those published during his annus mirabilis, 1967, present an especially 
clear picture of Derrida’s philosophical project.  The focus will therefore be on a 
reading of Derrida’s earlier writings. 
 
After exploring Derrida’s deconstruction of structuralism and Husserlian 
phenomenology, this chapter turns to the implications of deconstruction for space, 
time and meaning, before concluding with a review of what has been said in light of 
the hypothesis of a shared intimation of transcendence in immanence in the 
conversation with Derrida. 
 
 
3.2 Deconstructing structuralism 
 
According to Derrida, the moment at which thought as language starts to think itself 
– that is, to objectify itself – has a special poignancy, as it is then that insight may be 
gained into spatialisation itself, as well as into the necessary process of its demise: 
“Does the fact that language can determine things only by spatializing them suffice to 
explain that, in return, language must spatialise itself as soon as it designates and 
reflects upon itself?”191  Instead of using it as a heuristic instrument to intimate the 
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thrust of an utterance or event, structuralism makes structure itself into the object of 
theorising.  Structure itself becomes what is studied. As was mentioned in the 
previous chapter, this, according to Derrida, is only possible at the cost of a certain 
weakening or absence of force. 
 
One way of describing the meaning accorded to space and time during the epoch 
where spatialisation reigns, would be in terms of identity and difference.  Space is 
viewed as that which opens up the identical - that which may be gathered around a 
single identifying and unifying principle.  However, where spatialisation holds, 
everything is gathered under such a unifying principle: the totality is deemed to be 
graspable and radical difference is therefore excluded in principle.  Time, on the 
other hand, in the form of an absolute past or an absolute future, is what opens up 
true difference.  However, as that is excluded in principle, time is in a sense reduced 
to space - it is spatialised.  Derrida describes this spatialised form of time in terms of 
the notion of simultaneity: “simultaneity is the myth of a total reading or description, 
promoted to the status of a regulatory ideal.”  He then goes on to remark as follows: 
“The search for the simultaneous explains the capacity to be fascinated by the 
spatial image: is space not the ‘order of coexistences’ (Leibniz)?”192 
 
Thus, to the same extent that spatialisation may be viewed as violence against 
difference, it may be considered to be violence against time. It is the elevation of 
space above time or, conversely, the subjection of time to space.  Of this 
spatialisation, structuralism is, according to Derrida, an eminent witness.  Moreover, 
this witness may be interrogated in order to show the untenability of the hierarchy 
enforced by structuralism.  To this interrogation we now turn.  The following 
quotation will provide the point of departure: 
 
“Structure then can be methodically threatened in order to be comprehended 
more clearly and to reveal not only its supports but also that secret place in 
which it is neither construction nor ruin but lability.  This operation is called 
(from the Latin) soliciting.  In other words, shaking in a way related to the 
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whole (from sollus, in archaic Latin ‘the whole,’ and from citare, ‘to put in 
motion’)”193 
 
The suggestion that structure should be methodically threatened in order to reach a 
state where it is neither structure nor ruin is important.  It would be easy to assume 
that Derrida simply wants to bring all structuralist thought to ruin, whereas his aim is 
precisely to move beyond the opposition of structure and ruin.  His aim is to arrive at 
a place of lability, the characteristics of which will be investigated shortly.  The term 
“lability” is closely related to the well-known concept of “deconstruction,” widely used 
to describe Derrida’s intellectual labour.  Deconstruction similarly wants to move 
beyond the simple opposition of, and subsequent choice between, construction and 
destruction.  It wants to point to a process of construction, which always already 
bears the seeds of its own destruction within itself, the result of this destruction in its 
turn being a construct that already bears the seeds of its demise within itself. 
 
It is therefore not simply a matter of turning the tables - that is, of elevating difference 
above identity, time above space.  Derrida wishes to expound a thought of 
contamination: in all identity there is difference - every spatial constellation is also 
radically temporal.  While this thought of the contamination of identity with difference 
is Derrida’s manifest purpose, it should nevertheless, at this point, be asked in a 
preliminary way whether the inevitable result of such a thought is not an approach 
that elevates difference above identity, and – within this grammar – time above 
space. 
 
Derrida’s thought of contamination is articulated in many ways.  Remaining with the 
image of contamination, it may firstly be said that all thought is contaminated by 
experience (or equally, that all experience is contaminated by thought).  It is not 
possible to identify or locate two realms which are distinct from each other - on the 
one hand, the realm of uninterpreted experience, and on the other hand, the realm of 
thought or language.  It is not possible to abstract subjective thought from what is 
taken to be objective experience, in order to identify an essence - a principle that 
unifies the experienced.  Language is the reality and the index of this co-implication 
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of thought and experience.  As will be discussed later, Derrida uses the concept of 
writing to explain such a functioning of language and culture in general.  
 
With regard to structuralist thought in particular, the notion of contamination is 
brought to bear on the opposition between form and content.  Once again, the form 
or structure of a cultural utterance can only be fixated at the expense of the living 
energy of meaning.  Form becomes the object of thought at the price of a certain 
relaxation of force.  According to Derrida, it is precisely this which is not tenable.  
Form is always irredeemably contaminated by content, where content has the 
character of a force - the energy of becoming.  Whereas the structuralist impulse 
tends to fixate form, Derrida proposes a thought of form contaminated by duration, 
“that which is pure qualitative heterogeneity within movement.”194 
 
Structuralist thought may even try to neutralise the process of becoming itself by 
identifying objective forms within that process.  This may be witnessed, for instance, 
in the proposal of universal laws of history.  Such a view of history is, however, 
according to Derrida, a tamed and spatialised conception (or, precisely, a weak 
conception of history195).  The time of becoming is, on the contrary, a time that is out 
of joint: there is a qualitative heterogeneity between the present and the past, or 
between the present and the future.  In Spectres of Marx, Derrida uses the image of 
haunting to explain the contamination of the present by an absolute past and an 
absolute future.  The present can try as it may to abjure the ghosts of the past, but 
these ghosts always return to haunt it.  They do this precisely as ghosts - that is, not 
fully present, but not absent either.  The past and the future may not be tamed in the 
form of a present past and a present future.  The past is always an absolute past that 
nevertheless contaminates the present in the manner of a haunting.  The future is 
always an absolute future that nevertheless contaminates the present in the manner 
of a messianism without reserve. 
 
                                            
194
 Ibid. p. 23, 24. 
195
 Cf. Of Grammatology, p. 10: “History and knowledge, istoria and epistémè have always been 
determined … as detours for the purpose of the reappropriation of presence.”  Cf. also Writing and 
Difference, pp. 367, 368. While this is Derrida’s manifest point of departure, it should be borne in mind 
that Derrida’s characterisation of the whole history of Western metaphysics as a history of presence is 
itself prone to an accusation of structuralist generalisation. 
93 
 
With regard to the notions of space and time, Derrida’s deconstruction of 
structuralism proposes the notion of spacing as an alternative to the fixation of 
spatialisation.  The infinitive, used as a noun, designates the contamination of space 
by time: every constellation of simultaneity necessarily slips away into a new, 
qualitatively heterogeneous constellation.  Forcefully undermining “presence” 
through the concept of spacing, Derrida states that:  
 
“Spacing (notice that this word speaks the articulation of space and time, the 
becoming time of space and the becoming space of time) is always 
unperceived, the nonpresent, and the un-conscious.”196 
 
What will have to be investigated later is precisely this displacement towards 
becoming that is evidenced in Derrida’s words, and the fact that, even though there 
is a reciprocity in terms of space becoming time and time becoming space, the 
emphasis on becoming favours a radical conception of temporality. 
 
Apart from the opposition of form to content, the other great opposition advanced by 
structuralist thought is the opposition between signifier and signified.  The genius of 
Ferdinand de Saussure was to have introduced a thought of difference into 
structuralism: “Signs are governed by a principle of general semiology: continuity in 
time is coupled to change in time…”197  Accordingly, meaning is constituted by a 
network of signifiers as a whole, and precisely by the difference of one signifier to 
another in the network as a whole.  According to Derrida, the breakthrough to a 
thought of difference did not go far enough, however, as the distinction between a 
material signifier and an immaterial, ideal signified still allowed for a binary 
opposition, whereby a structure of thought is placed, as it were, on top of a structure 
of experience.   
 
“The reassuring evidence within which Western tradition had to organize itself 
and must continue to live would therefore be as follows: the order of the 
signified is never contemporary, is at best the subtly discrepant inverse or 
parallel – discrepant by the time of a breath – from the order of the signifier …  
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The formal essence of the signified is presence and the privilege of its 
proximity to the logos as phonè is the privilege of presence.”198 
 
The last sentence in the above quotation is significant, as it hints at another 
hierarchical opposition that runs parallel to the opposition between signifier and 
signified.  The thought of presence needs to safeguard the ideality of the signified, 
while still allowing for some kind of link to the world of experience.  This is 
accomplished by making a qualitative distinction between two kinds of signifiers.  By 
making the primary material signifier the vocal sound (due to its proximity to lived 
experience), a hierarchical system is introduced whereby the written signifier is 
relegated to a place of secondariness: it is regarded as a mere mnemonic aid.199  
The dismantling of this hierarchy will be discussed below. 
 
In the same fashion as he argued with regard to the form-content opposition, Derrida 
now argues for the untenability of the signifier-signified opposition.  The signifier and 
signified cannot be separated radically from each other - here also, it is a matter of 
contamination.  The signifier and signified must be thought together.  Under the 
tyranny of metaphysical presence, the signifier-signified distinction went hand in 
hand with an opposition between a privileged inside and a secondary, derived 
outside.200  The inside is the realm of ethereal, immediate signification, whereas the 
outside is the material but non-necessary support of this meaning by way of 
representation.  Undermining this opposition, Derrida heads a telling passage in Of 
Grammatology with the statement “The Outside is the Inside,” where he places the 
“is” “under erasure.”201  What Derrida is trying to do in making use of the, according 
to him, “is”-language of metaphysics, is to express the inseparability of outside and 
inside.  The materiality of a signifier expresses its meaning in its, as it were, 
horizontal movement towards another signifier.  There is no separate, “vertical” 
reference to an immaterial signified.  In Derrida’s words (once again referencing the 
opposition between speech and writing, to which we shall return): 
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“Now we must think that writing is at the same time more exterior to speech, 
not being its ‘image’ or its ‘symbol,’ and more interior to speech, which is 
already in itself a writing.  Even before it is linked to incision, engraving, 
drawing, or the letter, to a signifier referring in general to a signifier signified 
by it, the concept of the graphie [unit of a possible graphic system] implies the 
framework of the instituted trace, as the possibility common to all systems of 
signification.” 
 
The concept of the trace, emerging as it does in this last quotation, is important.  In 
undermining the, according to him, metaphysical logic of the opposition between 
signifier and signified, Derrida introduces a whole constellation of new concepts, 
notable amongst which is that of the trace.  In its manifestation, the trace undermines 
the opposition between presence and absence, between materiality and ideality.  
Somewhat like the notion of haunting, the trace is neither here nor not here.  It is 
neither the full presence of the thing itself, as it is a trace thereof, nor is it simple 
absence: there “is” precisely a trace.  The trace is a material expression of a 
contamination of the present by an absolute past that is itself already being radically 
superseded by an ungraspable future: 
 
“The trace, where the relationship with the other is marked, articulates its 
possibility in the entire field of the entity [étant], which metaphysics has 
defined as the being-present starting from the occulted movement of the 
trace.  The trace must be thought before the entity.  But the movement of the 
trace is necessarily occulted, it produces itself as self-occultation.  When the 
other announces itself as such, it presents itself in the dissimulation of 
itself.”202 
 
According to the logic of the trace, nothing can be exhaustively defined, as it is 
always already becoming something else.  In addition, the consciousness or 
subjective thought trying to define the thing is inextricably bound to the same 
becoming: it has no stable vantage point from which to attempt an objective 
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definition.  The trace is a thought of alterity - it is the contamination of the same by 
the other in a completely immanent process. 
 
We are now in a position to appreciate that other, very important concept in Derrida’s 
deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence, namely the concept of writing.  
Writing has a sense much broader than the technical inscribing of letters on some 
kind of medium using some kind of writing instrument.  In Derrida’s work, writing 
becomes a name for an alternative mode of meaning inference to that prevalent in a 
metaphysics of presence.  Many of the concepts already discussed (e.g. that of the 
trace, the sign, experience and meaning) feature prominently in Derrida’s elaboration 
on what writing entails, as does writing in the explanation of those concepts.  In 
listening to Derrida’s thoughts on writing, we would therefore inevitably have to 
rehearse some ground covered already – also, precisely because Derrida’s thought 
is one of contamination. 
 
Structuralist linguistics, as represented by the thought of Ferdinand de Saussure, 
departs from a stated preference for phonic signs, as opposed to written signs.  The 
phonic sign uttered by the human voice occupies a space of intimate proximity to 
lived experience.  So close is the vocal signifier to lived experience, according to this 
approach, that one may be justified in presuming that what is grasped in such a sign 
is nothing less than the truth.  Of course, in attempting to frame the vocal signifier as 
an absolute representation of lived experience, structuralism reveals its 
phenomenological lineage.  This will be discussed in the next section.   
 
Within a logic dominated by the phonetic preference, the written signifier is deemed 
to be of much lower value.  Writing functions as a mere technical support for the 
vocal sign.  Whereas there is an almost (but not quite, as Derrida would say) 
negligible distance between the vocal signifier and what is signified, the written 
signifier is an inferior representation of what is signified, first and foremost, by the 
voice. According to Derrida, however, this hierarchy that exists between the vocal 
and the written signifier is untenable.  In fact, upon close scrutiny, it becomes 
apparent that there is another, more original logic, according to which writing takes 
priority.  This logic is the logic of the trace, which was elaborated on above.  
According to this logic, lived experience and signified meaning do not represent each 
97 
 
other in a binary (vertical, simultaneous) sign, but all meaning is instead 
(horizontally, diachronically) contaminated by experience.  The materiality of the 
signifier cannot be sublimated, but rather, its constitutive role should be recognised 
and even celebrated.  Within this context, the meaning of the trace is worth quoting 
again: 
 
“Without a retention in the minimal unit of temporal experience, without a trace 
retaining the other as other in the same, no difference would do its work and 
no meaning would appear.  It is not the question of a constituted difference 
here, but rather, before all determination of the content, of the pure movement 
which produces difference.  The (pure) trace is difference.  It does not depend 
on any sensible plenitude, audible or visible, phonic or graphic.  It is, on the 
contrary, the condition of such plenitude.  Although it does not exist, although 
it is never a being-present outside of all plenitude, its possibility is by rights 
anterior to all that one calls sign (signified/signifier, content/expression, 
etc.)…”203 
 
What Derrida proposes with his concept of writing is therefore not merely somehow 
the elevation of the technical operation of writing above speech, but a form of 
meaning intimation that comprises vocal, as well as written, signification in a 
movement of contamination: form contaminated by content, meaning contaminated 
by experience, the present contaminated by the past.  The way in which this 
inscription occurs is called writing.  Writing understood thus is de jure anterior to all 
imposed binary oppositions.   
 
The deconstruction of phonocentric linguistics into writing can once again be brought 
to bear on the notions of space and time.  The age of the phonè, which is the age of 
the logos, which is the age of metaphysics in general, is dominated by the present. 
Starting from the present, the past and the future are delimited as present-past and 
present-future - they are understood in terms of the present.204  Concomitantly, the 
movement from past to present to future is deemed a linear movement.  In a similar 
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vein, departing from the present as the here, space is seen as being spread out 
around and before the present as a point of reference. 
 
Within the logic of writing and of the trace, however, space and time assume a 
different character.  If the articulation - the inscription that is the trace - is understood 
to be the experience of space and time, it is also what allows the difference between 
space and time to appear as such in the unity of that experience.205  Whereas the 
spatial is the corporal, the tactile, the temporal is the metamorphosis of this into 
something new, something different.  Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that, as 
a contamination, the two can never be separated.  If the trace is the articulation of 
space and time, it is also the articulation of difference.  This is, as already 
mentioned, evidenced in Derrida’s use of the term spacing. 
 
Two characteristics of Derridean time emerge in the course of this discussion.  The 
first is the fundamental passivity of time.  Time cannot be actively gathered in a 
present moment.  The point of departure for thinking time is rather the absolute past: 
the trace arrives from an ungraspable past on its way to something ungraspably 
different.  This characteristic of time will be discussed again in the context of the 
discussion regarding Husserlian phenomenology.  The second characteristic of 
Derridean time is its nonlinearity. In what will be discussed again below, when the 
influence of Heidegger’s critique of the “vulgar concept of time” is analysed, Derrida 
describes the age of metaphysics as an age when a linear concept of time resulted 
in the linearisation of writing.206  Dogmatically linear writing may be taken to be yet 
another symptom of the ordering of writing according to presence.  However, from 
within a writing informed by the logic of the trace - that is a writing inscribing time as 
absolute passivity - the necessity for linear writing breaks down.  What emerges out 
of the breakdown of linear writing is a “pluri-dimensional symbolic thought.”207  Of 
this pluri-dimensional thought, Derrida says the following: 
 
The access to pluri-dimensionality and to a delinearized temporality is not a 
simple regression toward the ‘mythogram;’ on the contrary, it makes all the 
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rationality subjected to the linear model appear as another form and another 
age of mythography.  The meta-rationality or the meta-scientificity which are 
thus announced within the meditation upon writing can therefore be no more 
shut up within a science of man than conform to the traditional idea of 
science.  In one and the same gesture, they leave man, science, and the line 
behind.”208 
 
What emerges here may be described, using Deleuze’s image, as a rhizomatic 
rationality - a rationality that grows simultaneously in different directions.  With 
respect to the remark in the quotation that this kind of rationality is not a simple 
regression to the “mythogram,” reference may be made to what Derrida has to say 
about the reasoning associated with khora.  Commenting on Plato’s Timaeus, 
Derrida states that “khora … does not proceed from the natural or legitimate logos, 
but rather from a hybrid, bastard or even corrupted reasoning.”209  This reasoning is 
neither simply logos nor simply mythos - it is the reasoning of logos contaminated by 
mythos.  Derrida’s difficult and opaque style of writing tries to exemplify this 
irrevocable contamination of clare et distincte logical thought that he proposes.  This 
may be witnessed in essays such as “The Double session” published in 
Dissemination210, “Tympan” published in Margins of Philosophy211, and books like 
Chora L Works212 and Glas.213 
 
To conclude this section on Derrida’s deconstruction of structuralism, reference to 
two more related notions should be made, namely that of supplementarity and of 
play.  The notion of the supplement emerges out of Derrida’s critique of the 
metaphysical assumption that it is possible to cover the totality of experience in a 
structure of thought.  In the course of a discussion of the implications of Claude Levi-
Strauss’ work, Derrida states that it is not so much a matter of the infiniteness of a 
field not being able to be covered by a finite glance or a finite discourse – as if at 
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some time in the future, due to technical inventions, this may become possible.  
Rather, the nature of the field – that is language – excludes totalisation.214  
Totalisation is excluded in principle due to the operation of the trace, whereby 
language is de jure, first and foremost, to be cast as writing.   
 
Under the spell of a metaphysics of presence, that which is signified by a signifier 
may be thought to be exhaustively catalogue-able.  However, due to its being 
haunted by an absolute past, the signifier comprises an overabundance that can 
never be exhaustively linked to a discreet signification.  There is always a 
supplement of meaning that escapes being totalised under only one signification.  
Inversely, a specific signified meaning always seems to lack all the nuances 
necessary to cover all the ramifications that spread out from a signifier.  This lack 
always needs to be supplemented.  In a translator’s note to the essay entitled 
“Structure, sign and play,” Alan Bass mentions that this double sense of supplement 
– to supply something missing, or to supply something additional – is at the centre of 
Derrida’s deconstruction of traditional linguistics.215 
 
The movement of supplementarity is also the movement of play.  If a structure 
cannot and should not be gathered around a distinct centre of presence, then the 
spontaneity and movement of a game become available.  There may be many 
different ways of supplementing a given situation, and they cannot be decided upon 
simply by following some pre-established rules.  The supplementations only open up 
in the play itself.  The only truth is the truth of the play - the only faithfulness the 
faithfulness to the game. Furthermore, the notion of play may be more congenial to 
the restless energy of becoming that informs history.  As will have become clear by 
now, in sounding such a note, Derrida consciously aligns himself with the tone and 
style of Nietzsche216: “the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the 
innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, 
and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation.”217  Thus, the play of 
Nietzchean interpretation is opposed to the nostalgic interpretation represented by 
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Rousseau and also, finally, by Levi-Strauss.  The nostalgic interpretation longs for a 
truth given, as it were, from the outside - the other celebrates the immanent truth of 
the interminable play of signifiers as such.   
 
3.3 Deconstructing phenomenology 
 
Apart from the fact that both structuralism and Husserlian phenomenology are 
twentieth century expressions of spatialisation after the “turn to language”, they also, 
according to Derrida, share a genetic bond, in that structuralism has grown and 
developed within a more or less avowed dependence on phenomenology.218  As has 
been mentioned in the previous chapter, the notion of structure is very much part of 
the phenomenological project.  However, in phenomenology, it is the structure of the 
intentional acts of transcendental consciousness that is analysed.  On the other 
hand, it is evident that some form of theoretical cogito is always at work in the 
structuralist analysis of language, history or culture.   
 
In light of the similarities between the structuralist and phenomenological projects, it 
is hardly surprising that Derrida’s critique of both follows the same strategy.  In both 
cases, it is a matter of pointing towards the movement, the restless energy that 
inhabits the spatialised structures and that cannot be suppressed, even though that 
is precisely what the metaphysics of presence intends.  Having cursorily noted the 
similarities between Derrida’s handling of structuralism and phenomenology, it 
should nevertheless be noted that the analysis of the Husserlian text informs 
Derrida’s work at a much deeper level than that of structuralism.  This is so because 
Husserl is actually grappling with the very issues that animate Derrida’s thought – 
notions of, for instance, spatiality and temporality - and Husserl develops a 
vocabulary to deal with these issues.  While keeping the living present at the centre 
of his philosophy, and thereby executing a classically metaphysical move, according 
to Derrida, Husserl is continuously struggling with temporality and with the 
movement of becoming.  In doing so, he sets the scene for a subversion to be 
performed using his own vocabulary.  This is what Derrida accomplishes.  Here, it 
must once again be emphasised that it is not so much a matter of turning the tables 
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on Husserl, that is, of merely emphasising temporality above structure (because 
Husserl is, in a sense, thinking about temporality all the time), as it is of turning 
Husserl’s thought into a thought of contamination and of haunting.   
 
The dialogue with Husserl may be traced back at least as far as Derrida’s 
remarkable Master’s thesis, entitled: Le problème de la genèse dans la philosophie 
de Husserl, which was written in 1953-4 while Derrida was still a student at the Ecole 
Normale.  The problem of genesis, as broached in that study, is remarkable in that it 
presents a tension between the notions of origin and of becoming, both of which are 
present in the concept of genesis itself.  On the one hand, there is the implication of 
an absolute coming into being of something that did not exist before.  On the other 
hand, genesis also implies being produced or engendered by something other than 
the self.  On the one hand, an absolute origin, not reducible to anything that 
precedes it. On the other hand nonetheless an implication of an effective past.  The 
tension inherent in the concept of genesis may be re-described as the question 
regarding the relationship of time to truth.  How is one to think the autonomy of 
sense and truth and their birth in time?  How is one to think both the radicalness of 
sense and the radicalness of becoming?219  Within the scheme of transcendental 
intentionality, sense originates in the encounter with the transcendental object as it 
presents itself.  On the other hand, transcendental subjectivity cannot function 
outside of time, and therefore has to deal with becoming.  According to Derrida, this 
problem, emblematically presented as the problem of genesis, haunts Husserl’s work 
at every stage until it finally takes the form of the question of transcendental 
historicity.220   
 
Paola Marrati argues convincingly that the logic that Derrida develops in this early 
reading of Husserl is the same logic, although elaborated, that informs his later 
readings of Husserl.  The same logic is operative later on when Derrida deals with 
the great exponents of the metaphysical tradition, but also in his interaction with, for 
instance, Heidegger and Levinas.  This is the case even though Derrida later drops 
                                            
219
 Paola Marrati, Genesis and Trace – Derrida reading Husserl and Heidegger (Stanford: University 
Press, 2005), p. 3. 
220
 Ibid. 
103 
 
the explicitly philosophical terms used in his early analysis in favour of his own 
terms, such as writing, the trace and différance.221 
 
Derrida’s subversion of the Husserlian scheme may be followed beginning with 
phenomenology’s principle of principles, zur Sache selbst, which insists that a 
philosophy worthy of the designation “science” must allow the truth of the world itself 
to shine forth.  The shining forth of the truth of the world involves a movement of 
exteriorisation into objective language by way of a passing through human 
consciousness.  But how is this exteriorisation to be conceived in a rigorous and 
scientific manner?  The analysis of this process is, in a sense, the aspiration of the 
phenomenological project.  A key strategy in Husserl’s project of conceptualising the 
phenomenological process is to identify different strata or levels of meaning along 
the passage of truth from the things outward into objective language.  The stratum 
which, functionally speaking, bears the biggest burden, could be termed the 
expressive level.  This level is intermediate, coming between the pre-expressive 
level of logical meaning and the indicative level of signification, where material 
signifiers and intersubjective communication come into play.  While, functionally 
speaking, accomplishing most of the work for Husserl, the expressive stratum of 
meaning is also the most problematic.  Derrida’s reading of Husserl shows that the 
absolute distinction, yet interrelation between the different levels, which Husserl 
attempts to establish, is untenable.  On the one hand, there is a contamination 
between the pre-expressive and expressive levels of the intimation of meaning.  On 
the other hand, there is also a contamination between the expressive level of 
meaning and the corporal, inscribed, exterior level of indication.  Let us now examine 
Derrida’s exposition of both these contaminations, which to a large extent comprise 
his deconstruction of phenomenology. 
 
In the essay entitled “Form and Meaning: a note on the phenomenology of 
language”222, Derrida takes issue with a certain stratification that runs through the 
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Logische Untersuchungen, and which Husserl nowhere repudiates, even in Ideen I. 
The stratification at stake here concerns the rigorous distinction between experience 
and expression.  Derrida remarks that a huge portion of Husserl’s analysis of 
experience “occurs as if transcendental experience were silent, inhabited by no 
language; or rather deserted by expressivity as such, since, starting with the 
Investigations, Husserl in effect determined the essence or telos of language as 
expression (Ausdruck.)”223  The purpose of language, in other words, is to faithfully 
express the true meaning of experience, yet language and experience must be 
rigorously separated in order to safeguard the objectivity of experience.  After 
exploring the fundamental structures of all experience, Husserl thus introduces 
language as expression and as a delimited stratum, independent from pre-
expressive experience as such.  But how are these strata to be conceived as 
separate and yet in contact, in order to facilitate the exteriorisation of meaning?  In 
Derrida’s analysis, this double feat is attempted by Husserl along the lines of a 
double reduction.  On the one hand, the pre-expressive stratum of experience – 
where it all starts, as it were – is reduced to logical meaning, or “sense.”  On the 
other hand, the expressive stratum of language is reduced to a logical conceptuality 
stripped of any sensory or material embodiment.  “Since, according to Husserl, 
expression supposes an intention of meaning (Bedeutungsintention), its essential 
condition is therefore the pure act of animating intention, and not the body to which, 
in some mysterious fashion, intention unites itself and gives life.”224  This second 
reduction is the distinction between the expressive and indicative strata of language, 
which will be returned to later.  The relationship of the pre-expressive to the 
expressive stratum may be summed up as the relationship of Sinn to Bedeutung.  
Sinn (sense) indicates the totality of the noematic face of experience, while the pair 
Bedeuten-Bedeutung is reserved for the order of expressive meaning (vouloir dire).   
 
Husserl envisages the transfer of meaning from the pre-expressive to the expressive 
stratum as, alternatively, a kind of mirror writing and a kind of imprinting.225  
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Expression merely mirrors the sense carried in the experience - it is completely 
neutral and adds nothing to that sense.  In Derrida’s words: 
 
“[T]he transition to being stated adds nothing to sense, or in any event adds 
no content of sense; and yet, despite this sterility, or rather, because of it, the 
appearance of expression is radically new.  Because it only reissues the 
noematic sense, in a certain way, expression is rigorously novel.  To the 
extent that it neither adds nor in any way deforms, expression can always in 
principle repeat sense, by providing access to ‘conceptual form’: ‘If we have 
‘thought’ or stated ‘This is white,’ a new stratum is there with the rest, and 
unites with the ‘meant as such’ in its pure perceptive form.”226 
 
The other metaphor that Husserl uses to explain the transfer of sense from the pre-
expressive to the expressive stratum is that of the imprint.  The expressive stratum is 
like some kind of tabula rasa that receives an imprint of noematic sense from 
experience.  In the expressive stratum, noematic sense is received in the form of a 
concept.  While expression adds no new sense to sense (being in that sense 
passive), it does add conceptual form (and is in that sense active): 
 
“The expressive noema must offer itself, and this is the new image of its 
unproductivity, as a blank page or virgin tablet; or at least as a palimpsest 
given over to its pure receptivity.  Once the inscription of the sense in it 
renders it legible, the logical order of conceptuality will be constituted as such.  
It then will offer itself begrifflich, in graspable, manipulable, conceivable, 
conceptual fashion.”227 
 
Even though radically distinct, the two strata – that of transcendental objectivity 
(experience) and that of transcendental subjectivity (expression) - are attuned to 
each other, in that logical meaning is what is delivered and received.  The noematic 
face of experience and the conceptual expression thereof are attuned to each other 
in the Husserlian preference for logical, theoretical meaning.  According to Derrida, a 
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circularity in the Husserlian system can be detected at this point.  While the most 
basic premise of phenomenology is to start with the things themselves, the 
questioning of the things happens in such a way that a certain outcome is 
presupposed: the outcome of logical conceptuality.  The language of logical 
conceptuality is the “is”-language of metaphysics.  While ostensibly being critical of 
metaphysics, and trying to develop a critical philosophy, the circularity arranged 
around the “is” places Husserl, according to Derrida, very much in the forefront of a 
venerable metaphysical tradition. 
 
What remains is for Derrida to point to the untenable problems accompanying 
Husserl’s radical separation of sense and meaning or, in other words, the pre-
expressive and expressive strata of meaning.  The first problem Derrida raises is that 
of the historical nature of concepts.  In order for it to be used to express a certain 
sense, a concept must be available.  This implies that the concept must already have 
existed and must therefore have its own history of use and development.  A concept 
is not created by the imprint of experiential sense - it already exists.  However, if this 
is the case, how can Husserl maintain the absolute priority of experience issuing, as 
it where, from the things themselves?  Does the historical character of concepts not 
imply a constitutive role for expression and language in general?  While Husserl 
seems to evade the question by emphasising the juridical anteriority of sense in 
relation to meaning, he never addresses the problem as such.228 
 
A second problematic area pertains to the relationship of the logical to the pictorial in 
Husserl’s scheme of the transfer of sense.  While it is logical sense – the noematic – 
that is transferred in order to be expressed, Husserl notably uses the metaphor of 
the Bild to explain this.  On the one hand, there is the metaphor of abbilden, or 
mirroring, in order to emphasise that expression adds nothing to sense – it merely 
mirrors.  On the other hand, there is the metaphor of einbilden, or imagination, used 
to indicate the formative activity whereby sense is expressed as a concept.  “Here 
one could speak, in a sense, of a conceptual fiction and of a kind of imagination that 
picked up the intuition of sense in the generality of the concept.”229  Husserl 
attributes the apparent contradiction between abbilden and einbilden to the 
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accidental metaphoricity of language, and wants to separate this from the logical 
import that everything is about.  The implication that Derrida, however, seems to 
draw, is the following: the fact that Husserl cannot but use pictorial language in his 
depiction of the transfer of sense indicates that sense is more than logical sense.  
Logic is contaminated by image and narrative and history. 
 
A third objection that Derrida raises to the absolute separation of experience and 
expression concerns the limiting power of form.  According to Husserl, experiential 
sense is expressed in the generality of a concept.  This renders it manipulable and 
express-able.  But does a general concept cover the full import of sense?  What 
guarantees a hundred percent coverage of the sense by the concept?  According to 
Derrida, Husserl himself acknowledges that the concept cannot and should not 
completely cover the import of sense.  “This impoverishment is the condition for 
scientific formalization.  Unequivocality is furthered in the extent to which the 
complete repetition of sense in meaning is given up.”230  The scientific demand 
internal to the phenomenological system thus apparently leads to the necessity of 
supplementation.  Meaning always overflows the concept.  The concept always 
needs to be supplemented in order to supply for a lack in the coverage of meaning.  
This formulation hints back to what has been stated before under the analysis of 
Derrida’s deconstruction of structuralism.  Meaning is a force which a metaphysics of 
presence tries to tame through the concept – an endeavour that never succeeds. 
 
The conclusion that Derrida makes is that Sinn and Bedeutung, experience and 
expression, experience and language, can never be totally separated.  Each is 
constitutively contaminated by the other.  Husserl grappled with this problem all 
along.  He realised the need for a supplementation of the geological metaphor of the 
stratum by a textile (or textual, as Derrida would say) metaphor.231  Like a cloth 
consists of a warp and a woof, so experience and language are woven together.  
While Husserl tried to disentangle experience and language, Derrida maintains that 
they are inextricably linked: experience is textual. 
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With this, we have come to the second pair of strata, which Husserl tried in vain to 
keep apart: the distinction between an inner and an outer stratum of language.  The 
distinction between expression (Ausdruck) and indication (Anzeigen) as radically 
distinct modes of language has already been discussed in the previous chapter, and 
mentioned in the overview at the beginning of this section.  The distinction has to do 
with the functioning of signs in the transfer of meaning, and ultimately truth, within 
the phenomenological system.  On the one hand, there is the general functioning of 
signs in language: a signifier stands in the stead of something else that is not 
immediately present, but which is re-presented (signified) by the signifier.  This 
function Husserl designates with the general term ‘indication’.  In Husserl’s own 
words: 
 
“In these we discover as a common circumstance the fact that certain objects 
or states of affairs of whose reality (Bestand) someone has actual knowledge 
indicate (anzeigen) to him the reality of certain other objects or states of 
affairs, in the sense that his belief in the being (Sein) of the one is 
experienced (though not at all evidently) as motivating a belief or surmise in 
the being of the other.”232 
 
The indicative sign functions, as it were, “outside” in the real, empirical world.  As 
such, it forms the backbone of intersubjective communication, and also of inscription.  
The problem with the indicative sign is that it cannot be the bearer of certain truth.  
There is no certainty that the absent signified (be it a thing or a state of affairs) is 
really completely congruent with what the signifier indicates.  There may be an error 
or a deception.  Indication in general is therefore not suitable to bear the burden of 
bringing the things in themselves to light.  This being so, Husserl now introduces a 
special, distinct stratum of linguistic functioning called expression (Ausdruck.)  The 
defining characteristic of expression is that it does not suffer from absence in the 
way that indication does.  Expression stems from immediate contact with the 
lebendige Gegenwart, the living presence, of the thing itself as it is given in 
transcendental consciousness.  In view of the fact that expression arises from 
immediate experience of the thing itself, expression is not really a mode of 
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signification.  Expression may even be explained as the absence of signification, or 
as non-signification.233 
 
The living present is of special importance in Husserl’s description of the way in 
which the truth of a thing can pass to consciousness and language.  Within the 
intentional act of transcendental consciousness, the transcendental object is 
immediately present to the intuition of the transcendental subject, and the fullness of 
meaning is immediately given.  One could also describe the fullness of meaning 
present in the lebendige Gegenwart as ideal meaning.  The ideality of the fullness of 
meaning in the living present implies that it is infinitely repeatable.  Because ideal, it 
can be expressed without loss.  Only when ideal meaning ventures out into the real 
world does it become subject to the drag of signification and interpretation, with 
concomitant erosion of the ideal meaning content.  If expression is to be seen as the 
absence of signification due to absolute proximity to lived experience, this, however, 
also implies that the transcendental subject expressing the meaning should be fully 
present to itself.  Husserl describes the absolute proximity of the transcendental 
subject to itself as pure auto-affection.  These notions of a living present and of pure 
auto-affection, together with the conceptions of space and time that they entail, are 
exactly what Derrida finds extremely problematic.  Here he ventures to show that the 
notions of space and time that Husserl utilises, if pursued rigorously enough, 
eventually lead to a collapse of the strata that Husserl so meticulously tried to 
separate.  Finally, it leads to a collapse of the absolute separation of space and time 
implied in the metaphysics of phenomenology. 
 
The presence at stake here is the spatialised presence of the instant.  Outer, 
material space is completely reduced (only to open up again afterwards in the 
unified, homogenised space of meaning.)  Time is, however, also reduced - it is 
reduced to the instant.  Time becomes the “now” of absolute proximity to self.  “Self-
presence must be produced in the undivided unity of a temporal present so as to 
have nothing to reveal to itself by the agency of signs.”234  This undivided unity of a 
temporal present has the character of a point, of the now as stigmē.  This “now” also 
becomes the source point for pure auto-affection, that is, for absolute proximity to 
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self.235  Let us look, with Derrida, first at the notion of the now as a singular point, 
and thereafter at the tenability of the notion of the self as completely self-identical. 
 
According to Derrida, it becomes clear, upon studying Husserl’s Phenomenology of 
Internal Time Consciousness, that Husserl realised no “now” can be isolated as a 
pure instant – a pure punctuality – but that there is necessarily something of an 
extension in the instant.236  This extension is nonetheless envisaged on the basis of 
the self-identity of the now as point, or, as Husserl indicated, as source-point.  The 
sense, the ideal essence, of a transcendental object has a beginning and remains 
stable in its movement along the flow of time - a form that persists through 
continuous change of matter.  Husserl describes this stability in terms of a “now,” 
even though he concedes that this now consists of a number of “retentions” and 
“protentions”, together with the actual present.  The flow of time demands that, for 
something to be experienced as present in transcendental consciousness, a 
retention of that thing from the previous instant should be held together with the 
present instant, as well as with an expectation of the next instant.  Otherwise, an 
experience of presence would be impossible.  Husserl argued that retentions and 
protentions should be seen as part of the extended now, and rigorously distinguished 
them from re-presentation.  Re-presentation implies absence and the use of signs, 
and therefore loss of certainty and truth if that representation itself cannot be 
founded on expression of the immediately present.  For the living present to be a 
present without any absence, the retentions and protentions that exist in the “now” 
must be regarded as utterly different from representations.  However, Derrida notes, 
this is precisely not the case!  Try as he may, Husserl is not able to radically 
distinguish between retention and repetition.  Even thought it happens in 
transcendental consciousness, the very act of comparing a retentional trace to the 
present instant implies the presence of the non-identical in the identical.  Absence is 
present in the present moment.  In Derrida’s own words: 
 
“As soon as we admit this continuity of the now and the not-now, perception 
and nonperception, in the zone of primordiality common to primordial 
impression and primordial retention, we admit the other into the self-identity of 
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the Augenblick; nonpresence and nonevidence are admitted into the blink of 
the instant … This alterity is in fact the condition for presence, presentation, 
and thus for Vorstellung in general…”237 
 
The point is that while phenomenology tries to exclude absence and alterity in order 
to safeguard presence, absence and alterity are in fact necessary for the presencing 
of the presence.  Only in relation to the irreducible non-presence of another now 
does the presence of the primordial impression appear.  The present is always 
contaminated by an absolute past.  Indication is always already present. 
 
This contamination is true of the transcendental subject as well: it always already 
bears its non-self in itself.  At this point, it should be recalled that the radical 
separation of expression from indication goes hand in hand with a separation of the 
inside from the outside.  While the outside of transcendental consciousness involves 
the world of extension in space (the material world), the inside is the mental world of 
pure auto-affection.  Meaning does not have to traverse space, as it happens in the 
instant of the immediate presence of transcendental subjectivity to the 
transcendental object.  This meaning is completely disembodied.  It is the ideal 
essence that only later becomes embodied in the further exteriorisation into physical 
sound and written inscription.  Here, we once again come across the qualitative 
separation of speech and writing, which was discussed in the previous section.   
 
According to Husserl, the pure auto-affection of the transcendental subject in the 
experience of the living presence is the experience of a mental voice.  It is the 
mental experience of hearing oneself speak at the same time that one is speaking: 
 
“The signifier, animated by my breath and by the meaning-intention (in 
Husserl’s language, the expression animated by the Bedeutungsintention), is 
in absolute proximity to me.  The living act, the life giving act … which 
animates the body of the signifier and transforms it into a meaningful 
expression, the soul of language, seems not to separate itself from itself, from 
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its own self-presence.  It does not risk death in the body of a signifier that is 
given over to the world and the visibility of space.”238 
 
Thus, we have a constellation according to which space, embodiment and writing are 
radically separated from the temporal instant, from lebendichkeit as, in a sense, pure 
mental meaning, and from the voice, which is the expression of this consciousness.  
In opposition to this constellation, Derrida simply points to the fact that the flow of 
time itself undermines such a radical separation.  Even though I may allege an 
absolute proximity between my consciousness and my voice, I nevertheless, in my 
pure auto-affection, have to compare myself with myself from moment to moment.  
And this introduces a moment of pure difference into my pure self-identity.   
 
Therefore, the phenomenological project, at least as it is dogmatically organised 
around a metaphysics of presence, collapses on itself if its own premises are 
pursued diligently enough.  As Husserl conceived it, the things shine forth by having 
their sense intuited in transcendental consciousness, and then expressed as logical 
concepts without any loss of meaning.  However, sense is temporal in nature, and as 
such is always already engaged in the movement of the trace, that is, in the order of 
signification.239  Expression and indication, sense and its inscription are always 
irrevocably co-implicated, that is, contaminated.  Derrida succinctly expresses this 
logic of contamination in terms of the notions of space and time: 
 
“Since the trace is the intimate relation of the living present with its outside, 
the openness upon exteriority in general, upon the sphere of what is not ‘one’s 
own,’ etc., the temporalization of sense is, from the outset, a ‘spacing.’  As 
soon as we admit spacing both as ‘interval’ or difference and as openness 
upon the outside, there can no longer be any absolute inside, for the ‘outside’ 
has insinuated itself into the movement by which the inside of the nonspatial, 
which is called ‘time,’ appears, is constituted, is ‘presented.’  Space is ‘in’ 
time; it is time’s pure leaving-itself; it is the ‘outside itself’ as the self relation of 
time.”240 
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The becoming space of time, which in its turn again is temporalised as space-ing, is 
what Derrida holds writing to be.  It is also intimately linked with the neologism 
différance, to which we now turn. 
 
 
3.4 Différance: the becoming space of time and the becoming time of space 
 
When pronounced, the word “différance” is completely indistinguishable from the 
conventional French “différence,” and this, Derrida comments, is in itself significant, 
since it once again points to the logic of contamination at work.  What we find here is 
a thought not singularly proper to either the region of sensibility or the region of 
intelligibility.  The difference that the “a” in différance makes is not sensible to the 
ear, yet, upon inscription (sensible to the eye), additional senses emerge.  
Conversely, différance is not completely different from différence, but the insertion of 
the “a” introduces something new.  The word thus demarcates a region where 
sensibility and intelligibility are intermingled.241 
 
The operation of a logic of contamination is deepened by observing that “différance” 
cannot be presented as such.  To define différance by means of the “is”-language of 
the metaphysics of presence would simply re-confine it within the most traditional 
terms of the opposition between presence and absence.  With this in mind, Derrida 
stresses that différance is neither a word nor a concept.  It has neither an essence, 
nor an existence.  It also does not have a beginning, as it has always already been 
at work.242  The best one can do then is to describe what happens, and saying this 
may also be the best description of différance: it is what happens - it is an operation 
within language, where the latter is taken in the broadest possible sense. 
 
In an often quoted explanation, Derrida starts with a semantic analysis of the French 
infinitive “différer”, in order to bring the dynamics of différance into play.  Deriving 
from the Latin verb differre, the French word ‘différer’ has two lexical meanings, 
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which at first seem quite distinct.243  On the one hand, there is the sense of a “putting 
off until later, of taking into account, of taking account of time and of the forces of an 
operation that implies an economical calculation, a detour, a delay, a relay, a 
reserve…”244.  Derrida links this sense specifically to a temporisation.  Différer, in this 
sense, implies the recourse – consciously or unconsciously – to a temporal 
mediation.  Time is taken, time is used up, and the attainment of a goal or fulfilment 
of a desire is suspended over time. 
 
On the other hand, the word ‘différer’ has the meaning of not being identical - 
something is different from something else in the sense of being other and 
discernible.  With regard to this sense, Derrida remarks that “whether it is a question 
of dissimilar otherness or of allergic and polemical otherness, an interval, a distance, 
spacing, must be produced between the elements other, and be produced with a 
certain perseverance in repetition.”245 
 
Now, according to Derrida, whereas the conventional French word ‘différence’ 
cannot convey the range of meanings implicit in the word ‘différer’, the neologism 
différance is able to do just that.  Différance can hold together – and precisely in 
contamination – the sense of temporal deferral and of spatial differing. This, together 
with the fact that it “is” an operation rather than a substance, is its gain.  How does 
the operational working of différance tie in with the temporisation and spacing 
implied in the thought?  In Derrida’s words: 
 
“In a conceptuality adhering to classical strictures “différance” would be said to 
designate a constitutive, productive and originary causality, the process of 
scission and division which would produce or constitute different things or 
differences.” 
 
This would be another way of saying that différance hints at the becoming space of 
time through inscription as markings, or rather as traces, while equally constituting 
the becoming time of space, as these inscribed traces are in turn deconstructed.  
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The happening of the production of differences or articulations is neither strictly 
active nor strictly passive.  It is not active, in that différance is not the subject that 
produces language, but it is also not passive, in that it is not produced by language 
either.  According to Derrida, the operation of différance recalls something like the 
middle voice, which has a certain non-transitivity and resistance to fixation into 
categories of active and passive, agent and patient, as its characteristics.246   
 
This section may be concluded by attempting to list, as succinctly as possible, the 
characteristics of the notions of Derridean space and time as they have emerged in 
the conversation thus far.  In this regard, it should by now be clear that the narrower 
context of Derrida’s work is transcendental philosophy, specifically in the re-
energised, linguistically orientated guise it received in the work of Edmund Husserl.  
Derrida, as it were, inhabits the language of phenomenology and structuralism 
which, according to him, is inherently unstable due to a metaphysical prejudice.  By 
showing the undecideability existing between the binary oppositions that make up 
this approach and that have to keep it in balance, Derrida effects a deconstruction 
whereby a new logic emerges out of the old vocabulary.  The operation of the new 
logic affects the notions of space and time dramatically. 
 
Phenomenology’s pursuit of a foundation for certainty in transcendental 
consciousness leads it to a reduction of empirical space.  Materiality and exteriority, 
outside of their appearance in the intentional act of transcendental consciousness, 
have to be placed between brackets.  While space is thus reduced, it has been 
argued in this study that it paradoxically returns as spatialisation – the casting of a 
net over all of experience and history, in order to unify it as a totality. 
 
Husserl is, however, unable to dispatch with time and temporality as easily.  Derrida 
points out that they are what he grapples with all the time.  In his conceptualisation of 
time (and space), Husserl builds on the work of Kant.  In his treatment of time in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant effects a “double move.”247  On the one hand, Kant 
asserts that time is empirically real: no object can be given in experience that is not 
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subject to the condition of time.  Time is thus a condition for appearance in general, 
a pure form of sensibility without which there could be no experience to begin with.  
On the other hand, Kant holds that time is transcendentally ideal: it may only be 
regarded to be a subjective condition for the intuition of sensible things.  Time does 
not apply to things in themselves, but is only a condition of possibility for the 
appearance of things in finite experience.248  This being his position, Kant now has to 
deal with the problem of the relationship between succession and synthesis.  Time is 
a succession, but also a division of moments into discreet instances of past, present 
and future.  There can, however, be no experience of time if the different moments 
were not related to one another.  A synthesis of successive moments is thus 
necessary for the awareness of any temporal extension.249  Kant’s answer to this 
challenge is to contrast the variable flux of empirical consciousness with the unity of 
transcendental apperception, which he terms pure, original, unchanging 
consciousness.  The “I think” is a spontaneous source of synthesis, which connects 
the manifold of intuition in one self-identical consciousness.250  The pure 
apperception of the transcendental subject is bound up with time, but is not temporal 
itself, otherwise it would itself be in need of another synthesis, thereby instigating an 
infinite regress.  The postulation of a non-temporal, pure apperception of the 
transcendental subject is a legitimate move, according to Kant, as it does not imply 
the acceptance of a metaphysical substance, particularly the soul. 
 
The postulation of a pure, original, unchanging consciousness is not an option that 
Husserl, however, leaves open for himself.  He wanted to remain, as strictly as 
possible, with the things themselves as they appeared within the experience of 
transcendental intentionality.  Consequently, he foregoes the Kantian double move 
of saying that space and time are empirically real, but transcendentally ideal. 
Examining how phenomena are given to consciousness in intentionality, Husserl 
concludes simply that temporality is characteristic of appearances in general:  “On 
both sides – that is, both in the immanent and transcendent spheres of reality – time 
is the irreducible form of individual realities in their described modes.”251  Husserl 
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thus assumes an originary temporality to phenomenality, and this is the important 
breakthrough of the Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, even though 
this temporality is still ordered around the principle of presence and the present. 
 
Husserl is now presented with the same problem as Kant: how to account for the 
succession of time, while also explaining the synthesis between discreet moments, 
without which the experience of time would be impossible.  As everything is 
temporal, recourse to an atemporal, pure apperception is not open to him.  Husserl 
therefore introduces an absolute subjectivity, which he calls the absolute flow: “In 
contrast to the intentional acts and their objects, the flow is an ‘absolute subjectivity’ 
that is not temporally constituted but immediately given to itself as a ‘living 
presence.’“252  As was already noted in the previous section of this chapter, Derrida’s 
argument now is that Husserl tries in vain to reconcile the absolute flow of 
subjectivity with the need for the synthesis of retentions and protentions, in order to 
realise the certainty of the living present.  The absolute flow of time must necessarily 
lead to the conclusion that every present moment is already inhabited by an alterity. 
 
It is important to recognise here that Derrida agrees with Husserl about original 
temporality.  This is, in fact, exactly the conclusion that Derrida wants to stress 
above all.  The reduction of objective temporality opens onto a purely immanent 
phenomenological temporality.253  Derrida’s thought is a thought of radical, original, 
entirely immanent temporality.  Nothing can be said to transcend temporality.  
Another way of saying this would be to say that Derrida’s thought is a thought of 
infinite finitude: there is nothing outside the process of successive, finite 
becoming.254   
 
The profound disagreement with Husserl and, of course, structuralism, has to do with 
Derrida’s rejection of the attempt to organise originary temporality around a notion of 
presence and the present.  The present cannot be the point of departure for a 
thinking of temporality.  The present always works from within the logic of non-
contradiction, whereby the identity of some point has to be defended against 
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something else - an alterity.  However, the present is always already not simply the 
present.  It is always already divided in itself, and is always already contaminated. 
Therefore, temporality should be thought from within the radical passivity of time.  It 
should be thought from the perspective of the absolute past.  What is produced as 
arché-writing, as différance, leaves a trace in the present, but cannot be subsumed 
under a proper heading.   
 
Presence and the present should, from within this logic, be understood as an effect 
of writing.  It is what comes from an absolute past and remains as a trace for as long 
as it is repeated. However, the repetition cannot be completely identical, and it 
should therefore be open to an unanticipated future.   
 
As should also be clear by now, the notion of the trace implies Derrida’s rejection of 
any separation of space and time.  Spatiality, or rather spacing, is what articulates 
the flow of time.  Martin Hägglund summarised this becoming space of time and 
becoming time of space as follows: 
 
“The synthesis of the trace follows from the constitution of time we have 
considered.  Given that the now can appear only by disappearing – that it 
passes away as soon as it comes to be – it must be inscribed as a trace in 
order to be at all.  This is the becoming space of time.  The trace is 
necessarily spatial, since spatiality is characterized by the ability to remain in 
spite of temporal succession.  Spatiality is thus the condition for synthesis, 
since it enables the tracing of relations between past and future.  Spatiality, 
however, can never be in itself; it can never be pure simultaneity.  
Simultaneity is unthinkable without a temporalization that relates one spatial 
juncture to another.  This becoming time of space is necessary not only for the 
trace to be related to other traces, but also for it to be a trace in the first place.  
A trace can only be read after its inscription and is thus marked by a relation 
to the future that temporalizes space.”255 
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Thus, Derrida inhabits the language of transcendental philosophy, but destabilises it 
in order for a logic of contamination to appear.  Eventually, the confines of 
transcendental philosophy are exploded because “spacing” – the other shorthand for 
the becoming space of time and the becoming time of space – has an ultra-
transcendental status.256  What remains is a wholly immanent process of the 
emergence of different articulations - an infinite finitude. 
 
 
3.5 The conversation with Heidegger 
 
Derrida’s relationship with his older contemporary, Martin Heidegger, as well as the 
implications of this conversation for Derrida’s views on spatiality and temporality, 
highlights an important line of enquiry.257  Although Derrida maintained that the 
conversation with Heidegger informed his work at all stages, the question remains as 
to what Derrida appropriated from, or modelled on, the Heideggerian project, and to 
what extent, on the other hand, he criticised and precisely sought to deconstruct 
Heidegger.   
 
In the same way as Derrida did after him, Heidegger also took phenomenology as a 
point of departure.  Heidegger, however, transposed transcendental phenomenology 
onto an existential plane.  Whereas Husserl analysed and explicated the way in 
which things (beings) appear in transcendental consciousness, Heidegger 
maintained that what should be explored is the appearance of being as such.  The 
most important task of philosophy is to think the difference between being and 
beings, or the ontic-ontological difference.  However, this, according to Heidegger, is 
precisely what has been tragically neglected.  Philosophy suffers from a 
forgetfulness of being.  This the early Heidegger tries to remedy by rigorously 
analysing the presencing of being within the horizon of the human being (Dasein). 
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Dasein is the site of the phainein, the appearing of being.  This appearing is, 
however, at the same time a disappearing, a hiding, as being cannot be definitively 
grasped by an instrumental rationality.  The forgetfulness of being that Western 
thought suffers from in Heidegger’s opinion stems on a practical level from a 
lethargy, a being taken up by everydayness, a being caught up in entertainment and 
the daily trudge of mass society.  On a metaphysical level, the same forgetfulness of 
being manifests itself in a commitment to presence and the present moment.  One 
being amongst the beings is taken to be the highest being, and everything is then 
organised around that being in terms of a logic of presence and absence.  What is 
connected to the highest being is present, and the further another being moves away 
the less presence it could be said to possess.  On the basis of this scheme, 
Heidegger reads the history of Western thought, from the pre-Socratics to the 
present, as a history organised around the principle of presence in the ontic plane, 
and therefore a history forgetful of being (of the ontological) as such. 
 
In Heidegger’s thought being and temporality are intimately linked - this, in a sense, 
is the burden of demonstration in his monumental Being and Time.  Concomitantly, 
the forgetfulness of being is linked to a “vulgar concept of time.”  Where an 
attentiveness to being is relinquished in favour of a preoccupation with beings, time 
is likewise thought on the basis of the present, as it relates itself to Dasein.  In ¶81 of 
Being and Time, Heidegger formulates this as follows: 
 
“… in so far as Dasein calculates time in reckoning with itself, … the kind of 
behaviour in which ‘one’ explicitly regulates oneself according to time, lies in 
the use of clocks.  The existential-temporal meaning of this turns out to be a 
making-present of the travelling pointer.  By following the positions of the 
pointer in a way which makes present, one counts them.  This making-present 
temporalizes itself in the ecstatical unity of a retention which awaits.  To retain 
the ‘on that former occasion’ and to retain it by making it present, signifies that 
in saying ‘now’ one is open for the horizon of the earlier – that is, of the ‘now- 
no-longer.’  To await the ‘then’ by making it present, means that in saying 
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‘now’ one is open for the horizon of the later – that is, of the now-not-yet.  
Time is what shows itself in such a making present”.258  
 
According to Heidegger, therefore, the most important characteristic of vulgar time is 
its being organised around the present.  The time that thus emerges is calculable 
and present-at-hand - it is manipulable by an instrumental reason, and this is a 
defining characteristic of the spatialisation wrought by metaphysics.  According to 
Heidegger, the concept of time as a flowing stream of “nows” hails from Aristotle. 
Furthermore, ever since Aristotle, all discussions of the concept of time have in 
principle accepted the Aristotelian definitions: time is the number of change in 
respect of before and after - time is what is counted, starting from the present as a 
point of reference.259   
 
While distancing himself from the vulgar concept of time, which seeks to understand 
temporality in relation to an ontic present, Heidegger equally maintains that time 
cannot find its meaning in eternity.  This might have been an option if it were 
methodologically justifiable, but methodologically speaking, such a “theological” point 
of departure is not justifiable.  An existential phenomenology can only start with man 
and with what appears within the human condition.260  The primary question is not 
“what is time”, but “who is time.”  What kind of being is man that he has a concept of 
time?  In response to this question, Heidegger suggests that time is intelligible only 
for a being that lives with an understanding of a limit.  Dasein conceives time in 
terms of a limit - as time passes, so do its possibilities.  In point of fact, the 
awareness of an absolute limit is what makes all possibilities intelligible, and along 
with this intelligibility, a concept of time emerges.  Death is the absolute limit for the 
being there of Dasein.  The certainty of death constitutes Dasein as a finite being: “It 
is the certainty of death, the certainty of finitude, that opens up possibilities and thus 
time.”261  By establishing a limit to our possibilities, death also allows us to grasp the 
unity (Einheit) of possibilities.   
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Being is temporal and the appearing of being in the finite life of Dasein characterises 
it as irrevocably temporal.  According to Heidegger, Dasein’s temporality is a 
temporality oriented to the future.  The fact that Dasein can only make sense of its 
life in light of an absolute limit that lies ahead (a sein zum Tode) characterises 
Dasein as ecstatically oriented to the future.  While the vulgar concept of time 
organises time around the present, Heidegger proposes a concept of time based on 
the meaning imparted by the future.  An authentic relationship to the future demands 
that Dasein take over its thrownness (Geworfenheit.)  Dasein can only appropriate 
itself in the mode of a return.  Implied in the authentic future is thus an equally 
authentic return, referred to by Heidegger as the existential past.  From the future 
and from the having-been (Gewesen), there eventually arises the originary present. 
The authentic notion of the present refers to a situatedness and not to the presence 
of things.  As has been mentioned above, life in expectance of a limit allows us to 
grasp the unity of our constellation of possibilities.  Significantly, the present does not 
generate the past and the future as modifications of itself, but emerges on the basis 
of them.  In the words of Paola Marrati: 
 
“Zeitlichkeit is the ek-static unity that unfolds in the mutual implication of the 
ek-stases (future, having been, and present), the ek-static character of which 
marks temporality as ‘the pure and simple original outside-of-itself [Ausser-
sich]’: temporality (Dasein, then) is not a being that can step outside itself but 
is from the outset the outside-of-itself”.262 
 
Temporality is the meaning of Dasein.  Dasein’s constitution and its ways to be are 
ontologically possible only on the basis of temporality.263  What, then, of spatiality?  
According to Heidegger, Dasein’s spatiality is derived from its temporality.  Spatiality 
is not equiprimordial with temporality.  The grounding of spatiality in temporality is 
similar to the deduction of the present from an ecstatic-existential relationship to the 
future.  In coming up against the limit of its death, Dasein appropriates its 
possibilities in authentic care.  Part of this appropriation of its possibilities involves a 
making room for its own “leeway”: 
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“Dasein takes space in; this is to be understood literally.  It is by no means just 
present-at-hand in a bit of space which its body fills up.  In existing, it has 
already made room for its own leeway.  It determines its own location in such 
a manner that it comes back from the space it has made room for to the 
‘place’ it has reserved.”264  
 
From within Heidegger’s existential-phenomenological analysis, spatiality is 
grounded in temporality, although it remains nevertheless an independent 
phenomenon.  That spatiality is an important phenomenon in Dasein’s life is borne 
out by the fact that Dasein’s interpretation of itself and the whole stock of 
significations which belong to language in general are dominated through and 
through by spatial representations.265 
 
The foregoing cursory remarks on Heidegger’s conception of temporality and 
spatiality afford us the opportunity to explore the relationship between Derrida and 
Heidegger, especially with regard to the notions of space and time.  In this regard, it 
should be remarked that there certainly is a deep sympathy between their respective 
projects.  The rejection of metaphysical presence, together with the analysis of the 
history of (Western) thought as a metaphysics of presence, which is announced by 
Heidegger, is continually commented and elaborated on in Derrida’s work.  The 
notion of spatialisation, used to describe the state of modern philosophy, and 
discussed in the previous chapter of this study, may even be said to derive more 
properly from the Heideggerian description of the “Age of the World-picture.”   
 
While Derrida and Heidegger share a certain diagnosis of the condition of 
philosophy, they nevertheless differ in terms of where the malady stems from. 
Heidegger rejects the metaphysics of presence on the grounds of inauthenticity: 
thought is not being true to itself - it is forgetful of being.  Derrida, on the other hand, 
rejects the presence-absence opposition as a point of departure for thought, by 
showing how this notion auto-deconstructs.  If pursued rigorously enough, the logic 
of presence-absence proves to be untenable, as the present is always already 
contaminated by an absolute past. 
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In addition, with regard to the main thrust of their alternatives to a metaphysics of 
presence, there is a deep affinity between Heidegger and Derrida.  In his analysis, 
Husserl arrived at a completely immanent temporal flux that informs transcendental 
consciousness.  In his transposition of phenomenology onto an ontological plane, 
Heidegger’s thought focuses on the temporality of being as such.  In a similar vein, 
Derrida’s thought – as it has emerged in the discussion thus far – may be 
characterised as a thought of a constitutive temporality that is radically immanent. 
The appearance of finitude as temporality, such is the accordance of Derrida and 
Heidegger. 
 
The deep-running, shared sentiments with regard to temporality and finitude should 
not, however, conceal significant differences within Heidegger’s and Derrida’s 
alternatives to the metaphysics of presence.266  While Heidegger understands 
temporality from the perspective of the future (the sein of Dasein is a sein zum 
Tode), Derrida understands it from the perspective of the absolute past. Heidegger’s 
ecstatic temporality involves Dasein’s recognition of its finitude, in view of its 
inevitable death.  This throws it back upon its past, out of which it then gathers an 
authentic care for its unique, finite situatedness in the present.  Derrida, on the other 
hand, deconstructs presence (and his thought is to that extent eccentric and ecstatic) 
by noting that the present is always already contaminated by the past.  This does not 
imply that Derrida is insensitive to the absolute finitude announced by death.  Death 
as an indication of finitude does feature prominently in Derrida’s writings.  The issue 
here is not finitude but identity.  Heidegger’s position is that there is an authentic 
temporality: awareness of an absolute limit throws Dasein back upon its own 
thrownness and allows it to gather itself in an authentic, existential awareness of its 
situation.  The notion of authenticity is borne out in Heidegger’s later writings, even if 
he abandons the language of phenomenology.  Like a flash of lightning, being shines 
forth at the beginning of an epoch, only to be progressively forgotten.  However, the 
hope remains that it will shine forth again at the end of the epoch to announce a new 
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epoch of being.  The crucial point here is that, according to Heidegger, it is the same 
being that shines forth again at the end of an age.  The same being that lighted up 
the origin will light up again.  In this sense, Heidegger can speak of an originary 
temporality.  There is a being at the origin that may be gathered again across the 
epochs.  According to Heidegger, difference is to be sought in the ontic-ontological 
difference. 
 
Derrida, on the other hand, while agreeing about the infinite finitude of temporality, 
cannot speak of an originary temporality.  There is no authentic relationship to 
temporality that derives from a gathering.  There is no identical being that appears 
again at the end of an epoch.  There “is” only différance.  What appears in the 
present appears as a trace: it is contaminated by an absolute past that is not 
gatherable into a present-past.  It awaits an absolute future, which is not gatherable 
into a present-future.  Derrida often writes about the future.  In his later writings, in 
the context of elaborating on the social and ethical implications of différance, he 
talks, for instance, about the coming of justice and a messianism without reserve.  
This future, however, has the structure of an absolute past: there is no telos and no 
eschaton.  The future that arrives will be completely unexpected, completely 
different, and in its turn, contaminated by its past, which will be an absolute past. 
 
The contamination of the present by the past goes hand in hand with the 
contamination of time by space.  Here, another difference with Heidegger emerges.  
While for Heidegger, the appearing of being in Dasein is in the first place temporal, 
and spatial as a derivative of its finite temporality, for Derrida, the process of 
temporalising is inscribed in its spacing - it is the spatial trace that traces 
temporalisation. 
 
The conversation with Heidegger finally serves to highlight a characteristic of 
Derrida’s understanding of temporality, namely its non-linearity.  This has already 
been mentioned at the end of the first section of this chapter.  In one and the same 
gesture, the differing deferring of différance leaves man, science and the line behind.  
Différance works in different directions.267  What remains is a constitutive and 
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productive causality, the immanent process of scission and division which produces 
or constitutes different things or differences.  Once again, this “is” the becoming 
space of time and the becoming time of space. 
 
3.6 Temporal transcendence in immanence 
 
The final section of this chapter is devoted to a review of the ground covered in the 
light of the hypothesis proposed in the first chapter, namely the existence of a notion 
of transcendence in immanence in Derrida’s thought.   With regard to the questions 
of meaning and the operation of signs, the introductory chapter linked the issue of 
relating transcendence and immanence to dualistic and monistic mechanisms of 
meaning intimation, the binary mechanism associated with an immanent and a 
transcendent pole, and the monistic mechanism associated with a thoroughgoing 
immanentism.  Is the transcendent to be regarded as somehow separate from the 
immanent, thereby accepting some kind of duality, or should the transcendent be 
taken to be some kind of epiphenomenon of the immanent, thereby preferring some 
kind of monism?  Furthermore, how are these questions, framed in semiological 
terms, to be related to broader ontological convictions? 
 
In the course of listening to Derrida’s analysis of the spatialisation wrought by 
metaphysics, it became clear that he links the metaphysics of presence to a binary 
mechanism of meaning intimation.  Some ontic existent is taken to be the point of 
absolute presence (or absolute identity), and everything else is then interpreted in 
terms of that existent.  Whether it be the platonic ideas, the Logos, God the Father, 
phoné, or the phenomenological eidos, the pattern is always the same: something is 
taken to be a fixed point of presence, and everything else refers to that presence and 
re-presents it.  Derrida then goes on to analyse a spatialised, metaphysical operation 
of the sign according to the binary logic of meaning intimation.  According to this 
conception, some kind of signifier acts as a placeholder for a signified that is true, 
present to itself, and pure – in a word: ideal.  While not in itself full presence, the sign 
seeks to safeguard the idea of full presence in its reference to an ideal signified: 
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“[T]his structure presupposes that the sign, which defers presence, is 
conceivable only on the basis of the presence it defers and moving toward the 
deferred presence that it aims to reappropriate.”268 
 
Derrida’s deconstructive project aims at undermining this binary logic of meaning 
intimation.  The operation of différance, as has been discussed, certainly makes no 
provision for the connection of a particular constellation with something else that it 
may be said to represent or reflect.  Introducing différance, Derrida mentions that the 
assemblage he proposes with this term “has the complex structure of a weaving, an 
interlacing which permits the different threads and different lines of meaning – or of 
force – to go off again in different directions.”269  Moreover, the reading of Derrida’s 
deconstruction of structuralism has shown that meaning overflows – even explodes – 
the structures imposed on it from without.  Viewed in this way, meaning is in a sense 
a blind, “meaningless” movement; a force of nature.  Meaning is what happens. 
 
In addition Derrida understands meaning in terms of the logic of the trace.  Meaning 
is that which appears spatially as a trace: never true to itself, always contaminated 
from the outside, a bastard son.  The trace lingers in its contaminated state for a 
while before giving way to something different (though “something”, in its turn, 
equally contaminated).  What Derrida does is nothing less than to introduce a new 
way of understanding the sign.  This has already emerged through a consideration of 
the deconstruction of structuralism, and can only be summarised again here.  
Derrida notes that the concept of the sign is thoroughly inscribed in a metaphysics of 
presence, and any deconstruction of the sign would have to be undertaken by using 
its “is” language against itself.  As has been mentioned before, Derrida takes 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s breakthrough to be the conceptualisation of language as 
an arbitrary system of differences.  Each signifier signifies only through its difference 
from the other signifiers in the system.  Although thematising difference, De 
Saussure, however, still thought of difference in terms of presence, somewhat similar 
to Husserl thinking of temporality in terms of presence.  Derrida wants to radicalise 
the thought of difference in language to such an extent that it is no longer gatherable 
around a principle of presence.  Thus, signification, according to the logic of the 
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trace, “is” the happening of différance.  The presencing of the trace is an effect of 
différance.  Thus, the signified is always also already the movement of the signifier.  
Understood in this way, the deconstruction of a metaphysics of presence could be 
translated into the deconstruction of a binary mechanism of meaning inference into a 
monistic, inferential mechanism.   
 
Upon consideration, it seems, however, that to describe the situation in this way 
would be an oversimplification.  In the first place, it has already, in the previous 
chapter, been remarked that modern transcendental thought – even if Derrida 
understands it as an example of a binary logic - may just as well be interpreted as 
actually being dogmatically monist.   
 
In what has been described as the epistemological turn, modern transcendental 
thought takes its point of departure singularly within transcendental consciousness.  
Methodologically speaking, the whole of reality can only be presented inside of 
human consciousness.  Compared, as it has been, to the ontological assumptions 
prevalent prior to the epistemological turn, transcendental thought may be regarded 
as being thoroughly monist.  All references to an ontological transcendent realm are 
placed strictly between brackets.  For all practical purposes, a complete 
immanentism is accepted.  From the perspective of this ontological immanentism, 
the mechanism of meaning intimation appears to be purely inferential, i.e. grounded 
in a monism.  From whatever it takes to be the stable node of meaning for its point of 
departure, the cogito continues in a hypothetico-deductive manner, or to use the 
term coined by C.S. Peirce, it continues by way of abduction.  This is an inferential 
process of meaning intimation. 
 
Derrida’s deconstruction of a binary logic of meaning intimation may be interpreted 
within this broader context of a movement towards a thoroughly immanent ontology.  
What Derrida has apparently done is to deconstruct the semiological and 
epistemological binarity that still existed in modern thought (even while the latter may 
be described as ontologically monist) into a semiological and epistemological 
monism.  There “is” nothing apart from the process of infinite finitude - meaning 
happens. 
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But does ontological immanentism really imply such a strict monism?  Is all binarity 
to be ruled out?  A careful reading of deconstruction would have this not be the case.  
A duality or binarity of sorts may yet be intimated in Derrida’s thought, even as it 
remains strictly immanentist.  The trace structure as a structure of contamination in 
fact implies a binarity: something is contaminated by something else.  Furthermore, 
an important burden of demonstration in Derrida’s conversation with Husserl is that 
there is no pure lebendige Gegenwart.  There is no thing that is absolutely identical 
to itself - absolutely self-contained, and therefore an absolute monism.  The structure 
of time as flow indicates that every moment is already divided in itself.  Every 
discreet moment is irrevocably contaminated by another - by an alterity.  In this 
sense, deconstructive thought always also implies a binarity or duality, even if it is 
not a matter of one pole representing another. 
 
It appears then that whereas the epistemological binarity – the radical separation of 
an immanent and a transcendent pole - of modern metaphysics has been thoroughly 
discredited, a pure and simple monism also seems to be untenable.  An analysis of 
change and, in particular, of the mechanism of meaning intimation, seems to indicate 
that some kind of transcendence inevitably appears within the immanence of 
monism.  Whereas the binarity of radically separating transcendence and 
immanence has been discredited in favour of a thoroughgoing immanence, 
immanence itself is inhabited by transcendence.  This is exactly what is borne out by 
Derrida’s thoughts of haunting and contamination.  This chapter has shown that the 
transcendence that inhabits immanence in Derrida’s thought is the transcendence of 
radical temporality.  Temporality “is” precisely the other that inhabits every 
“immanent” spatial constellation.   
 
Having said this, the critical question that was broached in the second part of the 
second chapter remains the following: does all thought that explicitly works with an 
ontological transcendence, and therefore accepts some kind of binary mechanism of 
meaning inference, necessarily end up in a metaphysics of presence, together with 
the spatialisation and fixation that this implies?  In the next chapter, another notion of 
transcendence in immanence will be proposed, one which, in contrast to the 
temporal transcendence in immanence of Derrida’s thought, may be characterised 
as theological transcendence in immanence.   
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Chapter 4: Theological transcendence in immanence: proportion and  
  progression 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The experience of finitude is inextricably bound with that of space, time and change.  
Upon consideration, these notions seem to implicate one another.  To understand 
the meaning of space and time – the genitive being used in an objective as well as a 
subjective sense – one will have to note the way in which the notions of space and 
time are used to explain finitude and change, as well as how they are evoked by the 
experience of finitude and change.  The first part of the hypothesis guiding this study 
states that the experience of change, as well as attention to the process of semiosis, 
suggest a situation whereby a given finite constellation always reveals itself to be 
transcended by what is more than itself.  An immanent finitude is always also 
inhabited by a transcending alterity.  This may be summarised by saying that our 
condition is characterised by a situation of transcendence in immanence.  The work 
of Jacques Derrida, as analysed in the previous chapters, seem to corroborate the 
first part of the hypothesis: Derrida’s thought, although radically immanentist, cannot 
fail to function with some kind of notion of transcendence.  What transcends every 
finite instance in Derrida’s thought, however, is the transcendence of infinite 
temporality.  In terms of Derrida’s thought, transcendence in immanence translates 
into the becoming space of time, and the becoming time of space.  This, in his view, 
is the meaning of space and time, although, in a sense, it is a meaningless meaning, 
since no meaning can ever be definitively arrived at - meaning is continually being 
deferred, and in the process also undergoes continual metamorphosis. 
 
In chapter two of this study, it was argued that Derrida’s narrative, describing a 
metaphysics of presence and its history, is vulnerable to an accusation of 
structuralist generalisation.  In support of this argument, an alternative genealogy of 
the rise of spatialisation was advanced – one that identifies the conditions for the 
prevalence of a metaphysics of presence with the demise of an analogical worldview 
towards the end of the Middle Ages.  The burden of the present chapter is, 
subsequently, to propose an alternative understanding of transcendence in 
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immanence to that which emerges in the thought of Derrida, as analysed in the 
previous chapter.   
 
In its exposition of an alternative conception of transcendence in immanence, this 
chapter draws from the broad tradition of theological and philosophical thought prior 
to the advent of modernity.  This necessitates a methodological remark to the effect 
that a mutually exclusive opposition between faithfulness to received traditions, 
creeds, doctrinal statements and theological treatises on the one hand, and creativity 
or contemporary relevance on the other hand, seems to be unwarranted.  On the 
contrary, in the words of Hans Urs von Balthasar: “history, far from dispensing us 
from creative effort, imposes it on us.”270  Following an interpretive strategy 
suggested by Rowan Williams, received traditions and intellectual discourses may 
fruitfully be regarded as scripts for a certain kind of performance, similar to the script 
of a play.  According to Jeffrey McCurry, Williams believes that the texts of the saints 
can be interpreted in the same way as the script of a play can be performed: 
 
“Such a poetics of theological creativity as ‘inflected interpretive performance’ 
negotiates the delicate balance between the theologian’s need to remain 
faithful to received traditions of scriptural, creedal, and speculative discourse, 
on the one hand, and the need to articulate Christian truth in new ways that 
can articulate, console, liberate, and challenge the Church, academy and 
world today, on the other.”271 
 
In fact, an interpretive approach that regards a reading of a past authority as an 
opportunity for a new, inflected performance of the thrust of what has been handed 
down seems to have been the general way of interacting with tradition prior to the 
advent of modernity.  This may be associated with the analogical worldview 
prevalent in Western thought for much of that time.  An analogical worldview takes 
as its point of departure the participation, at an analogical remove, of beings in 
being.  This primary analogon opens up entire ranges of analogies within nature and 
history.  A reading at a later stage, performed, as it were, as a non- identical 
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inflection of an earlier authority, may well be regarded as an analogical - that is non-
identical - repetition of the same. 272 
 
Thus, somewhat in keeping with the alternative proposed in the second chapter, but 
nevertheless not merely historical, the alternative understanding of transcendence in 
immanence advanced in this chapter may be described as a theological 
understanding, as it attempts to regard transcendence as first and foremost 
pertaining to the divine in relation to finite creation.  Such an alternative will have to 
account for the experience of finitude, change and difference – phenomena to which 
postmodern theories are all very sensitive.  The implications of a theological 
understanding of transcendence in immanence for the notions of space, time and 
meaning will subsequently have to be elaborated in more detail. 
 
Whereas the notion of transcendence in immanence in Derrida’s thought was arrived 
at through the inductive process of analysing the notions of space and time as they 
emerge and function in concepts such as the trace, writing and différance, this  
chapter follows an inverse, i.e. more deductive, route.  In the first section, the notion 
of theological transcendence in immanence will be explored.  The following section 
takes the theological notion of transcendence in immanence as developed, and 
applies it to the process of semiosis.  Can the notion of the sign, as it emerges from 
an understanding of theological transcendence in immanence, adequately account 
for semiosis?  Does this notion of the sign come sufficiently to terms with the 
accusation levelled against modern notions of the sign, namely that it entrenches a 
metaphysics of presence? 
 
The third section of this chapter attempts to provide an adequate understanding of 
the experience of change, proceeding from a theological understanding of 
transcendence in immanence.  As will become apparent, the notion of movement, as 
it was understood in the intellectual tradition prior to modern physicalism, is very 
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important in this regard.  In this section, as well as in the one on the semiotic 
process, the meaning of space and time from the perspective of theological 
transcendence in immanence will become apparent.  Finally, this chapter closes with 
a meditation on the practices whereby a theological understanding of transcendence 
in immanence seeks to embody space and time.  If the process of writing may be 
taken to be the embodiment of what Derrida has in mind with différance and spacing, 
the question becomes one of what an alternative mode of embodiment would look 
like – one that derives from a theological notion of transcendence in immanence.  To 
this end, the functioning of liturgical practices and, within those liturgical practices, of 
notions such as rhythm and proportion, will be investigated. 
 
 
4.2 Theological transcendence in immanence 
 
Although a notion of theological transcendence in immanence may very well be 
deemed to be an integral part of the experience of the Judaeo-Christian tradition 
(which comprises the narrower context of the discussion in this chapter), the journey 
of the intellectual articulation of this notion has been long and arduous and, of 
course, still continues today.  The process of gaining some kind of overview of this 
journey can do no better than start with acknowledging that the grand tradition of 
Christian intellectual labour stems from a confluence of the Hebrew-Aramaic Old 
Testament (particularly as interpreted in the Greek New Testament) and the Greek-
Hellenistic intellectual world within which it was received at around the beginning of 
the Christian calendar.273  The Hebrew Scriptures have an overarching character of 
narrative.  This also holds true with regard to the form that their interpretation was 
given in terms of the figure of Jesus Christ in the New Testament.  Even though 
interspersed with other literature types, the Judaeo-Christian Scriptures as a corpus 
recount the history of God’s relationship with creation and particularly with humanity.  
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Underlying this tradition is an existential experience of God’s presence in the world 
and in history.   
 
In Greek-Hellenistic thought, on the other hand (at least since Socrates), a mode of 
interacting with the world is found whereby reality is understood in terms of rational 
principles.  From the immediacy of experience, various principles are abstracted and 
postulated as underlying experience.274  Salient among the intellectual discourses on 
reality in Greek thought is the thought of being.  Whereas the dominant mood in the 
Hebrew Scriptures is one of narrative and history, Greek thought thematises being.  
In a sense, the intellectual methodology imparted by Greek thought has remained 
part of Western thought ever since.  In one guise or another, the phenomenological 
question is repeated over and over again: how does being appear? 
 
Albeit in a pre-reflective, pre-theoretical manner, the Judaeo-Christian tradition bears 
witness to the notion of theological transcendence in immanence.  In fact, in a sense, 
this tradition speaks of nothing else than the eternal God’s relationship of loving 
intimacy with His creation.  From its source in the Old and New Testaments, the 
Judaeo-Christian intellectual tradition maintains the creatureliness of finite reality, as 
well as its utter gratuity.  The polemical thrust of the first chapters of the book of 
Genesis, for example, makes the point that God is the only Creator and that He is 
without peer or competitor.  The sun and the moon, widely worshipped in antiquity, 
are creations - a greater and a lesser light made by God to give light alternately by 
day and by night.  The accounts of creation presented at the beginning of the book of 
Genesis, while not being the earliest writings of the Hebrew Scriptures, certainly, by 
dint of their placement at the beginning of the canon, provide an important witness to 
the conviction that the cosmos is not itself divine, but is the result of God’s creative 
work.  And so the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo may be taken to be an important 
contribution by the Hebrew Scriptures, informing the theological notion of 
transcendence in immanence.  While some have claimed that the notion of creation 
out of nothing is ambiguous in Genesis and in fact only hails from the encounter of 
Christian faith with Greek philosophy, the fact remains that writers such as Irenaeus, 
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Tertullian and Augustine were driven precisely by the need to affirm the biblical 
witness to the basic goodness of creation and of God’s utter freedom in creating it.275   
 
While proclaiming the gratuitous creation of finite reality by an almighty God, the 
Biblical witness is nevertheless adamant and consistent in also testifying to God’s 
nearness to, and presence in His creation.  The theme of ever-increasing and ever- 
renewing bonds of the covenant relationship that God enters into with His creatures 
substantiates this claim.  With regard to the covenant, Abraham Heschel points to 
the significance of the command to keep the Sabbath as a symbolic reminder and 
celebration of God’s nearness.  The day of rest is a day of experiencing the 
presence of God within time: “while Jewish tradition offers us no definition of the 
concept of eternity, it tells us how to experience the taste of eternity or eternal life 
within time.”276  Of course, the incarnation and the sanctificatory presence of the 
Holy Spirit, as proclaimed in the New Testament, sweep these themes of God’s 
covenant and his in-dwelling up into a majestic crescendo - a crescendo of which the 
chords would spread to and echo through the medium of the Greek thought of the 
time.   
 
Greek thought, for its part, despite its intellectual acumen, arrived at the end of the 
classical age still by and large as a thought of totality.  In chapter 2 of this study, a 
liturgical, dynamic reading of Plato was proposed in opposition to a reading that 
would see him as one of the earliest exponents of a fixating metaphysics of 
presence.  The ontology that emerged at that stage out of such a doxological reading 
of Plato had as its main feature, a transcendent but overflowing good that gives 
immanent reality to be.  Through participation in the good, immanent reality is on a 
doxological journey to the good.  While such a reading of Plato serves the purpose of 
casting doubt on the Heideggerian-Derridean history of metaphysics, it should, 
however, now be qualified by noting that within a broader context, Plato’s conception 
of the transcendent was not yet radical enough.   
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David Bentley-Hart characterises pre-Socratic thought as the thought of immersion in 
physis.  According to this notion, being is viewed as a closed and finite order of 
placement and displacement, construction and destruction, life and death, governed 
by the determinations of blind fate.  This, according to Bentley-Hart, is the ontology 
that most purely flows from a certain pagan vision of being as sacrifice: order is won 
by means of erecting a sacrificial barricade against chaos.  This thought of physis is, 
moreover, a thought of totality.  It “has no horizon but beings, and so can do no more 
than abstract from nature and violence and transience to a sublime, dark reservoir of 
ontic possibility, and to an inescapable structure of arising and perishing.”277 
 
Against the background of a thought of physis, as subjugation to the world’s mere 
event, the thought of Plato and Aristotle seeking, as it does, to postulate principles of 
being, represents a significant moment of enlightenment.  Yet, once again following 
Bentley-Hart, it could be argued that neither Plato nor Aristotle was able to radically 
overcome the sacrificial economy of finitude.278  Plato struggled with the tension 
between change and changeless essences: how does the changeable material world 
participate in the unchangeable realm of ideas?  His answer was to reify 
transcendental being into a datum as if it were given in world immanent experience, 
and he treated absolute being as a genus of which the varieties of immanent being 
are species.  With regard to this development, Eric Voegelin argues that the 
postulation of a transcendental realm was not a wanton assumption on Plato’s part, 
but followed from a genuine experience of desire in the soul, together with its 
cathartic effects.  In other words, it flowed from something akin to a religious 
experience.279  Aristotle, for his part, would have been aware of the experiences that 
formed the wellspring of Plato’s postulations, and would have shared in them, as 
witnessed, for instance, in a fragment of his work entitled On Prayer.  While Aristotle, 
according to Voegelin, rightly criticised the hypostatisation of transcendental being 
into a separate realm, he did not repudiate the experiences of transcendence which 
gave rise to the notion of a realm of ideas.  In the words of Voegelin, Aristotelian 
thought, in consequence,  
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“is a curious transformation of the experience of transcendence that can 
perhaps be described as an intellectual thinning-out.  The fullness of 
experience that Plato expressed in the richness of his myth is in Aristotle 
reduced to the conception of God as the prime mover…”280 
 
Thus, the “thinning-out” in Aristotle involved a shift of focus to the immanent dialectic 
of finite form and unrealised potency, and to a thematisation of causality.  Ultimately, 
however, Voegelin concurs with Bentley-Hart that neither Plato nor Aristotle was able 
to radically penetrate the problem posed by the experience of transcendence within 
immanence.281   
 
The thought of totality and, therefore, of necessity, remained with Greek thought in 
its later neo-platonic manifestations.  While neither Plato nor Aristotle was willing to 
use the term “infinite” to describe absolute being, Plotinus did speak of the One as 
infinite.282  Within Plotinus’ thought, the world of diversity and sensibility emanates 
from the infinite One and is also called to return to the One.  Yet, as Bentley-Hart 
observes, the infinity of the One still belongs to a metaphysics of the whole, a 
discourse of necessity - it is the metaphysical reverse of the realm of difference…”283  
As such, the emanative thought of the one and the many in Plotinus at once 
absolutely distinguishes and absolutely identifies being and beings and, in 
consequence, remains a thought of totality. 
 
It was, however, precisely in the encounter between the Jewish-Christian faith in a 
creator God, who yet covenantally lives amongst his creatures, with the Greek-
Hellenistic thought of being, that the thought of totality was shattered and a notion of 
transcendence emerged, which was able to do justice to “being’s splendid otherness, 
within the immediacy of its mysterious presence.”284  With the spread of the Christian 
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faith throughout the Greek and Latin-speaking world, the notion of theological 
transcendence in immanence was forged in the fires of apologetic answering ad 
extra, and of doctrinal controversy ad intra.  The Trinitarian and Christological 
controversies lead the Church Fathers to apply the clear distinctions of Greek 
thought regarding being to dogmas concerning the nature of the trinity and of Christ.  
Thus, in fourth century Cappadocia, the Church Fathers defending the orthodoxy of 
the Council of Nicaea maintained, against the theological hierarchies advanced by 
the schools of Alexandria, “that the Christian God is at once infinitely more 
transcendent of and, in consequence, infinitely nearer to (within the very being of) 
finite reality than was the inaccessible God of antique metaphysics, the supreme 
being set apart on being’s summit, the fixed hook from which the cosmos 
dangled.”285 
 
The notion of theological transcendence in immanence allows, at once, for a more 
radical thought of divine transcendence and a more radical thought of created 
immanence than was available to metaphysical thought prior to its emergence.  With 
regard to the radical novelty of the kind of immanence that emerged from the notion 
of theological transcendence in immanence, Alfred North Whitehead observes the 
following: “In deciding for the direct immanence of the Spirit in the material world, the 
great fourth century theologians of Alexandria and Antioch have the distinction of 
being the only thinkers who in a fundamental metaphysical doctrine improved upon 
Plato.”286  Thus, another kind of immanence and another kind of transcendence is 
implied in the Christian dogma of God’s free creation: neither that of the Platonic 
exemplar at the top of a hierarchy of resemblance, nor that of the neo-Platonic 
sublime One, nor – in modern terms, for instance – the transcendence of the 
Hegelian concept locked in a dialectical dance with particularity.287 
 
To merely affirm that the theological notion of transcendence in immanence is not 
this or that is not enough, however.  The positive content of this notion was already 
brought to attention in the second chapter of this study during the course of an 
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investigation of the thought of Thomas Aquinas.  In order for a richer narrative of the 
notion of theological transcendence in immanence to emerge, this chapter will now, 
in addition, make extensive use of a reading by David Bentley-Hart (following Hans 
Urs von Balthasar) of the theology of the fourth century Cappadocian Father, 
Gregory of Nyssa.  Where appropriate, observations already made in chapter two 
will be repeated here.   
 
How, then, can it be that the transcendence of Being over beings – of God over 
creatures – is such that the otherness of the transcendent is at once also the 
intimate reality of every finite thing in its particularity?  The doctrinal statements 
adopted by the ecumenical council of Nicaea concerning God as Trinity provided 
fourth century theologians with a reference point from which to explore the notion of 
theological transcendence with intellectual rigour.  Bentley-Hart points out that for the 
theologians of the fourth century, a salient feature of divine transcendence lay in the 
notion of divine apatheia.288  God’s apatheia, or impassability, means that He is in 
Himself the fullness of love and peace and life.  God does not need anything or 
anyone to supplement the fullness that is in Him.  In creating the world, God did 
therefore not act upon some inner lack that somehow had to be addressed through 
an exteriorisation into finitude and particularity.  The creation of the world is truly a 
creation out of nothing, and not out of necessity (“nothing” being understood here 
precisely as gratuity and non-necessity, and not as something over against being 
that, in its nothingness, allows being to define itself). 
 
To say that God is the fullness of love and peace and life in Himself, and that there is 
no dialectical necessity that binds Him to creation and into a totality, means that 
theology will have to find a way of explaining diversity and particularity.  This is 
precisely provided by the dogma of the Trinity, as this dogma asserts that diversity 
and particularity inheres in God, and therefore do not have to be derived from 
somewhere else.  God is Trinity, and this means that He is never to be considered 
otherwise than as the co-inherence of three persons in one.  God is always already 
the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit that yet are one being.  God does not 
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need the finitude of creation to allow diversity to emanate, for example, from an 
inscrutable One.   
 
That God is Trinity implies, furthermore, that there is always already a fullness of 
relationship in Him.  There is an otherness, a difference in God, which is 
nevertheless not the difference of alienation, but rather the distance of love and 
regard.  The Father loves the Son and expresses himself completely in the Son.  
Yet, He is not the Son.  The Son loves the Father and returns to the Father in the 
fellowship of the Spirit, yet he is not the Spirit.  The distance of love and regard, the 
fullness of self donation and returning, the difference of relationship that is 
simultaneously also the fullness of community, such is the perichoresis, the co-
inherence of the persons of the trinity, as envisaged by post-Nicene theology. As will 
be emphasised later, in using the term ‘relationship’ of God, we are always speaking 
at an analogical remove.  Thus, while it is true that there is relationship in God, it is 
also always infinitely more perfect than can be expressed in creaturely language.  
According to Bentley-Hart:  
 
“[T]he relationality of human persons, however essential it may be, remains a 
multiple reality … it is infinitely remote from that perfect indwelling, reciprocal 
‘containment,’ transparency, recurrence, and absolute ‘giving way’ that is the 
meaning of the word perichoresis or circumincessio.” 289 
 
As has already been mentioned, the dogma of the trinity also enabled a positive 
notion of infinity to be assimilated into the notion of divine transcendence.  David 
Bentley-Hart reads Gregory of Nyssa to the effect that God’s infinity means that he is 
the perfect completeness of what he is.  Attributes such as life, wisdom, goodness 
and beauty are only limited when their contraries are encountered.  However, God 
encounters no boundaries - He is without opposition.  God is “beyond nonbeing or 
negation, transcendent of all composition or antinomy.” 290  In terms of the notion of 
                                            
289
 Ibid. P. 172.  
Andrew Louth makes the point that post-Nicene theology reserved the term perichoresis for the 
fullness of relationship within the trinity, while speaking of diastema as the relationship within finite 
reality that analogically participates in the intra-divine relationships.  Andrew Louth, “Space, Time and 
the Liturgy,” In: Adrian Pabst and Christoph Schneider (eds.) Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy 
and Radical Orthodoxy (London: Ashgate, 2009), p. 219, n.11. 
290
 The Beauty of the Infinite, p. 193. 
141 
 
difference, God’s infinity means that he already contains all difference within himself 
in an endless parataxis - that is, as endless seriality.  Difference does not emanate 
dialectically from a simple One, but always already exists in a peaceful order of co-
existence.  God’s simplicity, therefore, should not be understood first and foremost 
as undifferentiatedness, but primarily as fullness or pleroma. 
 
Hardy and Ford suggest that a significant difference exists between Augustine and 
Gregory of Nyssa with regard to the conception of the infinite, which is God – a 
difference which, they hint, may even be indicative of fourth century differences in 
approach between the Greek East and the Latin West.291  According to this reading, 
Augustine’s understanding of God emphasises the self-sameness of God as trinity: 
God condescends to give Himself to man in Christ and the Holy Spirit, yet remains 
unchangeable over all in the very disclosure of Himself to man.  Gregory’s 
understanding of God, on the other hand, would then be one of an ever-deeper 
infinite – an infinite which, by its nature, is dynamic and expanding.  However, on this 
point at least, the reading of Hardy and Ford seems to overstate the difference 
between Augustine and Gregory on the basis of a misreading of Gregory’s 
conception of God’s infinity.  An ever-deepening, ever-expanding infinite would be a 
contradiction in terms.  What Gregory does is to adduce the notion of an ever- 
deepening, ever-expanding movement to the finite human soul as it traverses God’s 
infinite beauty.  The human soul is thus somewhat like a container that keeps on 
expanding as it tries – per impossible – to take in God’s infinite beauty.  As was 
suggested above, God’s infinity is better understood as that which does not ever 
encounter its opposite, and which is therefore never bounded.  This notion is not 
incompatible with God’s apatheia as discussed above, or even with the notion of 
unchangeability.  
 
According to Bentley-Hart’s reading of Gregory, furthermore, God’s eternity not only 
means that He is without beginning or end, but also that He is without extension or 
succession: 
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“[T]he divine nature knows no past or future, no sequence, but is like an 
endless ocean of eternity; it is not time, though time flows from it…  Extension, 
whether of time or space, belongs exclusively to the created order and 
distinguishes it from the unimaginable infinity of God who contains beginning 
and end at once in his timeless embrace.”292 
 
To say that God is in Himself perfect donation and return is to say that He is a 
fullness of dynamism.  Yet, this dynamism is not the movement from potentiality to 
actuality, as is found in created being.  God is infinite act - there is no potentiality in 
Him.  Once again, in the words of Bentley-Hart:  
 
God’s infinitely accomplished life of love is that Trinitarian movement of his 
being that is infinitely determinate – as determinacy toward the other – and so 
an indestructible actus purus endlessly more dynamic than any mere motion 
of change could ever be.”293 
 
Two conclusions seem to emerge out of the foregoing meditation upon theological 
transcendence.  In the first place, the tradition of Judaeo-Christian thought, when 
using the word ‘being’, maintained from early on that this word should most properly 
only be used when speaking of God.294  In comparison to the thought of late 
antiquity, the theological notion of transcendence is therefore a thought of being’s 
splendid otherness: God is being - only in absolute dependence on and in reference 
to God can “being” be used when speaking of finite creation.  Secondly, a theological 
thought of transcendence is, moreover, a thought of God as infinite being.  
Elaboration of this notion forces one into the realm of negative language: there is no 
potency in God - there is no beginning or end, there is no succession or extension, 
there is, indeed, no negation.  A foray into positive affirmation would have one say 
that God is the eternal now, but this formulation would then have to be carefully 
explained in view of the criticism against a metaphysics of presence, which forms an 
important background to this study.  God’s eternal “nowness” should only be 
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understood together with His transcendence, to such an extent that He is not an 
ontic being amongst beings that subsequently forms the centrepiece of a 
metaphysical montage.  Furthermore, God’s transcendent infinity is not a formless 
infinity to the effect that it would be indistinguishable from a void or a nihil.  On the 
contrary, God’s transcendence is infinitely formosus – “the supereminent fullness of 
all form”295  - it is infinite beauty - beauty that does not encounter any boundaries.  
Thus only can it be said that God is infinite now. 
 
Having explored the notion of theological transcendence as it emerged from the 
confluence of Judaeo-Christian and Greek thought, we are now in a position to 
contemplate the notion of immanence and, subsequently, of transcendence in 
immanence.  The development of a notion of theological transcendence as being’s 
splendid otherness - an otherness not in need of definition or supplementation by 
finitude - also enabled a thought of radical immanence to emerge.  The important 
point here is once again that there is no dialectical necessity between transcendence 
and immanence.  Within Christian theology, finite creation is radically contingent - it 
does not have to be there. The fact that it exists at all and that it keeps on existing 
from moment to moment is solely by the grace of God’s delight.  It is precisely in 
order to further emphasise this point that Bentley-Hart seeks to recover the notion of 
delight for theology: the being of creation is in essence God’s pleasure.  Created 
being exists because it pleases God that it is there.  “The Bible … depicts creation at 
once as a kind of deliberative invention (‘let us make…’) and, consequently as a kind 
of artistry for the sake of artistry.”296  God’s relationship to creation is one of love, but 
precisely also that love which is a delighting, a taking pleasure in.  And this love, 
which is delight, evokes a reciprocal love of delight in and desire for God in creation. 
Whereas God’s love and desire is infinite (although also infinitely dynamic in the 
perichoresis of the Trinity), finite creation’s desire for God manifests itself in a 
journey of change into an ever more encompassing participation in God’s glory. 
 
Therefore, in terms of this understanding, transcendence pertains to God, and 
immanence to creation - while God is infinite being, creation is the realm of finitude 
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and becoming. In Heideggerian terms297, while God is being, creation is the 
expression of God’s being in beings (the difference between being and beings 
certainly not being thought of in Heideggerian terms as some kind of necessity).  As 
will become apparent below, such an understanding of creation allows for a positive 
embrace of difference, change and finitude.  However, the notion of transcendence 
in immanence first has to be investigated. 
 
While being radically contingent, creation as God’s creation still, in some respects, 
shares in the being of God.  Patristic theology sought to understand this mystery in 
terms of the Trinity.  If the Trinity is understood as the expression by the Father of 
the fullness of Himself in the person of the Son – this expression being in the 
fellowship of the Holy Spirit, and the Son giving himself back to the Father fully – 
once again in the fellowship of the Holy Spirit, then creation must be understood as a 
contingent, non-necessary expression within this infinite movement of the Trinity.  
Because the Son is the full expression of the Father, he is also called the Logos.  
And precisely because creation is also an expression of God’s love, it happens 
through the Logos, the second person of the Trinity.  According to Bentley-Hart: 
 
“In creation God, who is never without his Word, nevertheless utters himself 
‘outward’ to that which has being only because God’s address can never be 
without reply (Isa. 55:11)”.298 
 
Creation, then, is not alien to that infinite address within the Trinity that is God 
Himself - it is an utterance outwards, a making into finitude (and therefore a kenosis) 
of that same address.  Understood in this sense, the being of creation can be said to 
participate in God.  Created being in some mysterious way, really share in God’s 
being.  In this regard, God’s transcendence may be said to inhabit finite creation. 
 
Having said this, a theological notion of transcendence in immanence must be 
carefully guarded against misunderstanding in two respects.  On the one hand, 
transcendence in immanence cannot be wed to a notion of being as univocal, that is, 
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as having the same character and nature uniformly.  Should this happen, the radical 
transcendence of God would be compromised, and theology would be in danger of 
thinking an ontic God – merely the highest being amongst beings.  On the other 
hand, transcendence in immanence can also not be a thought of the radical 
equivocity of being.  If this were the case, God would be wholly transcendent and, in 
a sense, wholly absent, which would in effect be the same as having a totally 
immanent reality.  It is therefore precisely in response to the experience of 
transcendence in immanence, and as a refining of the intellectual labour of patristic 
theology, that the notion of the analogy of being came to be used in the high 
scholastic theology of Thomas Aquinas, even if the term itself may not have been 
used explicitly.  In analogical thought, the participation of beings in being – the 
kinship, as it were, of beings to being is affirmed, while at the same time maintaining 
the even greater dissimilarity between beings and being as the never quantifiable 
interval between the finite and the infinite.  
 
According to Bentley-Hart, God is in Himself already somehow analogous: the 
coincidence in God of mediacy and immediacy, image and difference (in the 
perichoretic relationship between the persons of the Trinity) is the “proportion” in 
which every finite interval somehow, infinitely remotely, participates.299  Thus, the 
entirety of the world, in all its irreducible diversity, should be viewed as an analogical 
expression (at a distance, in a different register) of the dynamism and differentiation 
which characterise God .300 
 
What has been affirmed here in more theological terms was, in chapter two of this 
study, described more philosophically.  Salient points made there can now merely be 
restated.  In the first place, the analogy of being (or an analogical understanding of 
the relationship between being and beings) can be described in terms of the 
distinction between existence and essence.  In God, there is no distinction between 
existence and essence.  God is what He is essentially.  This means that, apart from 
being existence itself, God is also all predications of being in His own being.  He is 
goodness itself, truth itself, beauty itself.   The fact that in God, existence and 
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essence coincide, means that God is infinitely determinate.  He contains all 
difference in Himself in a parataxis of endless peace.   
 
Whereas the being of God is a real identity of essence and existence, finite creation 
and all finite creatures are characterised by a real distinction between essence and 
existence.  To speak of the essence of a creature would be one way of saying that in 
its unique haecceitas, it participates in transcendent being, and is thus an “instance” 
(to risk speaking in a reified manner) of transcendence in immanence.  That a 
creature at any given moment never fully inhabits its own essence is an indication of 
its creaturely finitude: it is not itself transcendent, but in its participation in the divine 
transcendent, it is itself precisely immanent.  In the words of Bentley-Hart: 
 
“… the matter of greatest importance here is the distinction thus preserved 
between the God who possesses – who is – the fullness of the divine and the 
creature who participates in the divine: for the latter there must always be – 
even within its relation to its own essence – a real distinction between subject 
and object, motion and motion’s aim, ecstasy and form, participation and 
‘substance.’  This is the nature of contingency…”301 
 
In a following section of this chapter, the nature of contingency within the context of 
theological transcendence in immanence will be investigated further, together with 
the implications that this has for the notions of space and time.  At present, and in 
closing this section, attention must be drawn to another characteristic of theological 
analogy, which was highlighted in chapter two.   
 
Aquinas, in applying Aristotle’s distinctions regarding analogy, found the analogy of 
attribution useful for explaining the participation of immanent being in divine 
transcendence.  From a certain perspective, that analogy with which all finite being 
participates in divine being is the analogy of attribution.  This is so because the term 
“being” can most properly be used only of God.  To the extent that it has being, finite 
being participates in God.  In chapter two of this study, it was noted in this regard 
that the analogy of attribution, when used theologically, cannot refer to a tertium 
                                            
301
 Ibid. p. 203. 
147 
 
comparationis, as if God, as well as creaturely being, both share in a more universal 
category called being.  On the other hand, the transcendent otherness of God, 
whereby he is also infinitely more than finite creation, must also be protected.  To 
this effect, another notion of analogy – analogy of proportion – has to be inserted 
within the analogy of attribution, thereby modifying it radically.  The analogy of 
proportion understands the relationship of being to beings as a proportion of mutual 
otherness.  There is proportion, but it is never quantifiable - every similarity is at the 
same time inhabited by an even greater dissimilarity.  Taken together, these two 
notions of analogy once again point not to mere univocity, nor to mere equivocity, but 
precisely to transcendence in immanence.  The remainder of this chapter further 
examines the notion of theological transcendence in immanence  - firstly by seeking 
to apply it to the related issues of semiosis and contingent change, and secondly, by 
examining the implications it has for understanding how space and time can be 
embodied in certain practices. 
 
 
4.3 A semiology deriving from theological transcendence in immanence 
 
An important thrust of Jacques Derrida’s earlier work seems to have been to show 
how a certain notion of the sign has been drafted into the service of a metaphysics of 
presence.  The operation of a metaphysics of presence is such that under its sway, 
every framework – be it cultural, philosophical or religious - is organised around a 
principle of presence.  Everything is hierarchically arranged according to its proximity 
to, or role in, upholding the principle of presence.  It also follows that certain other 
entities are rejected, subjugated, ostracised and negated because they are deemed 
to be far away from, or inimical to, the identified principle of presence.  According to 
Derrida, the way in which signs were conceptualised from the beginning in Western 
thought testifies to such a metaphysics of presence.  A sign is needed when the 
“thing” itself is not present.  A sign must uphold presence in the absence of what 
should, by rights, have been present.  According to Derrida, the opposition between 
presence and absence works itself out in the division of the sign into two 
hierarchically arranged “faces.”  On the one hand, there is the signified face of the 
sign.  This is the ideal meaning content that is to be presented by the sign.  On the 
other hand, there is the signifier, which is the material vehicle that merely supports 
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the ideal meaning content.  Within the material signifier, another hierarchical 
opposition emerges: that between a phonic signifier that is in close proximity to ideal 
experience, and a written signifier that is not close to immediate experience and can 
therefore only have a secondary and derived function.  What in fact happens, 
according to Derrida, is that the necessity to make binary hierarchical oppositions 
never ends, because full presence can never be attained or protected.  There is 
always a lack of fullness that needs to be supplemented.  Within this situation, 
Derrida advances a thought of contamination - a thought of presence irrevocably 
inhabited by absence.  Derrida argues that form and content cannot be separated 
watertightly, that there is no complete separation between signifier and signified, and 
also that there is no watertight separation to be made between phonic and written 
signifiers.  The materiality of a signifier expresses meaning in its, as it were, 
horizontal movement towards another signifier. There is no separate, “vertical” 
reference to an immaterial, ideal signified.  Signification should be thought from 
within the logic of the trace.  The trace is never pure presence, as it is a “mere” trace 
that “is” “here” at the moment.  On the other hand, the trace is not absence either: 
there “is” precisely a trace.  From within the logic of the trace, the sign can no longer 
be in service of a metaphysics of presence. 
 
In chapter two of this study, it was argued that a metaphysics of presence can and 
should indeed be roundly criticised.  Whereas a different genealogy of the advent of 
spatialised fixation was proposed, the absolute undesirability of a metaphysics of 
presence, as manifested in much of modernist thought, was endorsed.  The question 
that this section now seeks to answer is whether or not a notion of theological 
transcendence in immanence is also able to provide an alternative notion of 
signification, one that would testify to an alternative to a metaphysics of spatialised 
presence. 
 
Speaking of signification and the semiotic process comes naturally to a theological 
notion of transcendence in immanence.  As has been mentioned in the first part of 
this chapter, to speak of God as Trinity is to invoke thoughts of communication.  
Thus, in his eternal generation, the Son is the image of God the Father.  He is the 
expression of the fullness of the Father, while yet being the Son and not the Father.  
In the fellowship of the Holy Spirit, the Son gives himself back to the Father, but 
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through the Spirit, this giving back is a non-identical return.  Using the language of 
seriality and temporality (analogically), it would be as if the non-identical return of the 
Son to the Father in the Spirit were a further inflection of God’s infinite fullness.  In 
fact, the self-expression of the Father is also in the fellowship of the Holy Spirit.  
Thus, the fullness of God’s self-communication in the eternal life of the trinity is, in 
the words of Bentley-Hart, “never merely the reflex of the Same but the fullness of 
reply, in all the richness and dilatory excess of the language of love[;] the Spirit 
eternally remodulates the divine distance…”302. 
 
What meditating upon God’s life as Trinity allows us to glimpse, therefore, is a notion 
of non-identical repetition that is not negative – an instance of lack in need of 
supplementation – but where each repetition (or response) is rather another 
modulation within God’s infinite fullness. Within the Trinity there is difference and 
distance; there is communication, but this communication does not arise out of some 
kind of lack or absence - it is the infinite dynamism of giving and giving again with 
another inflection, and of receiving the same in a different manner.  Once again, 
Bentley-Hart says the following: “… one may speak of God as a God who is, in 
himself, always somehow analogous; the coincidence in God of mediacy and 
immediacy, image and difference, is the ‘proportion’ that makes every finite interval a 
possible disclosure – a tabernacle – of God’s truth.”303 
 
From the perspective of theological transcendence in immanence, signification within 
finitude cannot be thought independent of the infinite signification in God.  In fact, 
creation may in some sense be said to be part of that signification.  As has already 
been mentioned, creation must be understood as the same Word that the Father 
utters in the Son, but now as a word ad extra.  It is a word that is not inside the 
economy of the Trinity, as it is a creation, an artefact, and yet – precisely because it 
is uttered by God – not alien to God.  The notion of theological transcendence in 
immanence enables finite creation to be taken as a sign because it participates at an 
analogical remove in the communication of love, which is God.  Every finite 
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constellation is therefore in principle a constellation of meaning.304  However, in 
speaking of meaning here, one must be careful not to lapse into the mode of 
speaking of a metaphysics of presence.  To say that a finite constellation “is” a 
constellation of meaning should not be to say that finite meaning can be fixed or 
definitively described.   
 
Only an ontology working with the absolute separation of transcendence and 
immanence can assume that meaning can be fixed and stabilised.  While arguing for 
God’s transcendent otherness, the notion of theological transcendence in 
immanence is, however, precisely not a thought of the separation of transcendence 
and immanence.  The transcendent is in the immanent - the immanent partakes of 
the transcendent. This would imply, then, that every constellation of meaning, while 
genuinely expressing something, is also, at the same time, genuinely open to further 
inflection.  Meaning is not fixed, but is open for growth, and in that sense, final 
closure is always deferred.  Because the transcendent, which pervades the 
immanent, is an infinite transcendent, every finite constellation, while genuinely 
participating in the communication that is the transcendent in the immanent, can 
never fix that communication, but needs to be open to further inflection, modulation 
and non-identical repetition.   
 
As has been stated before, a finite creature always finds itself with a real distinction 
between its existence and its essence.  It exists - it has finite boundaries, but these 
boundaries are always only relatively stable.  Because a finite being participates in 
the infinite transcendent, its being is always ecstatic - its essence is always ahead of 
itself.  It is on its way to its essence, as if somehow it would ever be possible to attain 
the fullness of God.  The same ecstatic conception of meaning should also be 
applied to the philosophical category of substance: 
 
“All creation declares God’s glory, and so should be understood not simply 
according to a logic of substances, but first as a free and flowing succession 
of semeia, within which ‘substances’ are constituted as the relative stability of 
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the ‘notes’ or ‘moments’ that the whole discourse (the Logos) calls forth; being 
as a kind of cogent rhetoric.”305 
 
What holds for finite substances as relatively stable constellations or moments within 
an ongoing discourse is equally true of the relations or intervals between these 
moments.  The relations between finite entities are all relations, at an analogical 
remove, of the relations of infinite peace, joy and love that exist in God.  When a 
relation is reconfigured differently, this does not have to be interpreted as ontological 
violence.  Rather, the giving way of a constellation of meaning into a new ordering 
may always be understood from a broader horizon of interpretation, or a higher 
vantage point, or even a narrower context, as a harmonious interval.  In other words, 
the proportion between the constellations may always be sought out.  And the 
proportion always exists, first and foremost because God is a God of harmony, but 
then also precisely because He is a God of infinite harmony.  As an analogical 
expression of the infinite being of God, no interval can be deemed violent.306  In 
attempting to explain the harmony of analogous proportion, Bentley-Hart uses the 
image of Baroque art.  As the detail in an architectural edifice is incessantly re-
articulated in smaller, yet proportionate details, as a theme in a Bach fugue is re-
articulated in a different register again and again, so difference in creation may be 
taken to be the non-identical repetition that strives in its moving forward to express – 
once again per impossible – the infinite glory of God. 
 
The analogical sign can never be a fixated sign.  Transcendence in immanence 
means that every finite constellation is transcended - it is open and on the move, it is 
ecstatic.  In the same way that the relation between transcendence and immanence 
can never be quantified, the meaning of the analogical sign can never be fixed.  In 
the same way that transcendence and immanence cannot, in the creaturely realm, 
be separated radically – precisely because it is transcendence in immanence, a 
watertight distinction cannot be made in the analogical sign between a material 
signifier and an immaterial, ideal meaning content.  Translating what has been said 
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here in a theological mode as it were back into the more traditional semiological 
fields of linguistics and hermeneutics may imply that every act of reading or 
interpretation, at its deepest level, should be viewed as a liturgical act.  To point to 
the immersion of every semiotic act in the immanent ebb and flood of language, as is 
fashionable in much of postmodern theory, may not be the only avenue of opposition 
to the modernist separation of an all-powerful, knowing subject and a field of 
knowledge spread out before it.  There is no compelling reason why the fixation 
wrought by modernist spatialisation may not just as well be overcome by situating 
the reader and the text, the sign and its meaning, within a liturgical process - that is, 
a process of anaphoresis, a process of approaching the transcendent in worship, a 
process that never ends.307 
 
Using the traditional language of Christian theology, the human soul may be said to 
be a particularly significant manifestation of the meaning expressed by finite 
creation.  Whereas creation in its being is an answer to God’s expression of love and 
delight and therefore is meaning, it is with the creation of humanity that the 
articulation of this meaning attains a particular depth and splendour.  The following 
quotation from David S. Toolan (in his turn using the language of evolutionary 
physics and biology) illustrates this point succinctly: 
 
“The dizzy subatomic particle-waves spinning wildly out of the big bang didn’t 
know what to make of themselves at first …, but the initial conditions were 
such that as they joined forces, split and joined again and again and again, 
corralling energy from atoms, galactic clusters, molecules, chains of inorganic 
and organic compounds, simple life forms – and on and on to homo sapiens -
they were implicitly carving out an inside, an interior to ferry and hold the 
energy of their Initial Conditioner – the message of the Original Dispatcher 
who set them loose in the first place and never ceases to sustain the 
diversifying process forward.  From the very beginning the trouble was that 
quarks, atomic nuclei, molecules, plants, and bacteria, as finely woven as they 
are, could contain only so much of the divine energy field.  It came across like 
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static; no clear message…  Only with the emergence of the species homo 
sapiens did you have the complex hardwiring – nervous system and brain – 
that could possibly tune in to the Cosmic Mind and thus become mindful of the 
meaning of things.”308 
  
In the human soul, created being has an “inside,” a “relatively stable substance” 
where the echoing of the God-sound in creation finds a particularly meaningful 
resonance.  Bentley-Hart, interpreting Gregory of Nyssa, says that the particular 
meaningfulness of the soul lies in its traversal of all the semeia of being.309  The soul, 
in other words, passes along all the diverse constellations of meaning that is 
creation, and articulates them in its consciousness.  This is what it means that the 
soul in particular is the imago Dei, the image of God.  However, because finite being 
participates in the being of God (analogically, that is, also within an ever greater 
difference), the articulation of the meaning of being will never cease.  Thus, Gregory 
proposes the image of the human soul as being somewhat like an ever- expanding 
container.  As it journeys across the infinite arrangement of meaning constellations 
that is the expression of God’s glory, the soul keeps on expanding – journeying ever 
deeper into God, though never itself ceasing to be finite and creaturely.310 
 
The semiology proposed here springs from and is imbedded in the tradition of 
Christian thought.  As such, it can never stand on its own.  In one way or another, 
the reality of meaninglessness, violence, miscommunication and evil has to be dealt 
with.  To develop the Christian doctrine of evil and redemption falls outside the scope 
of this study.  For the purposes of this section on semiology, it is sufficient to 
remember that the gospel of Jesus Christ may be understood as a re-issuing of 
God’s word of creation.  If creation, being completely contingent and unnecessary, 
has also contingently become corrupt and prone to evil, then the life and work of 
Jesus Christ may be taken to be a word of repair and healing - a word of return to 
God.  The doctrine of the two natures of Christ states that Christ is the second 
person of the Trinity, the eternal Logos and Son, and at the same time, the finite 
human being Jesus of Nazareth.  Thus, in Christ, transcendence in immanence finds 
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its true and highest manifestation.  In the words of Bentley-Hart: “Only in Christ…has 
this ordering of the finite toward the infinite perfectly occurred; only here is the true 
image of God and the true form of the creature entirely given; but the Holy Spirit is 
able always to bring all natures into conformity with that love, to reconcile them to the 
infinite according to the salvation Christ has wrought, and to fashion in them anew 
the beauty for which they were created.”311 
 
Therefore, everything that has been said of the analogical signification effected by 
finite creation must be said a fortiori and de jure primarily of Christ.  Christ is the 
analogical sign through whom finite creation finds its signification again.  The journey 
of the human soul, as a traversal of all the semeia of creation, is thus also a journey 
in the Holy Spirit to be formed and re-formed according to the form of Christ.   
 
The proposal of a non-fixated semiology stemming from the notion of theological 
transcendence in immanence may achieve greater clarity if, in conclusion of this 
section, it is again explicitly placed alongside the deconstructive semiology proposed 
by Derrida.  In opposition to a conception of the sign organised around a logic of 
presence, Derrida proposes a semiology of contamination: in its presencing, every 
sign is contaminated by an irrevocable absence.  The sign is a bastard son, not 
faithfully representing his father.  There is always a lack – the fullness of presence is 
not fully represented.  This is a constitutive deficiency due to absolute temporality.  
Signification, therefore, is not something other than the becoming space of time and 
the becoming time of space.  There is no separate realm of ideal meaning that must 
be represented.  The notion of signification that thus appears is of some constellation 
of meaning that emerges from a sublime absence, wavers for a brief moment within 
the realm of being, without being able to be definitively fixed, as it is determined by 
its absent past, and then transforms into another, completely unforeseen 
constellation of meaning.  As has been observed, there are obvious 
correspondences between such a conception of signification in Derrida, and the 
ontological framework proposed by Heidegger, the modification by Derrida deriving 
from his contamination of the present from an absolute past, whereas Heidegger 
sees the present as being determined from the absolute limit of the future. 
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In contrast to the contamination of the present by an absolute past or future, 
theological transcendence in immanence proposes the “contamination” of the 
present by a deeper, transcendent presence - the presence of the infinite.  As has 
been mentioned before, within the Christian metaphysical tradition, as articulated by 
Gregory of Nyssa, God’s infinity means that He is the perfect completeness of what 
He is.  God is without opposition, and He is therefore beyond non-being or negation, 
transcendent of all composition or antinomy.  The logical implication, which Gregory 
also draws, is that God is beyond all temporal and spatial distinctions.  God is 
without extension or succession: “here”, “there”, “past”, “present” (understood as a 
discrete moment) and “future” do not pertain to him.312   
 
In opposition to an “ontic” semiology that wants to fixate meaning within the realm of 
the ontic present, theological transcendence in immanence proposes an ontic 
present that is inhabited and pervaded by an always greater transcendent presence.  
This is the transcendence of infinite being towards which all finite meaning 
constellations are always open.  The signification proposed by theological 
transcendence in immanence is therefore always provisional - always open to 
difference and deferral, and always ecstatic. The eccentricity of the sign does not, 
within this conception, however, pertain to the flow of an absolutely immanent 
temporality (which is the transcendence of temporality), but to the participation of 
immanent finitude in the always greater otherness of divine transcendence.  
Heidegger was aware of this option (as, doubtlessly, was Derrida ), but he rejected it 
on methodological grounds.313  As will be argued in the final chapter of this study, 
there are, however, no compelling methodological reasons for rejecting a semiology 
that understands every present finite constellation of meaning as open in its 
participation with the infinite.  Whereas signification within the Derridean 
understanding implies a kind of meaningless meaning – every meaning is inhabited 
by the nihil – signification within a scheme of theological transcendence in 
immanence actually appreciates every definite meaning, even within its 
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provisionality.  Whereas a specific meaning constellation may not be the final word 
on anything, it nevertheless constitutes a moment in the traversal by finite being of 
infinite being’s splendour.  As such, it is infinitely worthwhile and meaningful.  
Furthermore, whereas a semiology deriving from the notion of temporal 
transcendence has no use for the category of the beautiful, a semiology of 
theological transcendence in immanence may appreciate proportion within relative 
stable constellations of meaning, and also appreciate transformations as harmonious 
intervals, that is, as meaningful. 
 
 
4.4 Space, time and change 
 
In chapter three of this study, it was noted that Derrida positions himself within a 
certain problematic raised in Husserlian phenomenology.  I am referring to the 
problematic of the relationship between genesis and truth.  On the one hand, the 
eidetic reduction brackets out all reference to external reality and focuses on the 
essence of the transcendental object as it appears in consciousness.  This is an 
ideal essence, i.e. infinitely repeatable in transcendental consciousness.  On the 
other hand, there is the transcendental flow of temporality within which every eidetic 
essence appears.  But how can a stable essence be fixed within the interminable 
flow of temporality?  The thrust of Derrida’s deconstruction of Husserl is to argue that 
there is simply no stable, ideal essence to be safeguarded in order to allow for a 
perfect repetition at some later stage.  Derrida subsequently takes his deconstructed 
understanding of the dynamic of what happens in consciousness, strips it of its 
phenomenological guise, and presents an ontological claim: what we have is the 
infinite finitude of temporality.  All that there “is” is the radically immanent process of 
spacing - the becoming space of time (as a certain constellation achieves relative 
stability), and – what has always already started - the becoming time of space (the 
relatively stable constellation bears the seeds of its own demise in itself and is 
always already anticipating its other).  The “other” of the infinite finitude of 
temporality is, precisely, a temporal other.  It is the absolute past inhabiting every 
present - the messianic as the absolute future to be awaited.  As was pointed out at 
the end of the previous chapter, in a manner of speaking, it is transcendence in 
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immanence that is presented here – the transcendence of a radically immanent 
temporality. 
 
Clearly, the strong point of temporal transcendence in immanence is the appreciation 
it has for change and for the different, the non-identical.  It is an ontology that tries to 
limit the violence supposedly wrought by identity through the counter-violence of the 
deconstruction of every proposed stability. But what is the nature of this change?  
Can anything be said of this change, apart from the naked event of its happening?  
The point that Derrida seems to make with regard to change is that it is without a 
goal or destination.  Change happens, and the only meaning there is to it lies 
internally, in the event of the change which is happening.  Change does not 
necessarily lead to anything better or, for that matter, worse.  In the course of his 
critique of the phonic sign, which is in the service of a metaphysics of presence, 
Derrida mentions that the signification that emerges out of the deconstruction of 
Presence is in a mode of non-linearity.  According to him, the linear is complicit in a 
metaphysics of Presence, precisely because a metaphysics of presence sees one 
thing as leading to another; one thing as building on another, all the while more and 
more approximating presence.  In a telling few pages of Grammatology, Derrida 
pleads for a de-sedimentation of four thousand years of linear writing, in order to 
remember a writing: 
 
 “that spells its symbols pluri-dimensionally; there the meaning is not 
subjected to successivity, to the order of a logical time, or to the irreversible 
temporality of sound…  [T]he word history has no doubt always been 
associated with a linear scheme of the unfolding of presence, where the line 
relates the final presence to the originary presence according to the straight 
line or the circle.  For the same reason, the pluri-dimensional symbolic 
structure is not given within the category of the simultaneous.  Simultaneity 
coordinates two absolute presents, two points or instants of presence, and it 
remains a linearist concept.314 
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Thus, the absolutely immanent temporal flux is associated with non-linear change, 
that is, change that happens in any direction or dimension.  Earlier in this study, the 
Deleuzian metaphor of rhizomatic change was used to attempt to understand the 
change that Derrida has in mind.  A rhizome can develop in any direction or in many 
directions at once.  Having said that, what should be kept in mind when using this 
metaphor is that the rhizome itself does not remain as a stable base from where the 
roots are sent out in every direction.  The rhizome itself does not remain identical to 
itself over time.   
 
In the previous two sections of this chapter, it has already been argued that a 
theological notion of transcendence in immanence is not uncongenial to change and 
difference.  Talk of a dialectical opposition between the same and the different, the 
one and the many has no place within Christian thought.  To speak of God as Trinity 
is to speak of a difference that does not flow from any prior unity.  God is three 
persons and yet one being, and in the divine perichoresis, the co-inherence of the 
Father in the Son, and the Son in the Father through the Spirit, there is difference 
and yet the unity of one divine being.  Furthermore, Christian theology confesses the 
being of God to be infinite being.  This implies that the dynamic self-expression of 
the Father in the Son and the giving Himself back of the Son in the Spirit is an infinite 
dynamic of non-identical presence - Deus semper maior.  Within the being of God, 
there is always greater depth of mystery, always more unencountered glories (to 
speak from the vantage point of finite creation).  Thus, if finite, created being 
participates analogically (that is, always at an unquantifiable interval of ever greater 
difference) in the being of God, it should be very much open to difference.  Created 
being can never lock identity down, thereby foreclosing the journey of a being into 
further reflections of God’s infinite glory.  As has already been mentioned, Gregory of 
Nyssa, for example, conceived of finite change as created being’s traversal of the 
infinite being of God.  For classical thought, upon which Gregory builds, the concept 
of change was closely associated with the concept of motion.  And, far from being an 
unimportant indicator, as it is within a modernist, Newtonian worldview, the concept 
of motion in antiquity was multi-layered and full of meaning.  We now move to a brief 
exploration of this notion, the aim being to determine the implications for the 
meaning of space and time within an ontology of theological transcendence in 
immanence. 
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From the vantage point of theological transcendence in immanence, finite motion is 
not discrete, self-explanatory or trivial, compared to, for example, the “laws” 
governing force and acceleration.  In addition, in contrast to the change presented by 
Derridean temporal transcendence in immanence, motion, from this perspective, is 
multi-layered and full of meaning.  In the first sections of this chapter, it was 
mentioned that a notion of theological transcendence in immanence refers “being” 
first and foremost to God.  God most properly and essentially exists, while creation in 
its finitude and radical contingency exists only to the extent that it analogically 
partakes of the being of God.  A similar line is to be taken with regard to the concept 
of motion.  Properly speaking, all motion is analogically related to, and should be 
referred to, transcendent being. 
 
However, at this point, a question arises.  Does the avenue of referring all motion to 
God not bring us into conflict with God’s complete self-sufficiency – His apatheia – 
as was touched upon earlier in this chapter?  Furthermore, Aristotelian metaphysics, 
to the extent that it is congenial to Christian thought, presents God as the first 
Unmoved Mover.  The Aristotelian principle of causality states that everything that is 
moved is moved by another, and this causal chain constitutes a hierarchy of motions 
that culminates in the first Unmoved Mover.  In his magisterial synthesis of neo-
platonic theology and Aristotelian philosophy, Thomas Aquinas presents a view that 
attempts to respect divine apatheia, while still ultimately referring all motion to God.  
Aquinas does this by carefully distinguishing the motion within finite creation from the 
infinite dynamism of the Trinity that is not the same as finite motion.  Within God 
there is no change from potency to act, as He is one and all act.  If motion is defined 
as that which hovers between potency and act and is in a sense the transition from 
potency to act, then, of course, there is no motion in God.  On the other hand, there 
is the infinite self donation of God in the shared knowledge and love of the persons 
of the trinity which, in a sense, constitutes a motion.  Simon Oliver notes that 
Aquinas mediates between these understandings by sometimes referring to the 
dynamism in God in terms of Aristotelian energeia, which is a constant operation that 
does not involve the transfer from potentiality to actuality.315  The point is, then, that 
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a theological notion of transcendence in immanence can refer all motion ultimately to 
God, while still maintaining the utter contingency and non-necessity of finite motion 
to the life of God.   
 
In his discussion of the appropriation of the classical Greek notion of diastema by the 
Church Fathers, Andrew Louth makes a similar point.316  The term ‘diastema’, 
probably originally Aristotelian, has the implication of “interval or “extension.”  This is 
characteristic of everything that changes and is subject to becoming.  On the one 
hand, diastema distinguishes one thing from another – it is the discreteness of one 
thing from another.  On the other hand, it also refers to any distance or extension 
and the capacity to move across such a distance.  This is not merely to be 
understood in physical terms: diastema may also indicate the discursive “distance” 
covered in the movement from the premises to the conclusion of an argument.  
Diastema is characteristic of everything that belongs to the realm of change and 
becoming.  Thus, it makes possible the “space” required for relationship (in every 
sense, not just geometrical), including the “space” that exists between human 
beings.  
 
If diastema is the notion of finitude thought in terms of space, it is also the same 
notion thought in terms of time.  In the words of Andrew Louth, the notion of 
diastema includes: 
 
“… the time through which the sequences of the seasons pass, the 
succession of years, the movement from day to night and night from day, but 
it includes other experiences of time: the time through which human beings 
pass from birth, through infancy, and childhood, to maturity, and then on to 
death; the time through which our ideas, thoughts, feelings, relationships 
pass.” 
 
Thus, diastema refers to finitude and the discreteness of relatively stable 
substances, as well as to notions of time and space as traversal, which emerge 
within such a realm of becoming.  The Church Fathers, being exponents of early 
                                            
316
 Andrew Louth, “Space, Time and the Liturgy,” In: Adrian Pabst and Christoph Schneider (eds.) 
Encounter between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy (London: Ashgate, 2009), p. 217. 
161 
 
Christian theology, understood the notion of diastema within the context of the 
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo.  For them, diastema characterises the realm of creation, 
in distinction from God, who is being itself.  Within God there is no diastema, and yet 
there is the fullness of relation.  This is the relation expressed by the notion of 
perichoresis.  Von Balthasar emphasises the novelty, or at least the Wendung that 
Christian theology brought with regard to the reception of Greek thought concerning 
time and finitude: 
 
“Gregory of Nyssa, therefore, brings an absolutely new element to the 
problem by interpreting time as the very sign of the creature and thus of the 
fundamental passivity of created being.  In this way the three elements of the 
Greek philosophy of time find themselves profoundly modified.  The Stoic 
diastema becomes an ontological concept that designates a being that is not 
identical to itself, a being that is in some way torn apart, divided from itself.  
Plotinus’ ontological time aptly maintains its character of restlessness and of 
tense vitality but is more pronounced in its orientation toward the indigence, 
the poverty, the insufficiency of the creature.  Circular time is finally stripped of 
its infinite, eternal radiance.  To the contrary, the circle becomes the symbol of 
finitude.  The circuit is followed only one time.  Once it has arrived at its end 
term, the created being reaches at the same time the goal of its existence.  It 
dies, it does away with itself.”317 
 
What emerges from this discussion is that from the perspective of theological 
transcendence in immanence, motion is at once that which distinguishes the 
transcendent divine from created immanence, and that which allows for immanence 
to be intimately bound up with transcendence.  On the one hand, there is the relation 
of distinctness between the realm of being and that of becoming.  In God, there is no 
distinction between potency and act, and in that sense, there is no becoming.  God is 
infinite being in His simplicity, unchangeableness and eternity.  On the other hand, it 
is precisely because of the relation of divine transcendence in creaturely immanence 
that there can be finite motion at all. 
 
                                            
317
 Von Balthasar, Presence and Thought, p. 33, n.46. 
162 
 
In the previous section, change was explained in terms of Gregory of Nyssa’s 
understanding of the traversal of the infinite by the finite.  The same point may now 
be made with reference to Thomas Aquinas’ use of the concepts of emanation and 
causality.  Emanation, according to Aquinas, refers to the active self-expression of a 
nature in relation to others in the production of another self.318  Perfect emanation 
happens only in God, whose intellect and act of understanding is identical with his 
being.  God’s understanding and intellect are identical with His essence.319  In 
Trinitarian terms, perfect divine emanation may be described as the Father who 
expresses His self-knowledge in Himself, and as the Son, who is expressed or 
conceived as the self-knowledge of the Father.  God’s knowledge coincides with His 
being, and this is infinite and perfect.  In a sense, therefore, all things are held as 
what they are first and foremost in God’s self- knowledge.  All things, even that which 
would at some stage become finite creation, are contained first and foremost in the 
mind of God as part of the divine self- knowledge.  Then, according to His grace and 
free will, God grants being to these ideas of finitude, thereby creating a creation that 
is not God, and that is yet, as we have seen, not alien to the being of God.   
 
Within the creation that emanates from God there exists a hierarchy, which is not to 
say that some parts of creation have in themselves less being, or are in some way 
evil due to their position in the hierarchy of being.  The notion of a hierarchy of being 
is simply a way to deal with the experience of difference and change within the realm 
of becoming - a way, as will become apparent, that allows for a richer and deeper 
intimation of meaning in the experience of change.  Accordingly, Aquinas suggests a 
hierarchy of emanation within creation based on the discreteness of emanation or, in 
other words, the ability to make a communication of oneself without losing the self.320  
Highest with regard to the perfectness of their self-communication are the spiritual 
substances or angels.  They are purely intellectual beings who know themselves 
through themselves, and concomitantly do not require any sense perception.  
Human beings are likewise able to reflect on themselves and to thereby produce an 
emanation of themselves in other selves.  The human intellect is capable of self-
knowledge and understanding.  Yet, unlike the angels, humans must first venture 
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outside of themselves in order to receive sense perception, before they can arrive at 
self-knowledge. 
 
Animals have sense perceptions as well, which come to reside in their memories, but 
they are unable to be self-reflective and to form a self-image.  Below animals are 
plants, which have even less capacity for self-communication, even though, as living 
beings, they are able to move within themselves towards some form.  The lowest 
form of emanation is ascribed to inanimate bodies.  The only way in which their 
nature can be procreated is through the external action of one upon another - for 
example, a fire acts upon a combustible object and produces another fire.321   
 
Crucially, the emanative act of creation, whereby creation participates analogically in 
the creative act of God, would be incomplete without considering the non-identical 
return in God that all created being likewise participates in.  In the Holy Spirit, the 
Father’s self-knowledge in the Son also becomes willed or desired knowledge in the 
Son’s giving back of Himself to the Father.  In the words of Simon Oliver: 
 
“[C]oupled to the emanation of the Word must be a love whereby the lover 
dwells in the beloved, both in God’s knowing and in that which is known.  The 
love by which God is in the divine will as a lover in the beloved proceeds both 
from the Word of God and the God whose Word he is.  It is as if the Father is 
the lover and the Son the beloved, but immediately and in eternity this is 
returned so the Son is the lover and the Father the beloved.  This introduces a 
kind of circular dynamism to the inner divine life which Aquinas refers to as a 
kind of intellectual ‘motion’.”322 
 
Therefore, it seems that Aquinas, when speaking of the Holy Spirit, speaks of the 
divine will, and love and desire, and of the “motion” of a non-identical return within 
God’s infinite life.  In this motion, created being participates, and to the extent that 
finite beings are able to will and love and desire, they find their places in the 
hierarchy of being.  Intellectual natures in particular must possess a will alongside an 
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intellect, because an intellectual nature cannot but desire to know.  God’s word can 
never go unanswered, and finite beings, to the extent that they have an inside, a 
hollowness where God’s word can reverberate, are arranged in a hierarchy of being.  
This once again does not imply that certain beings are further away from God than 
others - God is equally intimate to all created being, but the manner in which created 
beings participate in the being of God differ, and allows for the intimation of an 
innumerable array of proportions and harmonious intervals within creation.   
 
To say that finite creation participates at an analogical remove in the divine act of 
creatio and non-identical return is to hint at a kind of circular movement in the 
change happening in creation.  All created beings are only relatively stable 
substances that are characterised by an ecstatic striving after the fullness of their 
being.  Discounting for the moment the brokenness and operation of evil in creation, 
the striving and movement of creatures would then, within the perspective of 
theological transcendence in immanence, not be neutral or aimless in any direction.  
On the contrary, in receiving its being as a gift, a creature strives and moves toward 
the transcendence calling in its own immanence, giving itself back in a non-identical 
return to the fullness from where it comes, thereby becoming more and more itself in 
a movement that does not have a fixed terminus.  If space and time, in terms of this 
view, are closely related to diastema, and therefore to movement, traversal and 
change, care should nevertheless be taken not to move too quickly into a 
quantitative frame of mind.  Simon Oliver emphasises this point by noting the 
following with regard to Aquinas’ thought: 
 
“Motion will always, for Aquinas be explained by the intimacy of God, for 
motion is, as for Plato, the embodiment of that which is known perfectly in 
eternity.  Whereas we tend to imagine motion in terms of ‘towards’ or ‘away’ 
from something, for Aquinas it seems that motion is more fundamentally 
understood to take place ‘within’ or ‘enveloped by’ esse ipsum.”323 
 
The point, however, remains that motion, space and time, precisely because they 
are referred to transcendent divine being, are oriented towards transcendence, 
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which allows for a deeper intimation of meaning, compared to the notion of spacing 
and temporalization proposed by Derrida.  The conclusion that motion is never a 
nondescript wandering may also be made by studying the so-called motor causality 
principle proposed by Aristotle and taken over by Aquinas.324  According to this 
principle, everything which is moved is moved by another.  Thus, whatever is moved 
requires a mover that is not the same “thing” as that which is moved.  To move 
something, and to be moved by something, are two utterly distinct processes.  A 
mover which is in actuality moves something else that is in potentiality.  The same 
thing cannot be in actuality and potentiality at the same time with regard to the same 
aspect.  Furthermore, actuality must precede potentiality in ontological terms.  There 
must be something in actuality that is able to evoke the movement from potentiality 
to actuality in something else.  In a sense, the principle of omne quod movetur ab 
alio movetur is another way of recognising transcendence in immanence - a 
recognition that, from the perspective of theological transcendence in immanence, 
would be another way of talking about creation’s participation – at an analogical 
remove – in God’s intimacy at every point to His creation.  Everywhere, creation 
manifests analogical participations in the inherence of divine transcendence in 
creaturely immanence, in this case specifically the transcendent actuality that 
actualises something that is in potentiality. 
 
The point here with regard to motion and change is, firstly, that motion is not neutral 
or aimless, and secondly, that a beautiful variety within movement may be intimated.  
The fact that, according to Aquinas, motion is not neutral, is succinctly demonstrated 
in his taking over from Aristotle the distinction between natural and violent motions.  
A natural motion can be described as a movement for which a particular being has a 
natural receptivity.  The motion of a heavy object falling downward is natural, as 
heavy objects, by their very nature, move downwards.  In contrast, a violent motion 
is one for which a particular being has no innate intention - it may even resist the 
motion, as witnessed, for example, by a heavy object being lifted upwards.325  In the 
case of a violent motion, it is particularly clear that an object is moved by something 
other than itself.  This principle of motion is, however, also applicable in the natural 
motion of inanimate objects, as well as in the motion of animate beings.  While 
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animals appear to be self moved, Aristotle-Aquinas maintains the strict distinction 
between mover and moved by distinguishing different parts in the body of an animal: 
the legs are the mover, and the remainder of the body is what is being moved. 
 
Higher up in the hierarchy of causality, upon considering the human soul, one may 
think that one has come across a mover that is not moved by something external.  
The soul is the mover of the body, but the soul itself – is that not moved by itself?  
Aquinas replies that the soul has a most fundamental composition by which it is 
moved, namely the composition of essence and existence.326  The soul cannot 
account for its own coming into existence.  It does not subsist by itself, but exists by 
the grace of God, who gives it into being, and who calls the soul back to himself 
again.  Thus, according to Aquinas, the phenomenon of causality can be studied in 
order to understand something of the perfection of circular motion compared to that, 
say, of linear motion, as well as to intimate something of the rich diversity of change 
in creation. 
 
The classical distinction between actuality and potentiality allows for a vivid 
illustration of the difference between theological transcendence in immanence and 
temporal transcendence in immanence when placed alongside each other.  Whereas 
Heidegger and Derrida prioritise potentiality over actuality, within a notion of 
theological transcendence in immanence the actual takes precedence over that 
which is in potentiality.  According to Derrida, an actual constellation is inhabited by 
the potential to be different – it is never identical to itself.  Theological transcendence 
in immanence, starting with the fullness of the actuality of divine transcendence, is 
sensitive to the potentiality that is yet to be actualised in every actual finite 
constellation, to the extent that that constellation is ecstatically on its way to fuller 
(self) presence.  The difference between theological and temporal transcendence in 
immanence with regard to actuality and potentiality will be discussed again in the 
final chapter of this study. 
 
This section may be concluded by summarising the characteristics of space and time 
from the perspective of theological transcendence in immanence.  The first point to 
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be noted in this regard would be that space and time, like being and change, find 
their meaning in being referred to divine transcendence.  Space and time are 
realities associated with finitude.  The notion of diastema, as appropriated within a 
conception of theological transcendence in immanence, expresses the discreteness 
of finite substances, as well as the relationship between them and the traversal of 
the “distance” of that relationship.  And so, the meaning constellation of “diastema” 
comprises at once the notion of discrete substances and the notions of space and 
time necessary to conceptualise finitude and substantiveness.  Significantly, Von 
Balthasar renders Gregory of Nyssa’s diastema, inter alia, with the word ‘spacing’ 
(espacement.)  In expounding the concept of diastema in Gregory’s religious 
philosophy, Von Balthasar also highlights this double connotation, firstly denoting 
finitude and extension between limits, and secondly as the “receptacle” of all created 
being, and therefore as space and time as such.327 
 
However, diastema is inhabited by mystery.  There is always more to it than can be 
grasped.  The finitude of diastema, with the accompanying understanding of space 
and time, is inhabited by a transcendence.  Diastema participates at an analogical 
remove in the infinite being of divine transcendence.  As has already been noted, 
God’s infinite being is not to be thought in spatial or temporal terms.  In Him there is 
no extension or succession.  To speak of God’s simplicity, eternity and apatheia 
would be to imply something like an infinite presence.  Yet, space and time are 
created by God as the reality of finitude - the unquantifiable manifestation of the 
analogical remove at which created being participates in the being of God.  Thus, 
beings emerge from God into finitude, where they exist as relatively stable 
substances, and where they change and grow and give themselves back to God in a 
non-identical return.   
 
Within the tradition of Christian thought, the reality of transcendence in immanence 
with regard to the meaning of time has been expressed by the taking over from Plato 
of the notion that time is to be regarded as a moving image of eternity.  Time is an 
expression of the movement whereby created finitude participates in the infinite 
being of God.  It is in its relationality, on the other hand, that space participates in the 
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infinite being of God.  Whereas Derridean spacing is characterized by a rapport sans 
rapport (a lá Levinas), theological transcendence in immanence allows for spatiality 
to be thought of in terms of innumerable arrangements of peaceful relations within 
and between constellations.   When space and time are taken together (as they 
should be) as the spacing or temporalisation of every configuration, theological 
transcendence in immanence would speak of the movement of non-identical 
repetition or return, which characterises created finitude.  Thus, while not being the 
same, according to the mode of a fixated presence, created beings are also not 
completely different, in the sense of existing in complete equivocity.  Rather, the 
difference that creatures exhibit from moment to moment and in relation to other 
creatures manifests an unquantifiable proportionality, which, as such, participates 
analogically in the proportion between divine transcendence and created 
immanence.   
 
Thus, finally, what emerges from the discussion in this section is an intimation of the 
progression of time and the proportionality of space, a progression and a 
proportionality, moreover, that are mutually interpreting.  Within creation there is 
progression within proportion and proportion within progression.  That a being can 
grow or change and not be the same as it was, while also not being completely 
different from what it was, testifies to the former.  The existence of rhythm, in all its 
beautiful variety, testifies to the latter.  Saying that there is progression within 
proportion and proportion within progression may be one way of expressing the 
participation by the realm of becoming in the realm of being or, in other words, it may 
be an expression of the presence of transcendence in immanence.  Furthermore, it 
should by now be clear that in terms of this view, there is no compelling reason to 
treat space and time first and foremost as physical realities, thereby relegating other 
modes of progression and proportionality to the ranks of the “merely” metaphorical.  
Within any given creaturely constellation – be it animate or inanimate, vegetal, 
animal or intellectual – the proportion of transcendence in immanence is analogically 
manifested: the potentiality of a substance for change towards its essence.  Equally, 
in the relation between constellations, the proportion of transcendence in immanence 
is analogically manifested as the relation between similarity and otherness, intimacy 
and desire.  In any event, distance is not negation.   
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Within a notion of change, conceptualised as the movement of a non-identical 
repetition or change, the meaning of space and time emerge as the proportionality of 
progression and the progressive unfolding of proportionality.  In the following section, 
the ways in which these notions of space and time are embodied will be discussed. 
 
 
4.5 The practice of progression and proportion 
 
In a sense, Derrida’s work is nothing but a continual emphasis on embodiment.  
Attention is constantly drawn to the ubiquity of contamination.  Every constellation 
comprises an intermingling of the ideal and the material, the signified and the 
signifier.  The Derridean emphasis on embodiment, however, is of a curiously 
receding nature.  An (embodied) meaning constellation is only recognised in its 
already being deconstructed.  The presence of absence within every presence 
results in a constellation only being recognised in the moment of its disintegration 
and giving way to something radically unforeseen.  The image that comes to mind is 
that of an Antarctic glacier affected by global warming: the front of the glacier is 
continually eroded backwards up the slope by the warmer waves and atmospheric 
temperature, even as the ice itself keeps moving forward.  Enormous blocks of ice 
break off and drift away into the ocean, but the glacier itself is not in homeostasis: 
the emphasis is not so much on new ice forming and moving forward as on the 
inexorable disintegration and erosion backwards at the front of the glacier.  Likewise, 
the emphasis in deconstruction is on the disintegration happening in every 
integration, as opposed to a balance, or even better - a community, between 
integration and disintegration.  This state of affairs has been described as a state of 
asymmetric non-reciprocity.328  Thus, within Derrida’s thought, justice demands an 
unreserved openness towards the other.  The coming of the other is the death of the 
self.329  The merest hint of reciprocity between the self and the other would 
inaugurate an economy that, in the final analysis, serves the interests of the self, 
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thereby compromising the absolute alterity of the other and defeating the arrival of 
justice.  As Derrida says, “There is no more gift as soon as the other receives.”330 
 
At this point, it may be useful to try and identify a more general logic of the 
asymmetric non-reciprocity found within Derrida’s thought.  This may be done by 
focusing on the functioning of the negative in his thought.  In this regard, 
deconstruction is a thought of the positive contaminated by the negative.  The logic 
of the trace is a logic of the positive bearing the negative within itself due to its 
radical temporality.  Nevertheless, the positive and the negative do not have 
anything to do with each other.  No relationship may be sought or postulated 
between them.  On the contrary, the absence of any relationship whatsoever is the 
absolute precondition for justice.  What one finds, therefore, is a curious sort of 
prejudice in favour of the negative.  The negative always has the prerogative to 
negate the positive.  The negative inhabits the embodied positive, and Derrida would 
probably be adamant that a separation of the two is illegitimate, as he would like to 
put the emphasis precisely on their mutual contamination.  The mutual contamination 
of the positive and the negative is, however, solely a function of time.  In all other 
respects they remain absolutely separated.  The relationship of the negative to the 
positive is the non-relationship of non-reciprocity.  However, as has been observed, 
the bias is towards the negative: presence is determined by absence; embodiment is 
determined precisely in its dissolution.  Furthermore, what arrives is totally 
unforeseen - it bears no relationship with what has passed away.  The non-
reciprocity between the negative and the positive is therefore an asymmetrical non-
reciprocity. 
 
 In phenomenological terms, the observation regarding the function of the negative in 
Derrida’s thought becomes an observation about intentionality.  According to 
Derrida’s deconstruction of Husserlian phenomenology, that which appears in the 
intentional space of transcendental consciousness “is” always not that anymore - it is 
inhabited by an absolute past, awaiting an absolute future.  In this instance as well, 
within the grammar of phenomenology, the asymmetrical non-reciprocity of a 
prejudice in favour of the negative is evident.  This state of affairs may be associated 
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with the most basic epistemological stance of modernity, a stance problematised yet 
paradoxically radicalised in much of postmodern thought.  What has, in chapter two 
of this study, been described as the epistemological turn, a turn which saw the 
demarcation of the transcendent move from an ontological (theological) transcendent 
towards an epistemological transcendent (that which transcends consciousness), 
predisposes thought towards the negative.  Subsequent to the transcendental turn, 
no relationship exists between the self and the other, between consciousness and 
what transcends it.  Intentionality then comes to designate the horizon within which 
phenomena appear.  The horizon, even though intentional in the sense of directed, is 
an openness, a passivity.331  The prejudice is towards that which arrives from the 
outside, that which is the negative of consciousness’ positive. 
 
From the perspective of theological transcendence in immanence, another kind of 
intentionality may, however, be proposed – an intentionality in juxtaposition to that 
which emerges from within Husserlian phenomenology.  This is the intentionality of 
intending some kind of communication - of wanting to say something.  From the 
perspective of this alternative intentionality, the emphasis is on wanting to say 
something (vouloir dire!), rather than on the more passive, even negative attitude of 
waiting for what appears within the intentional horizon.  Such an approach places the 
emphasis on the positive, rather than on the negative - on the something rather than 
on the nothing.  However, this “reversal” can only happen where a relationship 
between the positive and the negative is recognised.  Where no relationship between 
the self and the other exists – under the sway of transcendental consciousness – a 
prejudice towards the negative probably remains the most viable logical option.  
However, what theological transcendence in immanence proposes is precisely once 
again a prior ontological consensus, wherein the epistemological is embedded.  This 
would allow for a reciprocity, a community, between the self and the other, the 
positive and the negative. 
 
The intentionality of wanting to say something has a further implication for the 
reciprocity between the positive and the negative: while being reciprocal, it remains 
an asymmetrical reciprocity.  Meaning does not simply arise within the reciprocal 
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relationship, but is imparted in the relationship.  It has the character of a gift, and 
reciprocality would then come to imply a giving of a gift in return by the one who 
originally received the gift, albeit in the mode of a non-identical return.   
 
The prior sections of this chapter have, from the perspective of theological 
transcendence in immanence, explained what an emphasis on the positive, the 
something, would mean that yet maintains a reciprocality between the positive and 
the negative.  As in the case of being and movement, intentionality is ultimately 
referred to God.  Intentionality most properly belongs to the infinite life of the triune 
God.  Intentionality – the wanting to say something – is the movement of love 
between the Persons of the Trinity.  Finite creation, in its turn, can then be regarded 
as an utterly non-necessary movement of God’s intentionality to bring about 
something that is not God.  Yet this something is not outside of God’s intentionality.  
It finds its being in analogously participating in God’s being.  And so, finally, we are 
in a position to regard creatureliness as the positive embodiment of God’s intention 
to communicate something.   
 
How would the negative function within such a conception of positive embodiment?  
As has been mentioned before, a notion of theological transcendence in immanence 
cannot but recognise the existence of brokenness and evil within finite creation.  And 
in a certain manner, the existence of brokenness and evil in creation constitutes a 
negation of God’s good intention in creating finite reality.  This negation is an 
impossible attempt to exist independently outside of God’s positive intentionality.  In 
the words of Von Balthasar, who quotes Gregory of Nyssa: 
 
“Everything that exists outside of God is like nothing before his eyes.  ‘Not 
absolutely nothing, but like nothing,’ like a spider’s web.  ‘He who looks at it 
sees nothing.’  All of this is suspended in God, and in order to be able to 
subsist, it participates in the inexhaustible source of being.  But if it turns away 
from this source with a desire to belong to itself, it no longer merits the name 
of being.  This profoundly ontological privation of being is sin, which is 
veritably an annihilation.”332 
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The kerugma of the Christian tradition is that God negates the negation (or nihilation) 
of sin by restating his original intention with creation.  In Christ God’s word becomes 
flesh.  This, for Christian theology, is the defining moment of embodiment - God’s 
definitive statement of intent from which all further intentionality springs forth.  The 
incarnation of the Word of God in Christ is not to be opposed to the embodiment of 
God’s intent in the creation of finite reality.  From the perspective of brokenness, the 
incarnation, life and death of Christ may be taken to be a restatement of God’s 
original intent, which effects a negation of the negation that is sin.  From the 
perspective of temporal finitude and becoming, the incarnation may be viewed as an 
intensification and crowning of the original intent, whereby the original intent can 
appear in a more manifest and glorious manner.  These perspectives do not exclude 
each other, but there exists, in the words of Von Balthasar on the religious 
philosophy of Gregory of Nyssa, a “mystery of reciprocal priority” between them.333 
 
Thus, the notions of creation and incarnation place the emphasis on a positive 
intentionality - on something specific, a specific form.  The theological notion of 
transcendence in immanence goes hand in hand with the embodiment of a specific – 
not a generic - intentionality.  It is a specific form that is the form of beauty.334  With 
this, the character and functioning of tradition in Christianity become evident.  
Tradition is the continuation and unfolding of that specific form, which is God’s 
intention in Christ.  And yet, one must hasten to add, the specific form of Christ is 
also the form of infinite beauty.  It is the very form that resists every attempt at a 
grasping totalisation.  Because this tradition is the embodiment of immanence 
pervaded by transcendence, it is also the embodiment of the semper maior; a 
communication always being enriched in its unfolding as it traverses God’s infinite 
plenitude.   
 
It is here that another, perhaps more proper function of the negative becomes 
pertinent within a theology of transcendence in immanence.  This is the negative of 
the semper maior.  In truth, the notion of theological transcendence in immanence is 
also a thought of the mutual intermingling of the positive and the negative.  Whatever 
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may be asserted of God must then also be denied, because God is always more 
than that.  The difference with the functioning of the negative in deconstruction 
emerges therein that a relationship between what is affirmed and what is negated 
may be postulated.  The emphasis is on the positive tradition, on the form of what is 
being said.  A specific spatio-temporal constellation of the tradition is then 
subsequently not wholly negated - it is superseded by an “even more.”  Precisely 
because it has been embodied in finite creation, the intentionality of God can never 
be totalised in some kind of grasp.  Each relatively stable instance will have to be 
superseded by a next instance that, while not wholly negating its predecessor, 
nevertheless takes it up into an even richer depth of meaning and beauty.  The 
positive embodiment of Christ, in its unfolding as tradition, is inhabited by the 
negative of the semper maior, which urges a sensitivity towards difference and 
variety, but precisely also for proportion in progression and progression in proportion. 
 
The embodied intentionality of transcendence in immanence that is Christ is 
communicated across space and time.  Christian tradition may be regarded as the 
embodied carrying onwards of a specific form, a form that nevertheless resists every 
attempt at totalisation.  It is in this sense that the Christian church is called the 
mystical body of Christ.  It is called mystical because in its being, it expresses 
something of the immanent pervaded by the transcendent.  The church is not purely 
physical, nor is it purely spiritual, but it is precisely the embodiment of the spiritual 
and, conversely, it is the physical in its being open to the infinitely transcendent.  The 
four “marks” of the church, formalised at the First Council of Constantinople in the 
year 381, namely that the church is one, holy, catholic and apostolic, may be 
regarded as a summary expression of this tradition of transcendence in immanence.  
The church is holy in that it is the specific form of Christ that is handed on.  It is 
catholic in the sense that no spatial barrier exists for the communication of the form 
of Christ.  It is apostolic in the sense that no temporal barrier exists for the 
communication of the form of Christ.  And, finally, it is one in the sense that the form 
of Christ that is handed on resonates with all of created being, since it is a 
restatement of God’s original intentionality.  Because the form of Christ is also the 
form of infinite difference and variety, the marks of the church may be interpreted in 
a non-totalising manner.  Accordingly, the catholicity of the church would not inhibit 
the incarnation (so to speak) of the form of Christ at analogical removes from one 
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another at different places and in different cultures.  Likewise, the apostolicity of the 
church would not inhibit the incarnation of the form of Christ in later historical 
moments at analogical removes from the form of the early Church. In the same vein, 
David Bentley-Hart comments that the passage through time (and it may be added 
through space) of the form of Christ may be seen as the transmission of difference 
as gift, and not, as in much of postmodern thought, as violence and the reduction of 
the Other to the Same.335 
 
In order to, finally, arrive at a meditation on the practices whereby the meaning of 
space and time336 is embodied within the Christian tradition, a brief note on the 
“mystery of reciprocal priority” between the life and liturgy of the Church is in order.  
As has been noted337, the reference to the mystery of reciprocal priority hails from 
Hans Urs von Balthasar’s interpretation of the metaphysics of Gregory of Nyssa. 
Within Gregory’s thought Von Balthasar identifies a situation of real becoming and a 
situation of ideal becoming with regard to creaturely finitude.  Real becoming refers 
to the evolutionary impulse within creation whereby the intentionality of God in willing 
a creation progressively unfolds.338  “The ‘life force’, pure potentiality at the starting 
point, made its first appearance in the ordered disposition of matter, and then it 
demonstrated its ‘plastic vitality’ in the blossoming of successive degrees of life.”339  
Von Balthasar’s interpretation of Gregory may in its turn be paraphrased using the 
image of David Toolan, which has already featured earlier in this chapter.340  This is 
the image of creation progressively evolving and unfolding to develop an adequate 
“interior” (as much as that may be said of finite creation) where the word of God may 
find a resonance.  Ultimately, Christ himself, and subsequently the tradition of his 
mystical body, becomes the highest expression of God’s intent in creating finite 
reality.  In the words of Von Balthasar: 
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“And finally, in a last supernatural ‘evolution’, the earth bore that unique fruit 
which was the human body of Christ and which would turn out to be the 
beginning of the eternal deification of the earth.”341 
 
Von Balthasar, however, also identifies a line of thought in Gregory, which he terms 
‘ideal becoming’.  According to this conception, creation in its entirety, but pre-
eminently man, is to be viewed as the image of God.  Image is here to be 
understood as the content of God’s intention, which is not reducible to the 
progressive unfolding of his intention: 
 
“It is a question, on the one hand, of the preceding creation in its entirety and, 
on the other, of that properly divine character that is ‘the image’, which is not 
capable of being reduced to a natural formation … No transition could have 
produced this image by evolution.  Man is the analogatum princeps (chief of 
analogies) of life…”342 
 
From the perspective of ideal becoming, there is a man, which is the corporate unity 
of all individual men, which somehow summarises the intent of the whole of creation 
in being an image (finite and creaturely) of the infinite God.  The corporate “ideal” 
man (who is not ideal in a Platonic, transcendent sense), however, “because he 
cannot exist without change because the transition from nothingness to existence is 
already a certain movement, and which has a kinship to this mutability, was going to 
freely move towards evil.”343  And so God, in His love, gave a new man, Christ, in 
whom the whole of humanity is corporately taken up. 
 
Upon quoting Gregory’s use of the Pauline imagery of the first Adam and the second 
Adam, Von Balthasar comments as follows on the way that Gregory viewed the two 
modes of becoming as co-implicating each other: 
 
“… the transition from the ‘ideal’ to the ‘real’ is made without spacing 
(adiastatoos), on the plane of the spirit, but the transition is translated onto the 
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‘real’ plane by the ‘necessary’ pathway that leads it slowly toward its end term.  
Thus the ‘necessary road’ (anangkaios hodos) is reconciled with the cyclical 
nature of the spirit and the ‘impossible solution’ … opens up.”344 
 
The result, for the purposes of this discussion, is that there is an intimate connection 
between creation and Christ.  It is Christ who is the form of God’s positive intention – 
the same intention expressed as finite creation.  The co-implication of Christ and 
creation may also be formulated with reference to the brokenness and evil pervasive 
in creation: there is an intimate connection between creation and salvation, in that 
both involve the positing of God’s intention in the form of Christ.  Between these 
orders, a mystery of co-implication is to be intimated.  They are mutually elucidating. 
 
The church is the form of Christ in his mystical body, and therefore manifests the 
same co-implicating reciprocality.  On the one hand, the church is nothing but its 
members living their natural everyday lives according to the form of Christ.  This 
would be a conscious and fallible embodiment of God’s intentionality in creating finite 
reality.  On the other hand, the Church is also a liturgical embodiment of the form of 
Christ.  Christ is the focused, crowning expression of God’s original intent with 
creation, and also the restatement of that intent.  Because it is an embodiment of the 
tradition of the form of Christ, the same reciprocality exists between the life and 
liturgy of the church.  The liturgy is a focused expression of the life of the church 
according to the form of Christ.  The image of a magnifying glass used to focus the 
rays of the sun may be used to explain the co-implication of life and liturgy.  A 
magnifying glass is used to focus the rays of the sun onto a flat surface, resulting in 
a small, brilliant and warm circle of light.  The focused circle of light is not something 
other than the rays of the sun shining everywhere around it.  Yet, the characteristics 
of the light - its brilliance and its warmth – may be experienced more clearly when 
focussed through the magnifying glass.  Similarly, the life and the liturgy of the 
Church, in being an embodiment of the form of Christ, do not qualitatively differ from 
each other.  The liturgy may be seen as a focus, a crowning, and in some sense as a 
continual restatement of the life of the church.  On the other hand, if the church was 
not simply its members living their natural, creaturely lives after the form of Christ, 
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then there would not be anything to focus in the liturgy, just as the magnifying glass 
needs the rays of the sun in order to focus it into a small, brilliant circle.345   
 
Thus, finally, in the distinction between the life and the liturgy of the church, we have 
arrived at a point where we are able to speak of the practices whereby the meaning 
of space and time are embodied in a theological notion of transcendence in 
immanence.  Within both the life and the liturgy of the church, as well as in their 
interrelationship, the proportion in progression and the progression in proportion that 
is the participation at an analogical remove in divine transcendence in immanence, 
becomes apparent.  Of course, to somehow catalogue all such practices would be 
impossible, and therefore an exemplary sampling would have to suffice.  With regard 
to the practice of the meaning of space and time in the everyday life of the church, 
the following quotation from Andrew Louth provides a beautiful overview of what the 
script for a manifold of inflected interpretive performances of tradition in the varied 
contexts of today’s world may look like: 
 
“[S]pace and time are so to speak the coordinates of all created existence, not 
just physical existence, and the understanding of movement is consequently 
many layered.  Physical movement is movement through physical space and 
duration, but there is cosmic movement concerned with the movement of the 
heavens, the sequence of the seasons, the passage from evening to morning.  
This cosmic movement is more than physical movement, for it has 
significance, meaning, bound up with the quality of time characteristic of 
seasons – spring, summer, autumn, winter (vividly expressed in medieval 
calendars, not least those found (significantly) in books of hours) – and of the 
passage from evening, through night, to morning and the day.  The creation in 
six days suggests a sequence of ages, prefigured in the successive days of 
creation, including the ‘ages of the world’, variously conceived.  There are also 
the stages of human life, often modelled on the ages of the world: from birth, 
through the ages of man (variously divided, sometimes four – childhood, 
youth, maturity, old age ...) to death. 
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Furthermore, there is the movement of the soul from its baptismal awakening 
by repentance, through growth in the image of God by ascetic struggle, and a 
deepening transfiguration through grace in which the life of God is manifest in 
the soul, to deification.  All these experiences of movement suggest mutual 
analogies; it is not, as the modern mind is tempted to think, that physical 
space and duration are the ‘real’ meaning of space and time, the others being 
merely metaphorical.  Rather all these experiences of movement in space and 
time are experiences of the modalities of creaturely being, characterized by 
διαστηµα [diastema].”346 
 
With regard to the ascetical struggle referred to in the above quotation, reference 
may be made to the emphasis on the inculcation of virtues and the forming of 
wholesome habits that are part of a Christian life.  The function of discipline and the 
inculcation of virtues are practices which embody the meaning of space and time, as 
they testify to the orientation of creaturely life towards its end in God.347  Ascesis 
may furthermore be regarded as an embodiment of the intimate relationship between 
the positive and the negative in Christian tradition.  The soul struggles with undue 
attachments and addictions to finite attractions, and the becoming aware and letting 
go thereof are important milestones on the soul’s journey into God.  Likewise, the 
realisation that there is always more fullness of love and depth of relationship ahead 
strengthens the soul’s desire to keep on journeying. 
 
It is, however, precisely due to its nature as a focusing intensification of life, that the 
practices embodying the meaning of space and time are most evident in the liturgy of 
the church.348  With regard to the liturgy of the church too, the multitude of practices 
defies exhaustive description, and some salient examples will have to suffice.  
Catherine Pickstock’s analysis of the meanings of space and time that emerge in the 
pre-Tridentine Roman rite is extremely helpful in this regard.349   Pickstock refers, for 
example, to the constant re-beginning of the liturgy evident in the Roman Rite (the 
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so-called liturgical stammer) as a realisation that true eschatological liturgy is in time 
endlessly postponed.  With regard to the embodiment of spatial meaning in the 
liturgy, Pickstock refers to the place, or better, the standpoint, from which the words 
of the liturgy are uttered.  When the celebrant, for instance, says the words: “In the 
Name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit” at the beginning of the 
liturgy, these words constitute an ambiguous beginning in several ways.  It is, 
paradoxically, at once a sending out of God and a going into God.  “It instantiates 
both a commission bearing divine authority, and an unmoving invocation of divine 
protection and subsumption within the name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.”350  
Furthermore, to assume a position in the Name of the triune God is also not really to 
assume a position, but rather to partake of a journey, “for the Father is the journey of 
the generation of the Son from which the Spirit proceeds.  This name is therefore not 
a static name affixed outside being, but is an essential name commensurate with the 
existential space of the Trinitarian journey.”351  Again, when the celebrant utters the 
words “I will go to the altar of God…”, the altar is always more than the physical altar 
situated in the apse of the church.  “Unlike ordinary geographical destinations, the 
altar of God is an infinitely receding place, always vertically beyond, in the sense of 
altaria, a raised place where offerings are upwardly burnt…”352 
 
On the other hand, in the midst of the constant diastematic journeying and re-
beginning that the liturgy is, it is also, and just as much, a celebration of presence.  
This is of course supremely evident in the sacraments, especially the Eucharist.  The 
Eucharist is the celebration of the presence of Christ in the (immanent) realities of 
bread and wine, while being at once also infinitely transcendent thereof.  With regard 
to the temporal meaning of the Eucharist, Graham Ward states that “the Eucharist 
participates in a temporal plenitude that gathers up and rehearses the past, while 
drawing upon the futural expectations and significance of the act in the present…. 
Hence the presence cannot be fixed into the present which lies on the other side of 
representations.”353   
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The point is that the liturgy of the Church is an analogical embodiment of 
transcendence in immanence, which is expressed in diastematic journeying through 
time and space, a journeying that is at once also inhabited by a mysterious, un- 
graspable presence.  In this regard, much may also be said of Christian liturgical 
architecture.354  Again, one or two remarks will have to suffice.  The “natural 
scientific” side of a classical education consisted of a fourfold (quadrivium) of 
disciplines.  Geometry was the study of spatial order through the measure and 
relationship of forms.  Astronomy was the study of temporal order through the 
observation of the cyclical movement of heavenly bodies.  Harmony, specifically as 
music, was the study of the relationship and interchange between the temporal 
movements and events of the heavens and the spatial order and development on 
earth.  The last discipline making up the fourfold was arithmetic.  The implicit goal of 
the great quadrivium in antiquity was to educate the mind to become a “channel” 
through which the earth, understood as the realm of manifested form, could receive 
the abstract life of the heavens.355  Within the Christian tradition of transcendence in 
immanence, these classical sensibilities were taken up and transformed.  Thus, 
according to Robert Lawlor, the twelfth century architecture of the Cistercian Order 
made use of designs which conform to the proportional system of musical harmony, 
thereby creating structures of extraordinary beauty.356  References to geometric 
proportions abound in studies of Church architecture.  Thus, the cathedrals of 
Chartres and Notre Dame de Paris, for example, incorporate the so-called Golden 
Ratio in their design.  Suggestions have also been made that the progressions 
stemming from the square root of three (the so-called vesica piscis) are evident in 
these buildings and in the architecture from that time.357  What is expressed 
architecturally is the notion of proportion in progression and progression in 
proportion.  A specific proportion is a relatively stable constellation, perhaps through 
its harmony itself testifying to a certain transcendence in immanence.  And yet the 
proportion cannot be fixated - it invites further unfolding.  In the words of Robert 
Lawlor: 
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“A form is a geometric system and like any system, biological, chemical or 
other, it must be seen in the unfolding continuum of its components in their 
cause-effect relationships.  The movement from implicit to explicit is similar to 
that from cause to effect.  It is only in the arbitrary mental world that cause can 
be separated from effect, while in the natural world they are inseparable: a 
cause is not a cause unless it has an effect.  If we carry this logic further we 
see that the square surface also only exists in a continuous relationship to a 
cubic volume, of which it forms one of the six faces.  In contemplative 
geometry the attempt is always to follow the complete movement from the 
purely abstract, two-dimensional world of line, then plane, as it becomes 
explicit in the actual world of three dimensional volume”.358 
 
Christian liturgical architecture, at least at certain times in its tradition, has been a 
transforming appropriation of this insight, thereby attempting to embody the meaning 
of space and time from within a notion of theological transcendence in immanence. 
 
Finally, it may be remarked that the interrelationship of the life and liturgy of the 
church presents an instance of the embodiment of the form of Christ.  For the 
alternations between focusing and celebrating in liturgy, and living the life of 
everyday (which, it should be remembered, are not qualitatively distinct practices) 
constitute a beautiful rhythm, whereby, once again, the church participates 
analogically in the tradition of theological transcendence in immanence.  The 
practice of Sabbath, as appropriated within Christendom – one day of the week 
being liturgically set apart from the other days – is probably the most salient example 
of such a rhythm.  However, the Liturgy of the Hours, stemming from the tradition of 
Benedictine monasticism, also shows what such a rhythmic co-implication of liturgy 
and life may look like within the ambit of a twenty-four hour day.  And, of course, the 
cycle of the liturgical year, starting as it does with advent and Christmastide, moving 
to a climax in the season of Lent and Easter, and then incorporating a season of 
“ordinary time”, bears witness to the same rhythmic sensibility in the Christian 
tradition.  Thus, liturgical rhythm , as a temporal order, also bears witness to the 
presence of proportion in progression and progression in proportion, which is a 
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creaturely attempt to embody the positive form of Christ, even while being on the 
way to the “always more.” 
 
This chapter began with an investigation into what a notion of theological 
transcendence in immanence, as an inflected interpretive performance of Christian 
tradition, may mean when explicitly placed alongside the notion of temporal 
transcendence in immanence that emerged from a study of Jacques Derrida’s work. 
Subsequently, the notion of theological transcendence in immanence was examined 
with regard to its ability to present an alternative semiology from the problematical 
view of the sign associated with spatialised modernity.  The third section tested the 
notion of theological transcendence in immanence with regard to its ability to 
accommodate difference and change, both of which are realities to which 
postmodern sensibilities are very sensitive.  Finally, the practices whereby 
theological transcendence in immanence embody the meaning of space and time 
were investigated and placed alongside Derridean “writing” as the practice of the 
embodiment of deconstruction. 
 
In the next and final chapter of this study, the state of the conversation with Derrida 
will be evaluated. 
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Chapter 5: Whereto the conversation?  Once more transcendence in  
  immanence 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this study is expressly a conversation with Jacques Derrida on the 
meaning of space and time.  In this regard, a conversation about a specific topic is 
understood to imply alternate statements about the topic in question, followed by 
remarks and rejoinders whereby the different points of view gain a certain degree of 
clarity and possibly convergence.  Concomitantly, the methodology of this study is 
not a strictly phenomenological one. Had it been, it would have asked what the 
meaning of space and time would be that becomes manifest in Derrida’s extensive 
oeuvre.  As it is, however, the question about the meaning of space and time rather 
becomes a stage of sorts, against which Derrida’s thoughts, as well as an own point 
of view, appear.   
 
A point of entry into the conversation with Derrida was afforded by the hypothesis of 
a shared notion of transcendence in immanence.  Derrida, it was suggested, works 
with a notion of transcendence in immanence informed by radical temporality.  
Another way of describing this notion would be to say that it is a notion of infinite 
finitude.  At a given finite moment, a finite constellation is inhabited – or 
contaminated –by a radical other - the other of the avenir, or “to come.”  Nothing can 
be said of this alterity, apart from the fact that it is coming.  It cannot be anticipated - 
it cannot be planned for.  As such, the future of the “to come” curiously has the 
structure of the absolute past – there is nothing to be done about it.  The alterity that 
is coming transcends the finitude of the finite constellation.  On the other hand, the 
immanent constellation is not fully present to itself - it is inhabited by an other.  Thus, 
we have transcendence in immanence.  Yet, having said this, the transcendence of 
temporality remains, so to speak, on a horizontal plane - the effect of a temporality 
without reserve. 
 
Derrida profiled his notion of temporal transcendence in immanence by projecting it 
against the background of a history construed as the history of the metaphysics of 
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Presence.359  Against the totalising, homogenising, hierarchic violence of 
logocentrism, the transcendence in immanence advocated by deconstruction 
allowed for an exquisite sensitivity to difference and variety, and the associated 
notions of freedom and justice.  One way of summarising this sensitivity, which at the 
same time conveys something of the positive impulse of temporal transcendence in 
immanence, would be to invoke the Derridean neologism différance.  Différance may 
be described as the becoming time of space as well as – distinguishable, but not 
separable360 - the becoming space of time. Every spatial constellation is radically 
inhabited by the flux of time.  It is always not itself anymore, as it will give way to 
something different.  At the same time, something different, some kind of unforeseen 
spatiality, will always arrive as ideality is contaminated by corporeality. 
 
In a subsequent chapter, an alternative interpretation of the shared experience of 
transcendence in immanence was proposed and juxtaposed against the temporal 
transcendence in immanence intimated in Derrida’s thought.  The notion of 
theological transcendence in immanence seeks to enact an inflected interpretive 
performance of salient themes from the tradition of Christian theological thought prior 
to the advent of modernity.  In this regard it was suggested that a radical distinction 
between God and his creation should be coupled with the simultaneous affirmation 
of God’s intimate and pervasive proximity to every part of creation, as well as to 
creation as a whole.  The somewhat eclectic exploration of voices from the tradition, 
notably those of Gregory of Nyssa and Thomas Aquinas, was attempted with the 
foregoing contribution by Derrida in mind.  This implied that the challenge facing the 
theological notion of transcendence in immanence was to be at least as sensitive to 
the experience of difference and variety as Derrida is, along with most of postmodern 
thought. Theological transcendence in immanence maintains that words such as 
being and intentionality can most properly only be predicated of God.  Created 
finitude, since it is the expression ad extra of God’s intentionality, or the effect of 
which God is the cause, however, participates in an analogical way in the being of 
God.  Thus, created finitude is not an immanence closed in upon itself.  Rather, it is 
                                            
359In the second chapter of this study, it was argued that Derrida’s account, which continued a course 
plotted by Heidegger, is open to the accusation of structuralist generalisation. 
360Cf. Jacques Derrida, Positions, (London: Continuum, 2004), p. 40: “[S]pacing is neither space nor 
time; the incision is neither the incised integrity of a beginning, or of a simple cutting into, nor simply 
secondarity.  Neither/nor, that is, simultaneously either or…” 
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ecstatic, radically open to the all-pervasive divine transcendence.  The analogical 
participation of the finite in the infinite, it was argued, does allow for infinite variety 
and for the respect of difference.  Furthermore, in contrast to a notion of 
transcendence in immanence that remains with the rather entropic becoming space 
of time and becoming time of space, theological transcendence in immanence wants 
to regard every spatiotemporal interval as – at least potentially – peaceful and 
harmonious.  Using the grammar of analogical being, theological transcendence in 
immanence wants to intimate meaning as proportion in progression and progression 
in proportion as finite being traverses - per impossible - the surface of infinite being.   
 
Two notions of transcendence in immanence juxtaposed and brought into 
conversation with each other.  The question that the final chapter of this study asks 
is the following: whereto the conversation?  Besides the mere juxtapositioning of the 
different notions of transcendence in immanence, what avenues remain open for the 
conversation - especially if rationality as an epistemic value is to remain valued.  The 
issue of the possibility of rational conversation, as well as the limits of rational 
conversation, will be an important theme running through this chapter. If there was 
one insight that twentieth century intellectual reflection gained, it was an insight into 
the limits of rationality.  Rationality is a matter of language games and local reasons. 
Late modern or postmodern sentiments regard claims for a universal rationality and 
attempts at outlining such a rationality with suspicion, to say the least, and generally 
simply dismiss such claims as risible.  
 
Would it therefore not be prudent to leave the two notions of transcendence in 
immanence outlined thus far just as they are – juxtaposed against each other?  In 
this way they would, in a sense, remain transcendent to each other.  Would it not be 
prudent to leave the two great traditions of language, philosophy and theology – for 
that is, in a sense, what the distinction between temporal and theological 
transcendence and immanence comes down to – alongside each other and 
extraneous to each other?361  Such an approach would be to echo the sensibilities of 
the third century theologian Tertullian: what has Athens to do with Jerusalem? - 
                                            
361Cf. Catherine Keller’s remarks on the transdisciplinary transcendence (and immanence) of 
philosophy and theology; Catherine Keller, “Rumors of Transcendence – The Movement, State and 
Sex of ‘Beyond’” In: John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (eds.), Transcendence and Beyond – A 
Postmodern Inquiry (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), p. 129, 130. 
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credo quia absurdum est!  In contemporary thought, such a sentiment would seem to 
be represented by Jean-Luc Marion.  He uses philosophical language, specifically 
transcendental thought, along the lines of Descartes, Husserl and Heidegger, to 
argue for the impossibility of God for man.362  Marion uses philosophical concepts to 
argue for the inaccessibility of theology to philosophy.  According to Marion: 
 
“[w]e will have to conclude, regarding God, that all we ever find is a triple 
impossibility – impossibility with regard to intuition; impossibility with regard to 
concept; and impossibility, therefore, with regard to experiencing the slightest 
phenomenon.”363 
 
Such an approach would seem to suggest that theology can use philosophical 
language – in Marion’s case, the notion of impossibility - to clarify its own position, 
but there is no room for philosophy intrinsic to theology.  What theology can do is to 
use philosophical concepts to argue for the ultra-transcendence of God. 
 
The attitude of “separative transcendence”364 between philosophy and theology is of 
course not restricted to a theology that wants to safeguard the absolute 
transcendence of God.  In a sense, the whole movement of secularisation that 
started with the advent of modernity is a movement to legitimise, in philosophical 
terms, the pushing away of God into a sphere absolutely transcendent to what is 
deemed “the natural”, and to eventually  dismiss theology, along with metaphysics, 
as philosophically passé.  Such an approach would be very congenial to a discourse 
of temporal transcendence in immanence that wants theological transcendence in 
immanence to remain transcendent from it, and therefore dismissible.   
 
Formulated in semiological terms, the question we have been asking is the following: 
would the conclusion drawn at the end of the conversation with Derrida not be that 
one simply has to choose between an approach that favours a transcendent pole in 
the deduction of meaning via the working of signs, and an approach that favours an 
                                            
362Jean-Luc Marion, “The impossible for Man – God” In: John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon 
(eds.), Transcendence and Beyond – A Postmodern Inquiry (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2007), p. 17 ff. 
363Ibid. p. 24. 
364Keller, Rumors of transcendence, p. 131. 
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immanent, inductive process in the intimation of meaning?  Should the conversation 
partners part ways with a respectful bow, having heard each other’s point of view, as 
well as the internal rationality of each view?   
 
The conclusion of this study is that such a state of affairs need not - in fact, should 
not - be the outcome of the conversation with Derrida on the meaning of space and 
time. To leave the two notions of transcendence in immanence, as they have been 
explored, lying separatively transcendent to each other would be precisely to ignore 
the experience of transcendence in immanence (an immanence pervaded by an 
other - open to a “more”) that each of the discourses seeks to thematise.  To opt for 
a post-dialectical, merely rhetorical act of persuasion would be to disregard the 
rhetorical moment in every act of dialectical reasoning, as well as the discursive 
reasoning involved in all rhetoric.   
 
Jacques Derrida himself has reacted with exasperation towards those who have 
pictured him as a frivolous non-cognitivist with no concern for truth or contexts, and 
has staunchly defended his firm belief in the validity of rational thought as such.  In 
his Limited Inc, he writes: “Once again (and this probably makes a thousand times I 
have had to repeat this, but when will it finally be heard, and why this resistance?) as 
I understand it the text … does not suspend reference to history, to the world, to 
reality.”365  The deconstructive process, while in a sense placing itself in opposition 
to the “history of the metaphysics of presence,” nevertheless also situates itself 
inside that history and shakes the foundations from the inside.  In doing so, says 
Derrida, “I try to respect as rigorously as possible the internal, regulated play of 
philosophemes or epistemes by making them slide – without mistreating them – to 
the point of their nonpertinence, their exhaustion, their closure.”366  In undermining 
the totalising violence committed by the metaphysics of presence, deconstruction 
thus makes use of the rationality on which much of this metaphysics is built – in a 
sense, against itself.  What emerges is therefore not irrationality but another 
rationality, another way of being in the world.  Any discourse against the 
metaphysics of the ‘centre’, and this includes deconstruction itself, cannot escape 
                                            
365
 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc (Evanston, Il.: Northwestern University Press, 1988) p. 137.  
366Derrida, Positions, p. 5. 
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collusion with the structure it seeks to undermine.”367  In the repetition and return of 
play, how could the phantom of the centre not call to us,” asks Derrida.368  The point 
is that the deconstructive process, in deconstructing that which, in a sense, is its 
other – spatialisation and totalisation – inserts itself within (that is, immanent to) that 
which it seeks to deconstruct, and shows the supplementarity, the openness, from 
within.   
 
If this is true of Derridean temporal transcendence in immanence, the same may be 
said of theological transcendence in immanence as it was conceived in this study.  
Western theological thought has a tradition of engagement with philosophical 
thought that seeks to enact a gesture of appropriation - a gesture whereby 
philosophical thought is inhabited, and yet also transcended: thus, a gesture of 
transcendence in immanence with regard to philosophy.  This point may be 
demonstrated with reference to the theological methodology of Thomas Aquinas, a 
figure who has been mentioned extensively throughout this study. 
 
Since very early on Christian theology has sought to utilise the grammar and 
concepts of philosophy to clarify the tenets of faith.  The tradition of the Sapientia 
Christiana, according to Rudi te Velde, a tradition that started with Augustine, 
incorporates philosophical speculation and rational thought into theology.369  Within 
this tradition, essentially characterised by a Christianising Platonism, philosophical 
reason gave up its formal autonomy and functioned in its search for wisdom and 
truth within the realm disclosed by what was accepted to be God’s revelation in 
Christ.  Philosophical thought served the development of the interior intelligibility of 
Christian wisdom, informed by the spiritual and religious sources of the Bible and the 
Church Fathers.  Te Velde outlines this tradition of theological appropriation of 
philosophy in order to contrast it to some extent with the approach of Thomas 
Aquinas, an approach towards the relationship between theology and philosophy 
that may perhaps be typified as transcendence in immanence.   
 
                                            
367
 Hugh Rayment-Pickard, Impossible God, p. 14. 
368Writing and Difference, p. 297. 
369Rudi teVelde, Aquinas on God – The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa Theologiae (London: Ashgate, 
2006), p. 5. 
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As has been noted before, the twelfth and thirteenth centuries saw the reintroduction 
of portions of the Aristotelian corpus that had hitherto been lost to Western thought.  
Under its influence, “reason” became emancipated from its previously restricted role 
as dialectical instrument regarding matters of faith.  Increasingly, “natural reason” 
came to be regarded as the foundation of the various philosophical disciplines – 
practical as well as theoretical – which cover all of natural and human reality.  The 
reintroduction of Aristotelian science and its seemingly naturalist interpretation of 
reality offered a serious challenge to theology and the way in which it dealt with 
philosophy.  According to Rudi te Velde, what we see in the work of Thomas Aquinas 
is a redefinition of Christian theology that formally separates it from philosophy and 
situates it as an independent science with its own principles based on divine 
revelation.370  Aquinas does not leave philosophy and theology to lie separatively 
transcendent to each other, however: 
 
“The theological project of the Summa marks itself off against the whole of 
philosophical disciplines, not by excluding and rejecting them as being foreign 
to its own revelation-based approach to the truth, but by incorporating 
philosophical (metaphysical) reason and at the same time limiting its scope 
from within.”371 
 
If the whole of finite reality is accepted to be the result of the creative activity of God, 
then this reality will in one way or another bear witness to that God of which it is the 
artefact.  This means that theology can, to some extent, leave philosophy to study 
nature, making use of the precepts of natural reason. This is rationality’s 
immanence.  Yet, at least for Thomas Aquinas, this does not amount to some kind of 
natural theology whereby natural reason can arrive at God and His attributes. The 
immanence of natural reason, while enjoying a relative autonomy, is always also 
transcended in the acceptance of the prior truths of revelation handed down by 
tradition.  Within Aquinas’ conception of the relationship between philosophy and 
theology, the role of philosophical reason would be to elucidate the internal 
intelligibility of theology, not the truth or falsity of the proposition “God exists.”372 
                                            
370Ibid. 
371Ibid. 
372Ibid. p. 20. 
191 
 
 
What Aquinas has done is to separate philosophy and theology in order to relate 
them again in a relationship of transcendence in immanence.  Theology, as it were, 
inhabits philosophy and goes along with its immanent analysis of being.  The 
rationality of the analysis contributes to the intelligibility of theology.  Theology itself, 
however, derives from the truths of revelation.  These are accepted beforehand and 
provide the destination towards which the arguments for intelligibility of the 
philosophical reasoning are oriented. Later in this chapter, the methodological model 
of transcendence in immanence as a way of understanding the relationship between 
Aristotle and Aquinas will be revisited. 
 
Thus far, it has been argued that the conversation with Derrida on the meaning of 
space and time, based on a shared experience of transcendence in immanence, 
should not be abandoned with the two interpretations of transcendence in 
immanence lying separatively transcendent to each other. Such an approach would 
seem to be contrary to the impulse inherent in deconstruction, and also contrary to a 
well attested impulse within the tradition of Christian theology (even if counter 
examples from the tradition could also be offered.)  Both partners in the present 
conversation would seem to favour an approach seeking some kind of 
transcendence in immanence when it comes to juxtaposed or differing points of view.  
In what follows, the possible playing out of such an approach, firstly upon the 
initiative of temporal transcendence in immanence, and thereafter upon the initiative 
of theological transcendence in immanence, will be investigated. 
 
 
5.2 Theologies of temporal transcendence in immanence 
 
For the most part, Derrida only addresses theology in passing.  The remarks that he 
makes in this regard, especially earlier on in his career, suggest that he deems 
theology to be a paradigmatic instance of a metaphysics of presence and that it 
should, therefore, be subject to the same operation of deconstruction.  In Derrida’s 
own words: 
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“Since it cannot be elevated into a master-word or concept, since it blocks 
every relationship to theology, différance finds itself enmeshed in the work 
that pulls it through a chain of other ‘concepts,’ other ‘words,’ other textual 
configurations.”373 
 
Hugh Rayment-Pickard has suggested that the situation with regard to Derrida’s 
relationship to theology is, however, not that simple.  According to him, it may be 
helpful to distinguish two applications of the term “theology” and to treat Derrida’s 
relationship to each on its own.374  On the one hand, the word “theology” may be 
used to label discourses about God.  Rayment-Pickard refers to this as the restricted 
sense of “theology” and states that this is only one of Derrida’s many philosophical 
interests.  On the other hand, the term “theology” may be used “to name the 
conditions of possibility of ‘all metaphysical determinations of truth’, whether God is 
explicitly invoked or not.”375  While the restricted sense of “theology” is mostly only 
dealt with in passing, the second sense – Rayment-Pickard calls this “general 
theology” – could be regarded as the core topic and organising theme with regard to 
Derrida’s entire project.  Rayment-Pickard goes on to explain what he has termed 
“general theology” in Derrida: 
 
“General theology embraces the belief, the explicit or implicit assertion, or the 
structural affirmation, that there is a central, or underlying, or over-arching, or 
essential, or inherent meaning to things.  So a belief in God would be one 
example of general theology, and Derrida does write specifically about theism, 
faith and religion.  But what we are calling ‘general theology’ here goes far 
beyond theism and formal religion: it extends to the conditions of possibility of 
the entire range of possible affirmations of the absolute.”376 
 
What is suggested here is that the word “theology” – in the general sense – should 
be viewed as an abbreviation of the expression “metaphysics of presence”.  
Understood in this sense, Derrida’s whole project has to do with theology, more 
specifically the deconstruction of theology.  Perhaps Rayment-Pickard’s intention 
                                            
373Positions, p. 38 (italics added). 
374Hugh Rayment-Pickard, Impossible God, p. 5. 
375Ibid.(The quotation is from Of Grammatology, p. 10.) 
376Ibid. p. 6. 
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with the expression “general theology” may be clarified by noting that Derrida uses 
the expression “onto-theology” to indicate the same semantic field: 
 
“The subordination of the trace to the full presence summed up in the logos, 
the humbling of writing beneath a speech dreaming its plenitude, such are the 
gestures required by an onto-theology determining the archaeological and 
eschatological meaning of being as presence, as parousia, as life without 
difference: another name for death, historical metonymy where God’s name 
holds death in check.”377 
 
While it can be agreed that theology, in the sense of general theology or onto-
theology, plays an important role in Derrida’s thought, it should also be noted that 
this conception of theology is identified in order to be deconstructed.  In this sense, 
theology has a diminished, even negative role to play as the necessary coagulation 
of meaning around an organising principle that is inherently non-identical to itself and 
that will inevitably give way to something different.  Is this kind of scapegoat role then 
the final word on theology in Derrida’s thought?  In his book Rayment-Pickard 
suggests that more may be said about Derrida’s theology.  He argues that even 
though unacknowledged by himself, Derrida’s work may be said to be theological. 
Theology is not only that which deconstruction sets itself up against - deconstruction 
itself may be understood to be theological.  Within this context Rayment-Pickard 
uses the word “theology” to refer to the positive point that Derrida is making through 
his work – even if that positive point is about the impossibility of making any final 
positive point.  According to this interpretation there is an implicit, and sometimes 
explicit, theology of the phenomenological tradition along the lines of Husserl.  
Derrida, in important ways influenced by Heidegger, deconstructs Husserlian 
phenomenology.  However, the deconstruction of phenomenology is still a kind of 
phenomenology, as it tries to show the undecideability between what is present and 
what is absent.  According to Rayment-Pickard, this undecideability or impossibility is 
precisely what Derrida’s theology is all about.  In the latter part of this chapter, this 
point will be returned to within the context of theological transcendence in 
immanence’s gesture of immanently inhabiting temporal transcendence in 
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immanence while yet transcending it theologically.  Firstly, however, an examination 
of the theological reception of Derrida’s thought is in order. 
 
Working within the legacy of Derrida, two divergent schools of thought may be 
identified with regard to the implications for theology of deconstruction.  These 
“schools” may be described in terms of their relationship to the theme of the death of 
God, present in so many words at least since Nietzsche.  On the one hand, there is 
the school of deconstruction that wants to leave God dead and buried.  The death of 
God is celebrated as the long awaited end of an epoch of metaphysics.  On the other 
hand, there is a school that sees in the death of God precisely the opening for God 
to emerge.  According to this train of thought, the death of God draws away the 
metaphysical blinds from our eyes and kindles an authentic desire for God.378  
Perhaps this divergence and undecideability is precisely what Derrida would have 
wanted regarding the interpretation of his legacy.  Martin Hägglund, already referred 
to earlier in this study, may be regarded as an exponent of the former school of 
Derrida interpretation.  Hägglund’s stated intention is quite clear: 
 
“Refuting the notion that there was an ethical or religious ‘turn’ in Derrida’s 
thinking, I demonstrate that a radical atheism informs his writing from 
beginning to end.”379 
 
Hägglund’s argument, well rehearsed in earlier chapters of this study, centres on the 
radical and thoroughgoing ontological immanence of Derrida’s thought.  
Ontologically speaking, there is nothing more than the flux of infinite finitude.  The 
experience of transcendence – real as it is - is a product of the temporal flux of 
infinite finitude.  Earlier on in this study such a notion, informed by a radically 
immanent ontology, was termed a “horizontal” transcendence in immanence. 
 
The first school of Derrida interpretation would thus, it seems, be comfortable with 
leaving theology transcendent to deconstruction and therefore leaving it behind 
together with the metaphysics of presence. It is the second school of Derrida 
                                            
378Transcendence and Beyond, p. 224. 
379Martin Hägglund, Radical Atheism – Derrida and the Time of Life(Stanford, California: Stanford 
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interpretation that is, seemingly, more congenial to theology, even to the point of 
interpreting deconstruction as a desire for God. Such an approach would see 
deconstruction inhabiting theology immanently in order to point to a “more” beyond 
traditional theological notions of transcendence.   
 
Mark C. Taylor may be regarded as one of the earlier exponents of a reception of 
deconstruction that appreciates it as containing rich resources for religious and 
theological reflection.  Taylor takes as his point of departure the theme of the death 
of God, and suggests that deconstruction is to be regarded as “the hermeneutic of 
the death of God.”380  In interpreting the meaning of the death of the transcendent, 
theistic God,381 Taylor develops the notion of marginality and liminality.382  What 
emerges in the wake of the deconstruction of theology is not atheism, although it is 
not theism either.  Taylor is interested in that borderline, liminal space between 
theism and atheism.  The notion that he wants to explore is a/theism, with specific 
emphasis on the “/” in such an a/theological approach. 
 
Clearly in line with Derrida’s thought, Taylor remarks that “a/theology” cannot be 
spoken, only written.  At this point the whole argument for viewing language, thought, 
signification and life itself first and foremost as writing – arche-writing – becomes 
pertinent.  As has been discussed in the third chapter of this study, writing is 
understood to be more than the mechanical act of inscribing markings in some kind 
of medium.  In itself writing manifests a new way of dealing with meaning.  The 
binary distinctions that are characteristic of a metaphysics of presence are subverted 
in favour of a process of contamination.  Signifier and signified cannot be separated 
completely, neither can corporeality and ideality, or identity and difference, and God 
and the world cannot be separated in any way.   
 
According to Taylor, as soon as a word is written, it creates a boundary to delimit 
some kind of territory of meaning.  However, the boundary of the word is porous - it 
is in fact a liminal space that invites transgression.  The word is a crossing to 
something else.  This marginality, liminality and porous borderline is what is 
                                            
380Mark C. Taylor, Erring – A Postmodern A/theology(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 
6. 
381Ibid. p. 104: “A/theology is in a large measure a critique of the notion of the transcendent God…” 
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presented in the “/” of a/theology.  It is in the undecideability, in the liminal territory of 
the “/” that Taylor intimates transcendence, even though he himself would not have 
named it as such.  Taylor himself prefers to speak of the “seminal openings” afforded 
by the bewildering undecideability that emerges in deconstruction’s wake.383  
Seminal textual openings, resisting every attempt at appropriation by a metaphysics 
of presence, are the traces of transcendence intimated by Taylor in the process of 
writing.  In his words: 
 
“When understood in this way, writing can be read as the divine milieu.  Along 
this middle way, writing of God repeatedly appears as the unending 
dissemination of the word.”384 
 
Taylor extends his deconstructive hermeneutic of the death of God to encompass a 
“radical Christology.”  Radical Christology involves a thought of incarnation 
understood in terms of Derrida’s notion of writing.  The divine is the incarnate word: 
 
“[T]his embodiment of the divine is the death of God.  With the appearance of 
the divine that is not only itself but at the same time other, the God who is 
alone God disappears…  Incarnation irrevocably erases the disembodied 
logos and inscribes a word that becomes the script enacted in the infinite play 
of interpretation.”385 
 
Radical Christology, radical incarnation means that there is no other God apart from 
the opening afforded by the supplementarity of meaning.  “God is what word means, 
and word is what ‘God’ means.  To interpret God as word is to understand the divine 
as scripture or writing.”386  Taylor then goes on to describe the implications of such 
an a/theology for anthropology, hermeneutics and ethics.  Under the rubric of 
“mazing grace”, he argues, in line with Derrida, for a radically ateleological, 
aneschatological ethics of play.387  This is a life of graceful wandering.  The notion of 
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wandering affords a concluding remark about the meaning of space and time that 
appear within Taylor’s a/theology.  According to Taylor: 
 
“The time and space of graceful erring are opened by the death of God, the 
loss of self, and the end of history.  In uncertain, insecure, and vertiginous 
postmodern worlds, wanderers repeatedly ask: ‘Whither are we moving? ... 
Are we plunging continually?  Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions?  
Is there still any up and down?  Are we not erring as through an infinite 
nothing?’  While the death of God is realized in the play of the divine milieu 
and the disappearance of the self is inscribed in markings and traces, history 
‘ends’ when erring ‘begins,’ and erring ‘begins’ when history ‘ends.’”388 
 
With regard to space and time, Taylor quite explicitly takes over Derrida’s notion of 
spacing, but interprets this, precisely, as the play of the divine.  In the becoming 
space of time and the becoming time of space, the divine is to be recognised.389 
 
Whereas Taylor’s notion of a/theology develops the notion of writing in order to 
propose a theology of transcendence in immanence that remains on the horizontal, 
immanent plane, John D. Caputo focuses specifically on the notion of temporality in 
Derrida, in order to situate transcendence on an horizontal plane.390  In an essay 
entitled “Temporal Transcendence – the very idea of àvenir in Derrida”, Caputo 
argues that in the past, whenever the question of time was raised, time was 
regarded as something to be transcended in order to arrive at the eternal.  However, 
ever since the question of time was opened up in a radical way by the likes of 
Husserl, Heidegger and Levinas, philosophers have become more interested not in 
the transcending of time, but in time as transcendence.391  Caputo concurs with what 
has been argued in the third chapter of this study, namely that such an approach to 
time as transcendence is also particularly true of Jacques Derrida and the enterprise 
                                            
388Ibid. p. 150, 151. 
389Ibid. p. 107. 
390For an extensive interpretation of Derrida in the direction of religious thought and theology, see 
John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1997). 
391John D. Caputo, “Temporal Transcendence – The Very Idea of àvenir in Derrida”  In: Caputo and 
Scanlon (eds.),  Transcendence and Beyond – A Postmodern Inquiry (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2007), p. 188. 
198 
 
of deconstruction.  In this regard, Caputo wishes to understand temporal 
transcendence in Derrida along the lines of the key concept of àvenir: 
 
“In Derrida, a certain quasi-transcendence, if there is such a thing in Derrida – 
if this were ever a word we could have enticed him into using in his own name 
… - is a function of the à venir.  In Derrida, a certain quasi-transcendence, or 
analogue or successor-form or side-effect of transcendence, some 
transcendence without transcendence, unfolding under the different 
circumstances and transferred dynamics of deconstruction, would refer then 
to an infinite self-transformation of our temporal lives, which we might also 
describe as the passion of existence.”392 
 
The structure of temporality in Derrida has already been investigated extensively.  
The question now is how Caputo uses this temporality in his theological reception of 
Derrida.  There is, Caputo suggests, in Derrida a certain passion associated with the 
expectation of a “to come” that will break into the world otherwise prone to 
homogenisation and the re-appropriation of difference.  This passion for the 
impossible is at the same time a passion for existence.  The passion evoked in 
awaiting the arrival of the impossible is “the spark that drives existence past itself 
and ignites a certain self-transforming.”393  This self-transforming is precisely what 
time is, what time does – if one is attuned to it.  Caputo continues by suggesting that 
this passion for existence may even be consciously expressed in desire, hope and 
prayer.394  According to him, this is the religious side of Derrida.  In summary, it may 
be said that the location of transcendence horizontally on the plane of immanence 
follows naturally from an understanding of the radical temporality of Derrida’s 
thought.  The divine is precisely the possibility of self-transformation opened up in 
the expectation of the impossible, unforeseen “to come.” 
 
The present section of this chapter has considered two attempts at relocating 
transcendence on the plane of immanence, namely those of Mark C. Taylor and 
John D. Caputo.  Both of these authors seek to effect a theological reception of 
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Derrida by conceiving a theology and a religiosity informed by temporal 
transcendence in immanence.  From the perspective of theological transcendence in 
immanence, as advanced in this study, it would, however, be possible to offer 
serious criticism of the proposal for a theology informed by temporal (horizontal) 
transcendence in immanence.  In the remainder of this section, four interrelated 
critical responses are discussed. 
 
In the first place, it can be asked whether temporal transcendence in immanence, 
despite its methodological objective, really inhabits the theological tradition of 
Christianity, in order to be able to transcend it towards some “new” theology.  In 
order to effect a gesture of transcendence in immanence, this approach, deriving 
from Derridean deconstruction, should first be immanent to - that is, at home in, the 
tradition of theology.  But is this so?  The first critical remark levelled at a theology 
informed by temporal transcendence in immanence is that it represents a radical 
break with the greatest and oldest streams within the tradition of Christian theological 
reflection.395 
 
Gianni Vattimo argues that the present secular situation of the West is the realization 
of the inner genius of Christianity, rather than a radical break with it.  According to 
Vattimo, at the centre of Christian theology lies the conviction that Jesus Christ has 
freed us from the Truth: 
 
“Having freed us from ‘objective’ Truth (that is to say, as Heidegger would say, 
from metaphysics) Jesus Christ has freed all religious experiences also – 
thereby reducing himself (reducing Christianity itself) and all these other 
religions to their basic essence.  The Christian tradition knows well the idea 
that Charity matters above all else”.396 
 
                                            
395In the second chapter of this study, it was argued that the advent of modernity presented a radical 
break with the foregoing intellectual climate and tradition.  Postmodernity may be taken to be an 
intensification of salient themes in modernity, as well as an increased self-critical awareness of 
rationality’s own relativity. 
396Gianni Vattimo, “Nihilism as Postmodern Christianity”.  In: John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon 
(eds.), Transcendence and Beyond – A Postmodern Inquiry (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
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Thus, according to this interpretation, the incarnation, as divine kenosis, in which 
God abandons his eternity and dwells among us in flesh and time, is worked out in a 
Christian tradition that abandons itself and works towards a world with no final truths 
- a world of charity.  The present situation of nihilism, in which terms such as 
religiosity, modernity, Christianity and even nihilism itself cannot be said to refer to 
an “object”, is precisely the outworking of the inner genius of Christianity and an 
indication of the direction in which further development should take place.  Of course 
it may be remarked here that a conviction about the inner genius of Christianity and 
about what the content of charity would entail refutes the other claim made, namely 
that these terms do not refer to anything objectifiable.  However, the broader critical 
remark has to do with the claim that a temporal or horizontal transcendence in 
immanence departs in a radical way from the broad tradition of Christian theological 
reflection.  As has been argued in the fourth chapter of this study, the narrative 
traditions of the Old and New Testaments testify to the encounter with a 
transcendent, personal God, who is yet intimately related to his creation - a God 
who, in fact, is closer to each creature than that creature is to itself.  The point is that 
a post-theistic, impersonal theology lies separatively transcendent to the main thrust 
of Christian theological reflection.  It is a valid and coherent point, but could it really 
be said to be theology, if the history and tradition of the word is taken into account? 
 
The second critical remark to be made with regard to theologies of temporal 
transcendence in immanence has to do with the overcoming (or transcending) of 
metaphysics.  As has been mentioned, there is a school of Derrida interpretation that 
sees in the death of God only the death of the metaphysical God.  Far from leaving 
theology dead and buried, the death of God only draws away the metaphysical 
blinds from our eyes and (re)awakens a desire for God.  However, with regard to this 
position, the following critical question must again be asked: can this be so?  Is it in 
any rigorous way possible to leave all metaphysical speculation behind?   
 
In his essay entitled Nihilism as Postmodern Christianity, which was referred to 
above, Vattimo makes the following point regarding modernity and post-modernity: if 
modernity is to be understood as that epoch which awakened to the historicality of 
truth, and if the Enlightenment is sensitive to the historical unfolding of truth, then 
post-modernity is the awareness of the plurality of unfolding truths: 
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“[T]he experience it has of the dissolution of metanarratives opens 
postmodernism to the understanding of myths, understood not as 
metaphysical truths, but as myths that cannot be truly denied by any absolute, 
or metanarrative, or reason.”397 
 
Thus, Vattimo would have us speak of a weak historicism, which knows that every 
“speaker” has no other resources outside his/her own history.  When speaking of our 
life and experiences we have no other recourse than to depend on the (his)stories – 
the myths – that feed our memories.  In other words, we know we are historically 
determined, but there is nothing to be done about it.  Yet, Vattimo still protests that 
these myths and histories we live by are qualitatively different from metaphysics.  
This notion, however, needs to be challenged.  If we cannot speak of our experience 
without recourse to myths and stories, then we have convictions about being that 
transcend the merely physical - in other words, they are meta-physical.  As has 
already been emphasised in the introductory chapter of this study, when intimating 
the meaning of something, there is always a horizon, a corpus of evidence that is 
accepted as self-evident, even if only for the moment.  However, this situation could 
and should be extended to thought in general: there is never simply uninterpreted 
experience, and the interpretation of experience involves the acceptance of some 
state of affairs as “how it is” - in other words, as being so.  Therefore, it is not 
possible to escape from metaphysics. 
 
Hugh Rayment-Pickard, in his interpretation of Derrida, makes a related point: 
despite positioning theology, and specifically general theology or onto-theology, as 
the paradigmatic example of a metaphysics of presence that is to be inhabited in 
order to be deconstructed, Derrida’s thought nevertheless may itself also be viewed 
as theological.  Even as Derrida argues for the “impossibility” of theology, he 
implicitly recommends the idea of the impossibility of God as an alternative 
theology.398  In the following quotation Rayment-Pickard elaborates on his 
suggestion: 
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202 
 
“What we see in Derrida’s writing is not a philosophy sui generis, but another 
philosophy in the broadly ‘phenomenological’ tradition which also embraces 
Husserl and Heidegger. … Thus Derrida tries to make a phenomenon of the 
impossibility of a phenomenology.  This whole enterprise takes place on the 
presupposition that we will be wiser for reading the philosophers concerned.  
No one can doubt that Derrida’s philosophy is a tremendously complicated 
and paradoxical turn in the development of phenomenology.  Yet who could 
suppose that Derrida is not trying to show us the truth, however 
problematized, and that his writing does not belong to this history of 
showing?”399 
 
However, if it is not possible to leave metaphysics behind, then it should be 
acknowledged that a notion of temporal transcendence in immanence is at least as 
metaphysical as theological transcendence in immanence.  The metaphysics that it 
derives from is simply a different metaphysics – the metaphysics of a purported 
radical ontological immanence. 
 
The third critical remark about temporal transcendence in immanence and its 
theological reception has to do with the freedom promised by such a militantly 
ateleological approach.  In the discussion on Mark Taylor’s theological interpretation 
of deconstruction, it has already been noted that his a/theology is explicitly 
ateleological and aneschatological.  The ceaseless change that is the reality of 
immanent finitude is not change in any specific direction - it is an aimless wandering 
or “erring.”  As part of this finitude, human beings should consciously embrace and 
celebrate the endless possibilities of becoming – this, precisely, is freedom, this is 
the divine moment. 
 
It should be noted that the freedom of endless becoming has a well attested 
philosophical lineage. It may be regarded as an outworking of the radical break 
announced by modernity with the teleological worldview preceding it.  The 
philosophical-theological synthesis effected in the high Middle Ages of tenets from 
classical thought with Christian faith held that the human will was, as it were, drawn 
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by desire towards the highest good (being God Himself.)  According to this 
worldview, the desire for the highest Good (and Truth and Beauty) is mediated 
through a desire for created goodness, truth and beauty, thereby presenting a kind of 
journey for the soul with, as its destination, the beatific vision of God.  The journey 
into the good is at the same time a journey into the true self.  Thus, as a created 
being grows to become more and more true to its created, natural purpose, so it also 
draws nearer - from its perspective - to the highest good, which is God himself (who, 
as Being itself, is closer to the creature than it is to itself.)  In terms of this worldview, 
to become free means to become more and more oneself – a journey that is at the 
same time a journey into God. 
 
With the advent of modernity the recognition of divine transcendence in immanence 
was replaced with a radical separation of transcendence and immanence in 
preparation of an outright rejection of ontological transcendence.  This in turn gave 
rise to the modern situation of an opposition between nature and freedom, an 
opposition that, in postmodern thought, resulted in a celebration of radical freedom.  
Postmodernism in many ways radicalised the modern preference for the historical as 
a progressive becoming free from nature.  Heidegger’s statement in Being and Time 
that the potential should be regarded as higher than the actual is representative of 
postmodernism’s emphasis on the pliability and endless potentiality of being.400 
 
An emphasis on endless potentiality goes hand in hand with temporal transcendence 
in immanence.  The question being asked here, however, is the following: what kind 
of freedom can such a notion deliver?  The reply should be that it is not freedom at 
all, but rather the bleakest unfreedom.  In a world devoid of all teleological 
orientation, finite creatures are left with endless potentiality. While some have argued 
that the endless becoming itself should simply be celebrated and enjoyed for what it 
is, the effect of potentiality without direction is rather a curling in upon itself of finite 
being.  The experience of being ecstatic – that is, of always not being identical to 
oneself – and yet of not having any destination to grow to, results in finite being 
attaching to one aspect or another of finite reality and circling around it in order to 
gain some kind of leverage.  Far from being radical freedom, endless potentiality 
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devoid of an orientation towards a final good results in finitude grasping at some 
aspect of its finite condition and attaching itself to it.  Finite ends are thus regarded 
and treated as ends in themselves, and buckle under the pressure.  The need for 
security, for example, curls in upon itself and becomes an attachment to power or a 
fixated paralysis through fear.  The need to sustain life becomes an inordinate 
attachment to pleasure for its own sake, or consumption for its own sake.  In short, 
the removal of ends, instead of releasing endless potentiality, endangers the 
potentiality of immanent beings.  This state of affairs has been appropriated with 
grim cynicism by the market forces of late modern consumer society.  On the one 
hand, consumers are continually being reminded of their endless potentiality: “be all 
that you want to be.”  On the other hand, consumer products, ever-changing and 
ever-increasing in scope, are provided to satisfy the need for existential attachment 
of finite beings that have nowhere to grow to.  The result of the noble sounding ideal 
of celebrating endless potentiality and endless becoming is a very mundane 
condoning of the status quo of late capitalist consumerism.   
 
All of this is not to say that a notion of theological transcendence in immanence, from 
whence the present criticism is directed, is not sensitive to becoming and potentiality.  
Although, ontologically speaking, theological transcendence in immanence holds that 
the potentiality of spatiotemporal finitude is directed towards an infinite actuality, 
namely being itself, it also maintains that the only experience finite beings have is 
the experience of spatiotemporal finitude, and therefore of potentiality.  As has been 
mentioned, created finitude is thus very much an experience of growing and of 
becoming.  Nevertheless, it is only because the end (the highest Good) is actually 
present, albeit it, from an epistemological perspective, only provisionally, that the 
ecstatic journey of finite beings can start at all.  Even though potentiality is given in 
experience, theological transcendence in immanence maintains that finite potentiality 
is directed towards an absolute actuality, which orients its journey.401  Because the 
actuality that draws finite potentiality towards it is the actuality of infinite being, this 
means that finite beings will never be able to encompass infinity.  There will always 
be scope for more variety, more diversity, and more difference.  Only, this is the 
difference of peace and harmony, the difference of proportion and progression.   
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The fourth and final critical remark levelled at the theological reception of temporal 
transcendence in immanence involves the actual relationship of transcendence and 
immanence in the sphere of finite reality.  More to the point, the issue here is 
whether any indication of a relationship between transcendence and immanence is 
given at all, or whether it is denied.  Deconstruction may be seen as speaking of a 
contamination of the immanent by the transcendent, albeit in a temporal manner: the 
present is not identical to itself - it is inhabited by an other that has the structure of an 
absolute past.  But what is the character of the “contamination” that deconstruction 
speaks of?  It seems that the contamination of the immanent by the transcendent is 
necessarily after the fashion of a relationless relation. Even though temporal 
transcendence in immanence is a thought of transcendence in immanence, it seems 
that transcendence and immanence do not have anything to do with each other, and 
this is necessarily so if the integrity of the coming of the other is to be safeguarded. 
In other words, even though deconstruction as temporal transcendence in 
immanence wishes to overcome the radical separation of transcendence and 
immanence effected by modern thought, whereby the latter strived to ensconce a 
static, spatialised form of presence, temporal transcendence in immanence only 
manages to propose a relationless intermingling of transcendence and immanence.   
 
In a certain way, deconstruction remains very much within the lineage of Kantian 
thought, with its strict delimitation of the noumenal from the phenomenal.  This is so 
despite deconstruction showing the futility of a critique that seeks to establish the 
boundaries of reason in such a way that it would cover the phenomena rendered by 
experience without remainder.  While the distinction between the noumenal and the 
phenomenal, as proposed in Kant’s First Critique, remains pertinent to the 
discussion, it has been pointed out that Kant’s separation of the sublime from the 
beautiful in the Third Critique presents a very clear indication of the way in which 
postmodern thought continues a certain Kantian legacy.402  For Kant, judgements of 
beauty disclose a certain subjective purposiveness in nature.  The subjectivity of the 
                                            
402Cf. the discussion of the Kantian sublime by John R. Betz, “Beyond the Sublime: the Aesthetics of 
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judgements lies in the feelings of a pleasurable accord between nature and mind 
with which they are associated. However, the objects in nature are not in themselves 
beautiful.  Rather, they charm the imagination because they entertain its free play.  
In the end, therefore, Kantian judgements of beauty do not really reach an “other” 
apart from subjective thought, but remain occasions of auto-affection.  Alongside this 
conception of beauty stands the Kantian notion of the sublime.  Whereas the 
beautiful is conceived as that which delights the faculties and which evinces a 
harmonious interplay of the understanding and the imagination, the sublime is 
described as the occasion where the rawness of nature raises its head in defiance of 
every attempt at the intimation of harmony and order.  The sublime is associated 
with abyssal experiences - in other words, experiences of such magnitude or sheer 
overwhelming force that they are unfathomable by the categories of human reason.  
While it is doubtful that the Kantian sublime was ever intended to indicate some kind 
of move beyond the confines of transcendental philosophy that would break open a 
passage into ontology, it is precisely the absolute otherness of the sublime that is 
emphasised in postmodern receptions of Kant’s aesthetics.403  In the words of John 
R. Betz: 
 
“One of the most salient features of postmodern readings of the sublime is 
that the sublime figures as a kind of ‘promised land’, a place of prophetic 
refuge, because it registers an aesthetic break with every economy of 
representation.”404 
 
Thus, in postmodern thought the sublime is associated with the arrival of the 
absolute other.  This is also true of the way in which the transcendent is conceived 
within temporal transcendence in immanence.  Even though there is no constellation 
that can remain immanently closed in upon itself, as it is always inhabited by a 
transcendent other, the other remains an absolute other.  There is no relationship 
between the immanent and the transcendent, and as has been stated before, this is 
deemed necessary in order to safeguard the otherness of the other, lest it be 
appropriated within the immanent economy of the “same.”   
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The ethical concern for the integrity of the other as other has been the main focus of 
the work of Emmanuel Levinas.  For him every other is completely other, and the 
recognition of this fact places an enormous ethical burden on the conceiving subject.  
While criticising Levinas’ conception of the infinite, Derrida nevertheless, in important 
ways takes over the Levinasian maxim of l’autre est tout autre.  The point is that as 
part of the postmodern reception of the Kantian sublime, and taking over from 
Levinas an emphasis on the absolute otherness of the other, the relationship 
between transcendence and immanence within a notion of temporal transcendence 
in immanence may be described as one of asymmetrical non-reciprocity.  The 
relationship is firstly asymmetrical, since the emphasis is placed on the arrival of the 
other.  The immanent constellation is passive - it is subject to the inexorable flow of 
temporality and therefore to the arrival of the transcendent.  However, and more 
important for this discussion, the relationship is the non-relationship of non-
reciprocity.  The arrival of the transcendent other evokes no answer from the 
immanent constellation that is affected by it.  It is simply affected by it and therefore 
gives way to a new constellation that in its turn is affected by being originally 
contaminated with a transcendent other.  There can be no mention of any kind of 
community between the transcendent and the immanent.  And while this, in some 
quarters, may be regarded as the apex of ethical behaviour, the resultant worldview 
is one of atomised individuals who are continually being split more and more in the 
infinite flux of temporality.  What remains is, in effect, nothing, except for temporality 
itself.  Nothing prevents the ethical treatment of the other as other from sinking into 
mere indifference: directionless change is simply regarded as what happens. With 
regard to the meaning of space and time within such a worldview, the conclusion 
already reached in earlier chapters may be restated: space and time are indifferent 
categories - spacing is what happens; entropy increases. 
 
In contrast to the asymmetrical non-reciprocity resulting from temporal 
transcendence in immanence, the approach of theological transcendence in 
immanence could be said to be one of asymmetrical reciprocity.  Whereas the 
relationship between God and finite creation is deemed to be asymmetrical – 
creation is radically contingent and dependent; God is self-subsistent Being – there 
is nevertheless reciprocity.  Finite creation is the effect of God’s creative intention 
and, in being the effect of which God is the cause, creation participates after a 
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fashion in the being of God.  The transcendence that immanent creation is pervaded 
by is not thought in terms of strangeness, but in terms of community.  Even though 
divine transcendence is always more, infinitely more, than may be grasped in finite 
thought, the participation of finite immanence in divine transcendence implies that 
the power at work in creation is one of a drawing towards God, and not merely of a 
frightened running away upon the arrival of an absolute other.  Creation, and 
especially consciousness, is filled with a desire to grow towards its created goal, and 
as a result of grace, even past its created goal towards deification.  This is its 
reciprocal giving of itself to God in response to God’s gift of creation. 
 
Conceiving of the relation between transcendence and immanence in terms of 
reciprocity and community has important implications for ethics and social theory, as 
well as for aesthetics.  On the one hand, the interval that separates the self from the 
other may be regarded as a harmonious interval.  The otherness of the other may be 
celebrated precisely on the basis of shared creatureliness.  With regard to 
aesthetics, a transcendence in immanence viewed on the basis of a reciprocity 
between transcendence and immanence may afford the opportunity of once again 
appreciating beauty.  All experiences of beauty would not have to be suspected of 
being subjective projections upon the canvass of an unfathomable abyss.  Prior to 
conscious thought, there is already a relationship between transcendence in 
immanence that allows for proportionality in temporal progression, as well as 
progression in spatial proportion.  In other words, prior to subjective thought, there is 
already a relationship between transcendence and immanence that is beautiful.   
 
In this section, the possibility of temporal transcendence in immanence appropriating 
theology and thereby inhabiting it according to the methodology of transcendence in 
immanence has been explored.  As it stands, the prospects for such an approach do 
not look favourable.  Four interrelated critical responses have been broached, to whit 
the strangeness of temporal transcendence in immanence to the main tradition of 
Christian theology, the impossibility of a final overcoming of metaphysics, the 
implications of the conception of freedom as unbridled potentiality associated with 
temporal transcendence in immanence, and, finally, the implications of the non-
relationship of asymmetrical non-reciprocity between transcendence and 
immanence, as found in temporal transcendence in immanence. 
209 
 
 
In the final section of this chapter, the converse possibility will now be considered, 
namely that of somehow appropriating the insights of temporal transcendence in 
immanence into a broader view of theological transcendence in immanence, thereby 
inhabiting it according to the methodology of transcendence in immanence.   
 
 
5.3 Theological transcendence in immanence 
 
Whereto the conversation with Jacques Derrida?  Thus far, it has been argued that 
the notion of transcendence in immanence, according to its very methodology, so to 
speak, is unwilling to accept the differing interpretations of temporal transcendence 
in immanence and theological transcendence in immanence as remaining 
completely transcendent to each other - that is, as simply being juxtaposed to each 
other as different.  Rather, transcendence in immanence would seek to relate the 
two interpretations of transcendence in immanence in a relation of transcendence in 
immanence. The possibility of temporal transcendence in immanence appropriating 
theology (as it were), and explaining the divine in terms of temporal transcendence in 
immanence, was subsequently explored and rejected.  However, that leaves the 
possibility of theological transcendence in immanence inhabiting temporal 
transcendence in immanence, while also transcending it in a properly theological 
gesture. 
 
The final part of this study suggests that the possibility of theological transcendence 
in immanence appropriating temporal transcendence in immanence and inhabiting it 
after the fashion of transcendence in immanence is indeed viable and a suitable 
provisional conclusion to the conversation with Jacques Derrida.405  This will be 
argued primarily on the grounds of the content of the notion of theological 
transcendence in immanence itself, and secondly with reference to an historical 
precedent to such a gesture in the work of Thomas Aquinas.  In what follows, the 
methodology of transcendence in immanence, as materially contained in the work of 
                                            
405The conclusion is provisional, because in a sense, the conversation between the two positions is 
truly interminable.  It may always be possible to view the synthesis reached by the present study as a 
totality that auto-deconstructs, as it is already inhabited by its other. 
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Thomas Aquinas, will be investigated.  The study ends with an exploration of the 
possibility of achieving a similar gesture with regard to the Derridean manifestation of 
the phenomenological tradition.   
 
During the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, Christianity in the West was faced 
with a challenge in the form of the discovery of a large part of the Aristotelian corpus 
that had, since antiquity, fallen into obscurity.  Up until then, Christian intellectual 
labour was mainly approached in terms of the venerable tradition of Sapientia 
Christiana, according to which the role of reason was simply to expound the truths of 
revelation using philosophical concepts.406  Aristotelian philosophy, however, 
presented theology with an intellectual approach that was much more “immanent”, in 
that it sought to understand nature on the basis of experience and reasoned 
principles, and not primarily in terms of revelation.  In the face of this altered 
situation, Christian theology could, and in quite a few of its exponents did, react by 
emphasising the sole legitimacy of revealed truth, thereby denying immanent 
experience and reason any legitimacy whatsoever.  This could be interpreted as a 
response whereby transcendence overrules immanence.  On the other hand, 
theology could react with what would amount to capitulation before an emancipated 
reason, and could seek to reinvent itself as “natural theology” - in other words, as a 
theology that only accepts propositions pertaining to the divine that are in line with 
“natural” reason.  Had this been the case, a completely autonomous immanent 
sphere would seemingly have emerged.407  The fascinating and remarkable feat of 
Thomas Aquinas was that he rejected both of the previous options in favour of a third 
approach.  Aquinas saw that the emancipation of natural reason could yet prove to 
be a powerful ally within a broadened project of Christian intellectual labour.  In the 
words of Rudi te Velde: 
 
“The theological project of the Summa [Theologiae] marks itself off against the 
whole of philosophical disciplines not by excluding and rejecting them as 
                                            
406Rudi te Velde, Aquinas on God – The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa Theologiae (London: 
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way in which Thomas Aquinas incorporated Aristotle. 
407The possibility for a completely secular immanent sphere also rears its head in the first scenario, 
namely that of theology denying reason and created nature any legitimacy whatsoever.  If created 
nature is denied any role at all, it becomes a simple matter of inverting this position in order to deny 
any transcendence whatsoever. 
211 
 
being foreign to its own revelation-based approach to the truth, but by 
incorporating philosophical (metaphysical) reason and at the same time 
limiting its scope from within.”408 
 
What Aquinas did was to try and relate the revealed truths of the Christian faith with 
the more self-contained, immanent approach of Aristotelian philosophy, in such a 
way that theology inhabits and makes use of metaphysical reasoning while still 
incorporating it into a bigger picture of creation’s relation to the transcendent Divine.  
According to such a scheme of transcendence in immanence reason has its own 
limited autonomy.  Reason cannot be used to prove the existence of God or man’s 
relation to God without the knowledge that faith is.  And yet the precepts of reason 
do have a relative autonomy, being part as they are of a creation that has been 
granted an existence outside of God.  While reason cannot prove the existence of 
God, or force any conclusions about God solely on the basis of its logical analysis of 
experience, reason can be used to argue for the intelligibility of the Christian belief in 
God and the other doctrines of faith that accompany it. 
 
Thus, Aquinas simply accepts revelation. He does not try to prove (at least not in any 
modern, scientific sense) the existence of God who reveals himself, or the state of 
the world as being fallen and redeemed in Christ.  What Aquinas does is to explore 
how such a state of affairs can be intelligible or possible, based on the precepts of 
reason informed by experience of the natural world.  To this end, Aquinas explores 
and elaborates on the sacra doctrina of the Christian religion.  This “divine science” 
of the Summa Theologiae could be understood as the practical outworking of the 
notion of transcendence in immanence, since, on the one hand, it seeks to define 
itself properly as a science in terms of the Aristotelian understanding of a science409, 
and on the other hand, it only seeks to manifest the intelligibility of revealed truth, 
which it accepts beforehand.  Once again, in the words of Rudi te Velde: 
 
“Being a scientia, sacred doctrine is not restricted to factual revelation.  
Rather, it considers the whole of reality under the aspect of the intelligibility 
                                            
408Aquinas on God, p. 5. 
409
 “A science is, essentially, cognition ex principiis – cognition of propositions (conclusions), the truth 
of which depends logically on prior propositions, which are known through themselves (principles).”  
Te Velde, Aquinas on God, p. 23.  
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things have when seen in the light of God’s revelation.  On the one hand, one 
must acknowledge an essential distinction between philosophical knowledge 
and the knowledge of sacred doctrine.  On the other hand, the diverse 
disciplines of rational knowledge are subsumed by, and integrated in, the 
higher and more comprehensive intelligibility of the scientia of sacred doctrine.  
Sacred doctrine is not a science about a different reality; it is about the same 
reality, but seen under a different formality.  The different intelligible aspects of 
reality that are disclosed and studied by the philosophical disciplines of human 
reason are included in this science in a more unified and comprehensive 
manner, notwithstanding the fact that its formal point of view is only accessible 
for humans through faith.”410 
 
Thomas’ approach, as it appears in the above quotation, is truly remarkable.  This 
approach accepts that human reason only has access to nature by means of 
experience, whereby an immanent domain is in fact marked off.  Equally, it accepts 
that the propositions of reason, in seeking to explain experience, should be true to its 
own nature, in being finite and immanent.  At the same time, it accepts – on the 
basis of faith in revelation – that the whole of this finite, immanent reality should be 
viewed as a creation that is the result of the work of a creator, and that is radically 
dependent for its existence on the sustained care of God.411  While this does not 
alter the functioning of the individual operations of reason, it does affect reasoning as 
a whole.  Now the entire existence of reason, as it experiences nature, may be taken 
to be connected to the transcendent reality – God – that relates to and cares for 
creation. From within reason itself there is no compelling reason to reject the 
possibility of such a configuration.  It is just as rational to imagine a transcendence 
that inhabits and affects immanent reality as a whole as it is, based on experience, to 
imagine a reality comprised only of finite immanence.  
 
Commenting on the epistemological situation of, on the one hand, a prior acceptance 
of revelation, and on the other hand, an a priori exclusion of the possibility of conflict 
                                            
410Ibid., p. 27. 
411Eric Alliez describes the epistemological situation of a prior acceptance of revelation as follows: “… 
a ratio fide illustrata whose resolutio depends upon a single truth excluding a priori all hiatus between 
the truth of philosophy and the truth of revelation…”  Eric Alliez, Capital Times – Tales from the 
Conquest of Time, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1996), p. 189. 
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between experience and the truth of revelation, John Milbank mentions that Aquinas 
was able to draw from the tradition of Christian Platonism, which he inherited via 
Augustine and Anselm.412  Plato already grappled with the so-called Meno 
problematic, or the necessity of, in a sense, already having to know something in 
order to be able to know it.  According to Milbank: 
 
“… for Aquinas, since a priori reasonings to God are refused, and 
straightforward a posteriori inductions are equally impossible, discursive 
reasoning about God must presuppose a disclosure of God to our intellectus, 
which enjoys a very remote participation in the divine immediacy of vision.”413 
 
Thus, the disclosure of God to our human intellect is to be understood as a dim and 
unquantifiable participation in God’s own science.  For Thomas, sacra scriptura is, in 
important ways, what is to be understood when speaking of divine revelation, but 
then as read, manifested and performed, because the Bible was not yet taken to be 
a discrete, foundational and merely written text.414  To understand how the 
acceptance of divine revelation can – perhaps even more importantly - be a real 
participation in God’s own science, it may be helpful to bear in mind how Thomas  
regarded God’s presence to creatures.  John Milbank explains that Aquinas 
approached God’s presence to creation under the heading of divine substance, and 
that this emphasises the fact that, according to Aquinas, God’s omnipresence simply 
is God himself.  There really cannot be any other “being” than God.  However, on the 
other hand, following Dionysius, Thomas asserts that on account of his goodness, 
God somehow exists outside of himself.  This impossible self-exteriorisation explains 
how there can be something other than God participating in God, when God is in 
himself the fullness of being.  Thus, the dim, intuitive intellection that is the 
participation in the immediacy of the divine vision, is not something different from the 
tradition that is read and performed in Scripture.  At this point, Milbank comments 
that the participation of human intellect – dim, unquantifiable – in the divine presence 
is already grace.  Creation is, as it were, en-graced from the beginning.  Grace is not 
only added later.  Even while the “autonomy” of human reason is respected, this 
                                            
412Milbank, Truth in Aquinas, p. 36, 37. 
413Ibid. p36. 
414Ibid. p. 43.  Cf. Peter M. Candler Jr., Theology, Rhetoric, Manuduction, or reading scripture 
together on the path to God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006) p. 21 ff. 
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autonomy is in reality no autonomy at all - it is from the outset only able to function 
because of grace.415 
 
It is the contention of this study that, on this high level, Thomas Aquinas’ approach 
towards reason, especially as represented by Aristotelian metaphysics, could be 
fruitfully emulated in the conversation with deconstruction and temporal 
transcendence in immanence.  However, some further explanatory remarks on the 
“method” of transcendence in immanence employed by Aquinas will first be made. 
 
In the course of discussing the function of the negative in Thomas’ thought, Te Velde 
makes the following statement: 
 
“What is God?  What is it to be divine?  In dealing with these questions 
Thomas never loses sight of the human standpoint from which the search for 
intelligibility of God is undertaken.  For him there is no point of view ‘from 
nowhere’ (Nagel).  The inquiry about God assumes a typically dialectical 
character inasmuch as human thought starts from what is better known to us 
in order to proceed to what is better known by nature.  That from which our 
knowledge of reality takes its starting-point does not coincide with that from 
which reality itself takes its starting point.  What is needed, thus, is a 
mediation between the order of knowledge, proceeding from effect to cause, 
and the order of being, proceeding from cause to effect.  In other words we 
come to knowledge of God through something else (per effectum) in such a 
way that God is known as that primary being through which all other things 
are”.416 
 
This distinction between the epistemological modus in which thought cannot but 
proceed, and the ontological modus that is the reality about which knowledge is to be 
gained runs like a theme throughout the Summa Theologiae.  Whereas we humans 
cannot but use discursive reasoning, on another level the ontological reality of that 
which is the cause of all that we experience is assumed.  According to Te Velde’s 
                                            
415Truth in Aquinas, p. 37. 
416
 Te Velde, Aquinas on God, p. 66. 
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analysis, it is the underlying assumption of the fivefold way (quinque via) of arguing 
towards the existence of God: 
 
“’That God exists can be proved in five ways’, Thomas claims with full 
confidence at the beginning of the text in which he sets out to prove the 
existence of God.  In a variety of ways is can be shown that things perceptible 
to the senses, which are better known to us, are indeed ‘effects’ depending on 
an absolute and primary reality as their cause.  Each of the arguments is 
based on a general ontological feature of sensible reality, in which an 
essential dependency on something else is implicated: (1) what moves is 
being moved by something else; (2) each efficient cause depends on a prior 
cause; (3) what is contingent depends on what is necessary; (4) there are 
degrees of perfection, which requires a maximum and (5) natural things show 
in their operations that they are directed to an end, but not by themselves.  All 
five arguments follow a common pattern insofar as they reason from effect to 
cause.”417 
 
The distinction between the order of knowledge and the order of reality also finds 
expression in Thomas’ treatment of God’s characteristics.  According to Te Velde: 
 
“God cannot be known by human reason except indirectly from the world of 
sensible things, Thomas asserts.  This indirect route from creatures to God is 
based on causality since, insofar as sensible things are known to be effects of 
God, they lead us to the knowledge of the existence of God as their cause 
together with the knowledge of what must necessarily belong to God, ‘as the 
first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by him.’  What we are to 
know of God, ascending in this way from the sensible effects to their 
transcendent cause, is: first, that He is the cause of all things; second, that 
creatures differ from him inasmuch as He is not one of his effects and, third, 
that God differs, not by reason of lacking some perfection, but because he 
exceeds all his effects in perfection.  This is, in effect, Thomas’ elaborated and 
refined version of the triplex via according to causality, remotion and 
                                            
417Ibid., p. 47. 
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eminence, which he discerns as underlying Dionysius’ approach of God in De 
divinis nominibus.” 
 
The distinction and interrelation between the order of knowledge and the order of 
reality is another way of expressing the notion of transcendence in immanence.  The 
immanent realm opened up by the order of knowledge, which is to say by the 
operation of reason, is understood according to the best epistemological practices of 
the day (which, in Aquinas’ case, was the philosophy of Aristotle).  However, this 
does not preclude the acceptance of another order, the order of reality, as primary.  
According to this notion, there is more to reality than can be discerned by reason 
alone, and this greater reality in fact makes what is discerned by reason intelligible.  
From the perspective of the order of reality, all immanence is pervaded by the 
transcendence that it participates in, and is radically dependent on the same 
transcendence, of which it is the effect.   
 
The notion of transcendence in immanence, as explained in terms of the distinction 
between the order of knowledge and the order of being, is also used by Aquinas in 
order to explain the operation of language.  It is here that the notion of analogy 
comes into play.  Analogy is central to Thomas’ proposal of a solution to the question 
of how the words of language that belong properly to the sphere of finite immanence 
can refer to the infinite and transcendent God.418  Rudi te Velde introduces his 
treatment of analogy in Aquinas by placing it within the context of the Aristotelian 
semantic triangle of reality, knowledge and language (res – ratio – nomen.)  Because 
the order of reality is pre-accepted and given priority, the relationship between 
language and extra-mental reality is not as significant a problem as it has become 
since the epistemological turn associated with modernity.  On the other hand, 
according to Thomas, there is also no immediate access of language to reality.  The 
order of knowledge cannot be discounted: 
 
“The basic relation of signification (a nomen signifies a res) is mediated 
through concepts of thought by which a thing is conceived to be such and 
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such.  A thing is always signified according to how it is known and conceived 
by us.”419 
 
In the signification of words, one has to, therefore, distinguish between the two 
aspects of res and ratio.  In asking how designations such as “good”, “wise” and 
“beautiful”, deriving as they do from the world of finite experience, can be used to 
designate the transcendence of God, Aquinas furthermore stresses the fundamental, 
unquantifiable disproportion between res and ratio.  The ratio of the names does not 
succeed in adequately representing to the human intellect the res as it is in God.  On 
the other hand, the disproportion between res and ratio should not be regarded as 
an unbridgeable gulf between the immanence of human language and the 
transcendence of God.  Thomas’ intention is precisely to show how the actual 
speaking about God in the Christian tradition can be understood as a speaking, 
properly and intelligibly, about God.420  The point is that some names are positively 
affirmed of God, even while the way in which their meaning is conceived by human 
reason (the aspect of the ratio) should be regarded as insufficient. This must then be 
followed by a reaffirmation by which the name’s meaning (the aspect of res) is 
posited, as in God himself, in a manner that goes beyond our understanding.  “The 
transcendence of God and the immanence of language are not allowed to fall apart; 
they must be kept together in terms of a semantic relation of transcendence-in-
immanence, following the transcending immanence of God in his creatures.”421  Thus 
analogy as understood by Thomas, especially with regard to speaking the divine 
names, is another way of saying “transcendence in immanence”.   
 
The above discussion is, of course, not nearly enough to do justice to the breadth 
and scope of the Thomistic project. The aim of the above remarks has been to 
highlight a certain approach or methodology.  Whereas the Aristotelian philosophy of 
his day could have been regarded as an atheistic422 threat to Christian faith in God, 
                                            
419Ibid. p. 99. 
420Ibid. p. 102. 
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422Williston Walker refers to the development in the later thirteenth century of a radical Aristotelianism, 
the so- called Latin Averroism, which emerged from the influence of the Islamic philosopher, Ibn-
Rushd (Averroës).  This line of thought regarded Aristotle as supreme among the teachers of truth 
and was puzzled by the efforts to reconcile Christian revelation with an Aristotelian reason shorn of its 
Neoplatonic (theistic and mystical) accretions.  Best known amongst these “radical” Aristotelians were 
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Thomas sought to validate Aristotelianism while situating it within a broader frame of 
reference, and thereby limiting it from within.   
 
At this point, it should be remarked that, on the one hand, the historical situation in 
the thirteenth century was such that Thomas’ synthetical approach was by no means 
the only option available423, and, on the other hand, that modern scholarship also 
remains ambiguous with regard to the possibilities and parameters of such a 
synthesis. The first remark may be illustrated by highlighting the attitude of 
Bonaventure, general of the Franciscan order, towards Aristotle.  Early in the 
thirteenth century, in response to the nascent Aristotelianism, Pope Gregory IX 
urged Catholic theologians not to allow theology to be placed under the authority of 
its servant (philosophy).  What the Pope called for was an engagement with 
Aristotelianism, rather than allowing it to become the exclusive remit of the Faculties 
of Letters at the newly formed universities.  Thus, Bonaventure, following his 
masters, Alexander of Halés and Jean de la Rochelle, initially assumed a great part 
of Aristotle’s heritage.  However, when faced with the very real possibility of an 
autonomous and heterodox Aristotelianism, Bonaventure modified his attitude and 
denounced “in an eschatological and apocalyptic sense, every philosophy 
independent of revelation that would wish to snatch us from the hands of the royal 
fiancée of Christian wisdom.”424  Eventually this impulse developed into a proper 
neo-Augustinianism, separatist and harking back to the older tradition of sapientia 
Christiana.  For a time this alternative approach towards Aristotelianism also had the 
theological upper hand, as witnessed in the famous condemnations of 1277. 
 
Even after the rehabilitation of the angelic doctor and his elevation to the status of 
doctor ecclesiae, a tradition suspicious of classical philosophy in general and 
Aristotelianism in particular remained alive and well in subsequent centuries.  
According to Alasdair Macintyre, Luther, for example, was an heir to this tradition, to 
                                                                                                                                        
two masters in the arts faculty at Paris in the 1260s and 1270s, Siger of Brabant and Boetius of 
Dacia.  (Walker, A History of the Christian Church, p. 334); cf. also Alliez, Capital Times, p. 191, 192. 
423Alasdair Macintyre goes as far as to suggest that Aquinas’ treatment of Aristotle should be 
regarded as “highly deviant” within the context of his time.  Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue – 3d 
edition(London: Duckworth, 2007), p. 178. 
424Alliez, Capital Times, p. 191. 
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the extent that he would have remarked about Aristotle that the latter was a buffoon 
who had misled the church.425 
 
The second remark, to the effect that contemporary Thomistic scholarship also 
remains undecided about the felicity of Aquinas’ transcendence-in-immanence 
approach to philosophy, may be corroborated with reference to the positions of 
Etienne Gilson and Alasdair Macintyre. On the one hand, in line with Gilson, the 
emphasis may be placed on the irreducibility of theology and philosophy to each 
other in Aquinas’ thought.  In the preface to the sixth edition of Le Thomisme, Gilson 
states that in dealing with Thomas’ philosophy, “I continue to insist on the essentially 
theological character of Thomas’ teaching but I maintain more than ever that his 
theology by its very nature includes not only in fact but necessarily a strictly rational 
philosophy.”426  While Thomas’ theology includes a philosophy, each approach has 
its own integrity and any engagement with Thomas’ thought should speak both 
languages, but each on the appropriate occasion (as Thomas himself does, 
according to Gilson.)427  Whereas it is, according to Gilson, just as wrong to think 
that Thomas radically separates the domains of theology and philosophy as it is to 
think that he confuses them, Gilson nevertheless maintains that theology and 
philosophy are two formally distinct domains in Thomas’ thought.428 
 
On the other hand, Alasdair Macintyre seems to hold a position that allows for the 
mutual inter-penetration of the theological and philosophical in Thomas’ thought.  
The following quotation from Whose Justice? Which Rationality? is illuminating: 
 
“I also argued earlier that Aquinas does not merely supplement Aristotle, but 
that he shows Aristotle’s account of the teleology of human life to be radically 
defective.  That radical defectiveness in understanding turns out in the light of 
these sections of the Summa to be, on Aquinas’ view, not only or so much a 
radical defectiveness in Aristotle’s account as a radical defectiveness in that 
natural human order of which Aristotle gave his account.  A strong thesis 
                                            
425After Virtue, p. 165, 167. 
426Etienne Gilson, Thomism – The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, translated by Laurence K. Shook 
and Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002), p. xiii. 
427Ibid. p. 10. 
428Ibid. p. 20, 23. 
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about the inadequacies and flaws of the natural human order emerges, so that 
the relationship of Aquinas’ Aristotelianism to his allegiance to Augustine 
appears in a new light.  The Augustinian understanding of fallen human nature 
is used to explain the limitations of Aristotle’s arguments, just as the detail of 
Aristotle often corrects Augustine’s generalizations”.429 
 
A salient point to be made here is, therefore, that Aquinas also often reads Aristotle, 
as it were, against himself.  Aquinas reads Aristotle in ways that are very different to 
the original pathos of the Stagirite.  According to Macintyre, this is evidenced, for 
example, by the way in which the four cardinal virtues of Aristotelian ethics are 
changed upon the introduction of the Christian virtue of charity.430 
 
Far from jeopardising the methodology of transcendence in immanence identified in 
Aquinas, these two positions of modern Thomistic scholarship – most probably 
presented in a somewhat stereotypical manner – rather serve to further elucidate it.  
On the one hand, it is indeed the case that philosophy and theology are formally 
separate domains. They may not even always be absolutely congenial to each other. 
Both formally and possibly with regard to material content, theology and philosophy 
are in a certain sense transcendent to each other.  The initial condemnation of 
Aquinas’ theology by the most conservative theological currents of his day clearly 
shows that there are and should be limits to Thomistic intrinsicism. 
 
On the other hand, the methodology of theological transcendence in immanence is 
precisely also one of transcendence not left lying separatively transcendent, but of 
also pervading immanence.  The point to be made here is that it is not possible to 
establish to what extent transcendence changes immanence and to what extent it is 
left with its own integrity.  The relationship between transcendence and immanence 
is unquantifiable.  Whereas it is evident that Aquinas sometimes reads Aristotelian 
philosophy against itself, it is also true that he granted a certain relative autonomy to 
reason and wanted to work according to experience and the precepts of reason.  
                                            
429Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1988), p. 205. 
430After Virtue, p. 174.  This is not to say that Etienne Gilson maintained that Aquinas left all of 
Aristotelian philosophy unchanged.  Cf. Thomism, p. 20 on “the transcending influence of faith on 
reason”. 
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The most prudent approach would be to agree with Rudi te Velde that Aquinas 
accepts the truth of revelation a priori, and this results in the working of human 
reason being changed as a whole.  Thus, there is the possibility of the one system of 
thought inhabiting the other intrinsically, making use of its own innermost precepts, 
while changing their meaning as a whole, because the system as a whole is 
changed.  In the words of Eric Alliez:  
 
“[T]he genius of Thomas… [rests] largely upon his intuiting the resources of 
that finalist meta-physics in a crisis situation that was all the more dangerously 
threatening the unity of Christian thought for its being secretly borne along by 
the deployment of its transcendence.”431 
 
In conclusion, it must be re-emphasised that the whole excursion into the 
relationship of Aquinas to Aristotle had the sole purpose of providing historical 
support for the suggestion that theological transcendence in immanence can inhabit 
(or pervade) temporal transcendence in immanence after the fashion of 
transcendence in immanence. Even if the historical example of Aquinas’ 
appropriation of Aristotle is shown, by way of alternative interpretations, to be 
inconclusive, the notion of theological transcendence in immanence itself, as 
suggested in this study, has enough resources in itself to justify the attempt at 
inhabiting and incorporating the notion of temporal transcendence in immanence 
after the fashion of transcendence in immanence.  
 
Having argued for the methodological and historical plausibility of theological 
transcendence in immanence engaging with philosophical thought after the fashion 
of transcendence in immanence, the question now becomes one of how this 
approach would be effected in the conversation with temporal transcendence in 
immanence - that is, in the conversation with the legacy of Jacques Derrida.  In this 
regard, it should be borne in mind that the incorporation of Derridean deconstruction 
into a notion of theological transcendence in immanence after the fashion of 
transcendence in immanence would most probably involve a measure of reading 
Derrida against himself - in other words, against his own stated intention. 
                                            
431Alliez, Capital Times, p. 194. 
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5.4 Derrida’s impossible God 
 
The difference between a worldview informed by Aristotelian philosophy and a late 
modern or postmodern worldview is, of course, enormous.  Even though it may be 
described as a more immanent way of philosophising, Aristotelian philosophy 
nevertheless worked with a reality deriving from first principles and stretching out 
towards a final telos.  In contrast, the epistemological turn, as discussed in the 
second chapter of this study, seemingly foreclosed any naïve acceptance of a 
metaphysical reality, apart from what is disclosed to reason via experience.  And yet, 
as has repeatedly been argued in this study, the complete abolition of metaphysics is 
simply not possible.  In its interpretation of experience, reason inevitably accepts 
certain things as given.  The history of thought since the epistemological turn could 
be described as the history of a stringent and ever-increasing minimalism with regard 
to metaphysics.  Whereas Aquinas had a fleshed out metaphysics to work with in his 
project of relating the Christian faith to natural reason after the fashion of 
transcendence in immanence, any attempt to effect a similar relationship with 
postmodern philosophy will have to take into account this situation of metaphysical 
minimalism, if not the total rejection of metaphysics in the current intellectual climate.   
 
The only recourse open to an intellectual labour that does not accept an order of 
reality prior to the order of knowledge of that reality is to work with what appears in 
experience.  This is the logic underlying the whole of the phenomenological tradition.  
Phenomenology is the intellectual tradition of working with what appears “as such” in 
consciousness.  The concluding contention of this study, being specifically a 
conversation with Derrida, is that the phenomenological approach, as an approach of 
appearing and showing, could be investigated and followed in order to argue for the 
intelligibility of the possibility of God.  This is, of course, not an argument to prove the 
existence of God.  Rather, from the vantage point of a prior acceptance of finite 
creation’s radical contingency and dependence on God, phenomenology as an 
ordering of knowledge may be inhabited and limited, even as it is used to show the 
intelligibility of the possibility of God.  This is, then, the indication that this study 
would give with regard to the direction of the conversation with Jacques Derrida on 
the notion of transcendence in immanence. 
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The idea that the phenomenological tradition is part and parcel of the greater onto-
theological tradition of Western thought is a well-established argument within the 
work of Heidegger and Derrida.  What has, however, been suggested earlier in this 
chapter and which will now have to be elaborated on is that the deconstruction of 
phenomenology could be interpreted as itself presenting a certain theological point of 
view.  This is the argument made by Hugh Rayment-Pickard in his book, Impossible 
God – Derrida’s Theology.  Following Rayment-Pickard, the phenomenology of the 
impossible God, as it emerges in the work of Derrida, will now be traced, specifically 
with a view to using it as part of a gesture whereby theological transcendence in 
immanence inhabits temporal transcendence in immanence.  In the process, salient 
features of the earlier work of Husserl and Heidegger will once again be highlighted. 
 
Husserl’s phenomenology is based on the possibility of a fullness of appearing inside 
transcendental consciousness. The suspension of all questions regarding the 
existence of a world outside of transcendental consciousness opens up a world 
inside of transcendental consciousness where transcendental objects may be 
analysed according to the strict rules of logic.  In effecting an epochē of the outside 
world, Husserl attempted to cast phenomenology as a science that works with ideal 
truth.  Phenomenological truths are infinitely repeatable in transcendental 
experience, and successive experience may elaborate and build on prior experience 
as the history of our scientific knowledge of the world progresses.  What makes this 
fullness of appearance - the appearance of ideal truth - possible is the living 
presence that is the substrate of transcendental consciousness.  Both terms in the 
expression lebendige Gegenwart are important.  By saying that the presence 
underlying transcendental consciousness is a living presence, Husserl is establishing 
a binary opposition between life and death.  Life is privileged, death denied.  Life is 
what is proper to the realm opened up by the phenomenological epochē.  In the 
same way, the present is raised up above that which is not the present (the past or 
the future, absence in general.)  This putting forward of the living present as what 
safeguards the appearance of ideal truth is, according to Derrida, a fairly traditional 
theological gesture.  Even though Husserl would protest that the scientific method of 
phenomenology allows for a thorough critique of metaphysics, the emphasis on the 
living present and the ideal truth that it promises is the manifestation of theology 
subsequent to the epistemological (transcendental) turn at the beginning of 
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modernity.  According to Derrida, the living present, as a foundation of 
phenomenology, is effectively a version of “God.”432  Rayment-Pickard goes as far as 
to say that all Derrida’s writings on Husserl have the underlying purpose of revealing 
phenomenology as a theological pursuit.433 
 
Derrida’s deconstruction of Husserlian phenomenology entails a showing of the fact 
that the Lebendige Gegenwart underlying transcendental experience is neither fully 
alive nor fully present.  Derrida’s argument, well rehearsed by now, is that “life is 
characterized by that irreducible secondariness and contingency which has its 
archetype in writing and which is thematized in Derrida’s work under the title of 
death.”434  Deconstruction shows the impossibility of theology in its modern guise. 
 
The second important step in Rayment-Pickard’s analysis of deconstruction as 
theology is a reading of the work of Martin Heidegger.  As has been argued in 
previous chapters, both Heidegger and Derrida orient themselves, at least initially, in 
relation to the work of Husserl.  Whereas Derrida is influenced in important ways by 
his older contemporary, Heidegger, his own emphasis in the critique of Husserl 
nevertheless allows him also to develop a deconstruction of Heidegger’s brand of 
phenomenology.   
 
Heidegger is very much part of the phenomenological tradition, in that his thought 
remains a thought of “showing.”  What appears, however, should not be confined to 
what appears within the horizon of transcendental consciousness.  Such an 
approach would be part of a broader malaise within Western thought, namely that of 
Seinsvergessenheit.  The horizon of appearance should be conceived in a way that 
allows the question of being to be addressed.  How does being appear?  The early 
Heidegger seeks to approach this question by suggesting that Dasein is the horizon 
for the appearance of being.  The later Heidegger simply prefers language itself as 
the “house of being.”   
 
                                            
432Hugh Rayment-Pickard, Impossible God, p. 27. 
433Ibid. p. 26. 
434Ibid. p. 28. 
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According to Rayment-Pickard, Heidegger’s phenomenology may be understood as 
a phenomenology of privation, and it would be precisely this approach that Derrida 
develops into his own impossible phenomenology of “disappearance.”435  In a sense, 
all phenomenology is born of privation, as it entails the recognition of some kind of 
horizon, whereby what is behind the horizon is left out.  Yet, it is precisely this 
leaving out that allows the phenomena to appear at all.  Heidegger translates 
phenomenology onto an ontological plane, asking the question of being.  In his view, 
the pertinent epochē is that of disregarding everything that does not appear within 
the finitude of Dasein’s life.  This line of thought makes it clear why death is such an 
important theme in Heidegger’s work.  Whereas for Husserl it is the life of intentional 
consciousness which enables a determination of the transcendental ego (the horizon 
of experience), for Heidegger it is the death of self, or at least the anticipation of 
death, which makes his existential conception of the self possible.436 
 
Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein.437  The realisation that 
it is possible not to exist, the realisation that its existence is finite – a sein zumTode – 
awakens Dasein to authenticity.  In the face of the inevitability of its own death, 
Dasein is thrown back upon itself. The self of Dasein is an ecstatic self: in its 
gathering of itself it remains oriented towards the futurity of its own death.  Being-
towards-death is an orientation towards non-being as a possible alternative condition 
to being that precisely opens up the possibilities of authentic living.  What we find in 
Heidegger, therefore, is a phenomenology of finitude and temporality.  Only in its 
being-unto-death – the possibility of its own impossibility - can Dasein or language 
be a horizon for the appearance of being, an appearance that is simultaneously also 
a withdrawal.  Heidegger’s phenomenology is thus already a phenomenology of 
disappearance, an approach with which Derrida will associate himself.  In concluding 
his discussion of Heidegger’s phenomenology, Hugh Rayment-Pickard makes the 
following statement: 
 
“The phenomenological gesture in Husserl and Heidegger is structurally the 
same: both attempt to secure a foundation which is apodictically certain in the 
                                            
435Ibid. p. 69. 
436Ibid. p. 75. 
437Being and Time, p. 294.  
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sense that it cannot be ‘outstripped’.  This gesture yields what Heidegger calls 
the ‘phenomenological ground’ of Dasein.  Thus Heidegger, like Husserl, is 
concerned to open up a ‘ground’ for philosophy.  Husserl’s ground has been 
described by Derrida as the ‘living present’.  Heidegger’s ground is Being 
oriented towards its own oblivion.”438 
 
The point is that, according to Heidegger, there is still the possibility of an authentic 
appearing.  The phenomenological horizon is a horizon of possibility, profiled over 
against the possibility of impossibility.  According to Derrida, however, possibility is 
irrevocably contaminated by impossibility.  What appears, therefore, in Derrida’s 
phenomenology is the impossibility of possibility and the possibility of impossibility. 
 
Rayment-Pickard expounds his interpretation of Derrida’s phenomenology of the 
aporia against the background of Derrida’s relationship with Heidegger.  In this 
regard, a useful first step would be to consider the attitude with which Derrida reads 
Heidegger.  According to Rayment-Pickard, a marked change may be discerned in 
Derrida’s attitude towards Heidegger from Derrida’s earlier writings to his later 
work.439  In his earlier writings, Derrida was more ready to use Heidegger as a kind 
of stepping stone or foil for his own posturing with regard to the history of 
metaphysics.  Along with Heidegger, he characterised the history of Western 
metaphysics as a history of presence or logocentrism, but then implicated Heidegger 
as the last great exponent of this tradition, or, at least, someone balancing on the 
threshold of the new.  According to Rayment-Pickard, this attitude of Derrida’s may 
be termed prophetic - it is accompanied by a vision of a new post-metaphysical 
philosophy to come – Derrida’s own.440  By contrast, Derrida, in his later writings, 
notably Aporias and The Gift of Death, is much less willing to move beyond 
Heidegger, preferring to see himself as a fellow traveller caught up in the network of 
Heidegger’s paths.441  This would correspond to what Rayment-Pickard refers to as 
the move from prophecy to mysticism in Derrida’s work.  It is precisely this “mystical” 
element inside a phenomenology which is also a non-phenomenology that affords 
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439Ibid. p. 114. 
440Ibid. p. 115. 
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the possibility of appropriating the phenomenology of temporal transcendence in 
immanence into a broader structure of theological transcendence in immanence. 
 
How does one arrive at a characterisation of Derrida’s thought as a mystical 
phenomenology, which is at the same time also a non-phenomenology?  The move 
in the direction of a post-phenomenological phenomenology may be discerned in 
Derrida’s attempt to show, over against Heidegger, that there is a difference older 
than being.  Whereas for Heidegger the most fundamental difference is the ontico-
ontological difference, which is to say the difference between beings and being, 
Derrida points towards a more archaic difference.  A phenomenology based on 
finitude and temporality must involve an appearing which is at the same time a 
withdrawal.  In this regard, Heidegger was on the right track.  However, in using the 
language of authenticity and proximity, Heidegger was nevertheless clinging to 
metaphysical vestiges - at the end of the epoch of Seinsvergessenheit, the authentic 
being will once again appear – even in its withdrawal.  However, according to 
Derrida, there is no authentic clearing for being to appear - there is no 
uncontaminated horizon against which a phenomenon can be profiled.  In the words 
of Rayment-Pickard: 
 
“The point is that although things (beings) may appear within the phenomenal 
field, and do so precisely on the precondition of the ontological difference, the 
difference itself between a being and Being can never become a 
phenomenon.  This is because the phenomenality of presence is always 
undivided: such-and-such a being appears, but Being does not appear 
separately…  However at this point Heidegger and Derrida begin to part 
company.  For Heidegger the non-phenomenality of the ontico-ontological 
difference can be overcome when the traces which it leaves imprinted in 
language speak through the functioning of language itself.  For Derrida the 
non-phenomenality of difference is final, and language, far from rescuing the 
situation, only enmeshes phenomenality in an endless sequence of 
signs…”442. 
 
                                            
442Ibid. p. 95. 
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The difference between beings and being cannot constitute a horizon against which 
something can appear.  This is the impossibility of phenomenology.  All that there “is” 
is the trace – a manifestation which is not an authentic appearing, as it is inhabited 
by absence and lack.  The trace is simultaneously a presence and an absence.  The 
difference older than the difference between beings and being is the difference of 
différance: the becoming space of time, which is also the becoming time of space.  
“Différance is what makes possible the presentation of the being-present.”443  
However, most importantly, différance does not allow for anything to appear “as 
such”.  And as such it is the impossibility of phenomenology. 
 
If, up to now, Derrida’s own point of view gained profile in the deconstruction of 
Heidegger’s phenomenology, the question that arises is the following: could 
Derrida’s own position be formulated in positive terms?  This is probably where 
Derrida himself is at his most hesitant, and he will certainly never give an 
unparadoxical answer but, nevertheless, this is the direction in terms of which Hugh 
Rayment-Pickard reads him.  Showing the impossibility of phenomenology remains a 
kind of showing.  As such, it is a kind of phenomenology – even as a non-
phenomenology.  Therefore, the question now becomes the following: what appears 
“inside” the impossibility of phenomenology? 
 
According to Rayment-Pickard: 
 
“[i]t was not until the 1990’s – in The Gift of Death (1992) and Aporias (1993) 
– that Derrida sought to develop the theme of non-phenomenality through a 
consideration of Heidegger’s being-towards-death.  For Heidegger, of course, 
the reality of my death necessarily stands outside living consciousness and 
provides an exit from the sphere of Husserlian phenomenology.  For Derrida, 
being-towards-death is the topos for considering an aporetic phenomenality 
which is already present in Heidegger, but which requires further development 
and clarification.  The Gift of Death approaches the issue of being-towards-
death at the edge of a discussion of the possibility of a responsible ethical 
                                            
443Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, p. 6.  
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subject.  In Aporias Derrida tackles the issue much more directly by asking the 
very question of the phenomenality of being-towards-death.”444 
 
An aporia is that which cannot appear or be shown phenomenologically, but which  
is nevertheless there and simply has to be lived with. In Aporias, Derrida indicates 
this by discussing the impossibility of clearly showing “my death.”  While “my death” 
is what opens up the phenomenological horizon, it is at the same time impossible for 
it to appear within that horizon.  It functions as the irreducible other to any 
phenomenology.  What appears is irrevocably haunted or contaminated by an 
irreducible other - a “more.”  Another model of Derridean impossible phenomenology 
is to be found in the theme of the pure gift.  “The gift does not exist and does not 
present itself.  If it presents itself, it no longer presents itself.”445  Thus, what we see 
is the appearance of impossibility.  It is the impossibility of possibility, which is at the 
same time the possibility of impossibility.  In this hopelessly aporetic situation, in this 
fluid, unbounded zone of differences and deferred meaning, there is an 
(im)possibility beyond the merely possible.  Clarity and definition give way to the 
“more” of mysticism and mystery.   
 
In the words of Rayment-Pickard: 
 
“The possibility which opened up here is of God as ‘the effect of the trace … 
the movement of erasure of the trace in presence.’  The possibility of God is 
tied up with his death: God’s death is what makes God (im)possible.  Here 
Death remains permanently intersected with Life (conceived as God or full 
presence).  In a move that he repeats again and again, Derrida employs ‘God’ 
(later the gift, aporia, chiasmus, khora) in the attempt to describe the opening 
of language and difference.”446 
 
What appears in Derrida’s post-phenomenological phenomenology?  It is the 
impossibility of the possible (conceived in Heideggerian terms), which is also 
                                            
444Impossible God, p. 107. 
445Derrida, Given Time 1: Counterfeit Money, p. 15. 
446Impossible God, p. 117.  The quotation is from Writing and Difference, p. 108.   
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paradoxically the possibility of the impossible.  The least that can be said is that all 
phenomena are haunted by a mystery - there is more to them than what appears. 
 
It is the contention of this study that the trajectory sketched in the development from 
Husserl, through Heidegger, to Derrida - a path into an aporetic (non)-
phenomenology - provides a means of reading temporal transcendence in 
immanence in a way that enables it to be incorporated into a broader notion of 
theological transcendence in immanence.  To restate what has been repeated many 
times - this would not be to say that the internal logic of phenomenology will 
necessarily have to lead to the conclusion that “God” exists.  The point is merely that 
the development in phenomenology may be read in a way that argues for the 
intelligibility of the possibility of God – a possibility which is at the same time a 
phenomenological impossibility. 
 
The result of this development would then be that temporal transcendence in 
immanence is incorporated into a notion of theological transcendence in immanence.  
Why does a stringent phenomenological analysis lead to the conclusion of the 
impossibility of phenomenology?  This is because, from the perspective of 
theological transcendence in immanence, created finitude is radically dependent on 
divine infinite being as its transcendent cause and telos.  Created finitude partakes 
analogically in the divine infinite being, and can therefore never be pinned down 
univocally.  There is always more - there is the possibility of the celebration of 
difference and variety, a difference and a variety that nevertheless always manifest 
itself in harmonious, albeit non-quantifiable, intervals.   
 
It goes without saying that the suggested appropriation of temporal transcendence in 
immanence by theological transcendence in immanence, after the fashion of 
transcendence in immanence, flies in the face of the whole ethos of deconstruction, 
as envisaged by Derrida.  This point may be succinctly illustrated with reference to 
Derrida’s work on the structure and meaning of language.  From the introductory 
chapter of this study, it may be recalled why structuralism can be regarded as an 
offshoot of phenomenology: a structure is what appears within a network of 
signifiers, constituting a horizon, whereby a certain meaning is constituted.  
However, the deconstruction of structuralism entails a showing of the irrevocable 
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contamination of structure by force - meaning cannot be covered by structure in an 
exhaustive fashion.  There is a structural infinity to language - there is always more 
than can be structurally conceptualised.  The point is, however, that for Derrida, the 
structural infinity of language is a syntactic infinity.  The infinitisation lies in the 
unending addition of diacritical marks to the existing series.  No richer or rounder 
grasp of meaning is hereby achieved.  What is added is “non-sense, something 
which by right has no meaning, since it is itself the possibility of meaning.”447  Derrida 
is adamant that the structural infinity of language is not a semantic infinity - spacing 
is not an indication of the movement of a deeper, infinite meaning that inhabits every 
constellation.  Structural infinity and, extrapolating to phenomenology, the 
impossibility of possibility and the possibility of impossibility, is what happens on the 
surface. There is nothing more than spacing.  
 
The point is, therefore, that to argue – on the grounds of Derrida’s own thought – for 
the intelligibility of the possibility of an ontologically transcendent God who is 
nevertheless intimately, immanently present to his creation, is to read Derrida 
against himself.  However, this is, after all, precisely why theological transcendence 
in immanence is transcendent to temporal transcendence in immanence – which 
allows it to appropriate temporal transcendence in immanence after the fashion of 
transcendence in immanence. 
 
The preceding line of argumentation is furthermore open to misinterpretation on both 
of its flanks.  On the one hand, the interpretive trajectory from Husserl, through 
Heidegger, to Derrida, as suggested here, may be construed as an acceptance and 
even condoning of (post)modern philosophy in its phenomenological guise.  This, 
however, is not the case. To say that the impossibility of phenomenology, which is at 
the same time the possibility of impossibility, is a position which could be 
incorporated within a notion of theological transcendence in immanence is to make 
one more remark in the conversation between temporal transcendence in 
immanence and theological transcendence in immanence.  It should be understood 
against the background of the discussion with Derrida on the notion of 
transcendence in immanence.  While temporal transcendence in immanence would 
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seek to incorporate theological transcendence in immanence after the fashion of 
transcendence in immanence, thereby explaining it away, this chapter has advanced 
arguments in favour of the untenability of such a gesture.  On the other hand, the 
possibility of theological transcendence in immanence incorporating temporal 
transcendence in immanence after the fashion of transcendence in immanence was 
also investigated and found to be possible in terms of the interpretive line that leads 
to an (im)possible phenomenology.  Such a gesture would emulate, to some extent, 
the endeavour of Thomas Aquinas, whereby the latter used the precepts of 
Aristotelian philosophy to argue for the intelligibility of the Christian faith.  The 
conclusion of this study suggests that the aporetic impossibility of phenomenological 
possibility – which is at the same time the possibility of impossibility – that is 
indicated by Derrida could be regarded as leaving open the intelligibility of the 
possibility of God.  However, such a gesture should itself be understood against the 
background of a general critical posturing in relation to the philosophical 
developments of modernity and postmodernity.  Outside of the discussion with 
Derrida, there is no need to remain with the minimalistic metaphysics of 
(post)modernity, which works almost exclusively with the order of knowledge, at the 
expense of the order of being.  
 
On the other hand, to speak of the impossibility of phenomenological possibility 
could be construed as a theological position that denies philosophy any legitimacy 
whatsoever inside of theology. This would be the position tended to by Jean-Luc 
Marion.  According to Marion, God is indeed the impossible for man.  God, himself 
without being, gives being as a gratuitous gift.  From within the order of knowledge, it 
would seem, there is nothing that could be used to argue for the intelligibility of the 
Christian belief in God.  The only role of philosophy, in Marion’s view, would be to 
demonstrate this fact.  However, this, to restate what has been said at the beginning 
of this chapter, would be to leave theology and philosophy lying separatively 
transcendent to each other.  There is, however, an important difference between the 
impossibility of God, as presented in Marion’s thought, and the (im)possibility of God 
deriving from a possible reading of Derrida’s work and that – it has been suggested – 
may be inhabited by theology in the fashion of transcendence in immanence.  The 
point here is that from within the order of knowledge, albeit at the furthest extremes 
of the phenomenological project, transcendence in immanence is to be intimated.  
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Far from constituting some kind of natural theology or proof of God’s existence, this 
epistemological situation can be incorporated into a broader theological perspective 
that honours the precedence of the order of being - in other words, a theological 
perspective that faithfully accepts the presence of God as He reveals himself.  
Nevertheless, it does grant the order of knowledge a relatively independent 
existence - a relative immanence.  Reason does have a role to play, a role within the 
wonderful, mysterious relationship of transcendence in immanence. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
It would have become apparent that the present study sought to contribute to current 
academic research on three interrelated fronts. 
 
In the first place there is a contribution to the growing corpus of Derrida scholarship.  
In this regard the study sought to contribute to the understanding of the notions of 
space and time in Derrida’s work.  Special attention has been given to the meaning 
of space and time in Derrida, the genitive being understood in a subjective as well as 
objective sense.  On the one hand the role that space and time play in the 
phenomenological (de)construction of meaning has been investigated.  On the other 
hand the giving way of strictly phenomenological considerations in order for the 
ontological suggestions with regard to space and time (namely a thoroughgoing 
immanentism) to emerge, was followed.   
 
Secondly this study sought to develop the notion of transcendence in immanence.  It 
was suggested that the notion of transcendence in immanence may be used, on the 
one hand as a means of interpreting Derrida’s work, but more importantly as the 
basis for a critical conversation with Derrida.  This study proposes that the notion of 
transcendence in immanence, as distinguished into temporal and theological 
transcendence in immanence, may be a very useful instrument for, on the one hand 
understanding the empathy that a Christian theological position has with Derrida’s 
critique of modernity, while on the other hand allowing for a precise identification of 
the parting of ways with Derrida on the understanding of transcendence, 
immanence, space, time and change. 
 
The third contribution of this study is methodological in nature.  The notion of 
transcendence in immanence suggests a methodology that does not allow two 
positions or points of view to remain separatively transcendent to each other, but 
rather seeks to relate the positions after the fashion of transcendence in immanence.  
This does not necessarily entail a synthesis of two positions in dialectical tension into 
a higher unity.  A moment of transcendence remains.  The methodology of Derridean 
temporal transcendence in immanence was investigated with regard to its operation 
on the tradition of Christian theology, and subsequently found wanting.  Thereupon a 
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methodology of theological transcendence in immanence was suggested with regard 
to the way that Christian theology should relate itself to Derridean temporal 
transcendence in immanence.  An important contribution of the present study is that 
it suggests an alternative reading of Derrida to the existing Radical Orthodox 
reading, with which the present study nevertheless has much in common.  Authors 
from a broadly Radical Orthodox persuasion have tended to emphasise the nihilistic 
consequences of Derrida’s thought.  While the present study does not deny the 
nihilistic implications of deconstruction, and have rehearsed the criticism against it, it 
nevertheless tries not to leave the two points of view lying separatively transcendent 
to each other.  It is suggested that the notion of theological transcendence in 
immanence itself is resistant to such a stance.  If the immanence that created 
finitude is, is pervaded by the divine transcendence in whose being it shares, then 
the traces of transcendence within a thought of infinite finitude may be sought, even 
if that thought itself denies divine transcendence.  Accordingly the methodology of 
theological transcendence in immanence developed in the present study has sought 
to read Derrida somewhat against himself.  The phenomenology of (im)possibility 
that Derrida’s thought may be interpreted as presenting, has been analysed before.  
The contribution of the present study is that it uses that phenomenology in a reading 
of Derrida which shows how temporal transcendence in immanence can be inhabited 
and transcended by theological transcendence in immanence.  Such an approach, 
the present study argues, is truer to the notion of transcendence in immanence than 
a critique of Derridean thought that dismisses it out of hand. 
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